More on Genghis Khan

Genghis Khan is almost immortal and irreplaceable in the hearts and minds of Mongolians.

As early as in 1661, in a story told by historians, when the Manchu emperor Shunzhi died that year, the Mongols refused an official decree to mourn.

Summoned to Beijing to explain their “recalcitrance”, a group of Darkhats said they had been ordered to remain in mourning for one emperor only, Genghis Khan, all their lives. “If we were in double mourning we would make a serious mistake regarding the Sacred Lord’s brave soul … we would rather die obeying our late Emperor’s order than live violating it.”

“The Manchu officials knew when they were beaten, and granted the Mongols freedom to follow their own ways, pretty much unmolested, for the next 300 years.” (John Mann, Genghis Khan – Life, Death and Resurrection, Bantam Press 2004)

Even Genghis’ relics were contentious as recent as during the last century.

In the autumn of 1937, a representative of the Japanese Army based in Baotou in Inner Mongolia demanded that Genghis relics be handed over to the Japanese. The Japanese figured that whoever gained access to the relics “held the key to Mongolia” and that “whoever ruled Mongol lands had a fine base from which to secure the rest of China and Siberia.”

“Suddenly Genghis’ relics, Genghis’ very soul, had become the key to empire in Asia.”

However the Japanese were warned that if the relics were moved, there would be riots, and this reportedly compelled the Japanese to back off. But the incident also prompted the Mongols to approach the Chinese nationalist for help in moving the relics to a safe place. The KMT government agreed “to move everything by truck and camel to the mountains south of Lanzhou”. The area was chosen because it was safe, and not far from the Liupan mountains, where Genghis had reportedly spent his last summer.

So on 17 May 1939, 200 nationalist soldiers arrived unannounced at the Mausoleum, to the astonishment of the locals who blocked the way. A nationalist explained the need to protect the place against the “East Ocean devils.” Panic gave way to negotiations. The nationalists promised that all expenses would be paid and that some of the Darkhats could come along. But news spread and thousands spent the night in lantern-hit ceremonies, weeping and praying as the carts were loaded. At dawn, the train of vehicles moved off, with a brief pause when an old man prostrated himself in front of one of them.

One nationalist soldier reportedly muttered to another, “given such loyalty, no wonder Genghis Khan won wars.” Across “a sea of tears”, in the words of a journalist, the carts slowly pulled out.

“Because Genghis was, of course, a Chinese emperor and the whole Mausoleum a Chinese relic, both sides in what would soon be a vicious civil war united in competing to praise Genghis as a symbol of Chinese resistance to the invader, seeing him not as the founder of the Mongol nation and empire, but as the founder of the Yuan dynasty.”

“There was, therefore, a political subtext to this apparently altruistic gesture; the Mongols had better not forget that Genghis’ conquest were not conquests at all, but a little difficulty that led to the Chinese majority being ruled, for a short while, not by foreigners but by a Chinese minority; in brief, they had better remember that Mongolia was actually part of China.”

When Genghis’ relics arrived in Yenan, the Chinese Communists praised Genghis (Yuan Taizu) as “the world’s hero” and used him as a symbol calling on the Mongolian and the Chinese people “to unite and resist (Japanese aggression) to the end.”

As Mann mused, “this was how to deal with a barbarian conqueror: confer upon him a retrospective change of nationality and turn him into a symbol of Chinese culture, fortitude and unity.”

Mann added: “It was an astonishing display, given that this was the Chinese heartland, with few Mongols in evidence. Genghis had devastated the area. Yet ordinary people fell for his magic, because he had become a Chinese emperor, albeit posthumously; also, they were ancestor-worshippers, and Genghis was certainly a great ancestor, even if not theirs. So they knelt and kowtowed with joss sticks in their hands.”

Genghis Khan, Xi Xia Empire, and China

Mongolia has emerged as a new interest of mine. It does deserve a place in this China/Korea blog, given the influence that China/Korea have on Mongolia and vice-versa.

One of Mongolia’s most enduring legacies is most certainly Genghis Khan, an extraordinary character way ahead of his time. More than just a military conqueror and a war strategist, he was also the pioneer of modern management and globalization.

In his book, author John Mann noted that Genghis possessed the arrogance of someone who had been chosen to “unite, lead and conquer, who was justified in using every means to achieve Heaven’s purpose, and the humility of an ordinary man awed by the inexplicable nature of the assignment. It was this that lay at the heart of the paradoxical whirlwind of destructiveness and creativity, of ruthlessness and generosity, that constituted Genghis’ character.” (John Mann, Genghis Khan – Life, Death and Resurrection, Bantam Press 2004)

I was in China’s Ningxia province over a decade ago where I witnessed the ruins of the Xi Xia empire. As Mann noted, Xi Xia is hardly known to anyone beyond a few specialists because Genghis did his best “to wipe state, culture and people from the face of the earth. There is a case to be made that this was the first ever recorded example of attempted genocide.”

Xi Xia’s successor cultures, Mongol and Chinese, had no interest in saving its records, reading its script or preserving its relics. It took scholars of other countries, mainly Russia, to begin the work of decipherment and understanding.

It was only recently that the Chinese tried to gain leadership in this field, setting up a research institute, retrieving artifacts and restoring monuments.

“Only now is this ancient culture re-emerging into public gaze on the stage from which it was so violently ejected.”

The Chinese called the Xi Xia people Dangxiang (党项), while in Mongol they are known as Tangut.

As for Mongolian versus Chinese identity, let’s just say that history has made perfect delineation a somewhat difficult task.

As Mann noted, once upon a time, Mongolia and China were one, under the Mongols, who thereby became in effect Chinese. Since then, the Mongol empire has vanished and China “was also diminished in other ways.” Outer Mongolia – the Mongolian People’s Republic, as it became – “unfortunately slipped away from the family at a time of Chinese weakness in the early 20th century."

“But there are more Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, which is still part of China, than in Mongolia itself, which isn’t. So history’s underlying reality is best served by calling all Mongolians “Inner Mongolians” because to Chinese that’s where Mongolians come from. So therefore the troops that invaded Xi Xia in the 13th century were “Inner Mongolians”.

“There is one further dimension to this. The territory of Xi Xia overlaps present-day Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia, all very much part of China. If the Tanguts were with us today, they … would be Chinese – never mind that their language was related to Tibetan, that they established their own state by beating off the Chinese and that they were virtually extinguished or absorbed before the emergence of a united China. They were, after all, blotted out by a Chinese people, i.e. the Mongols. So their position is unequivocally part of the great family of China as it emerged after 1949. Thus, by the ruthless application of hindsight, it is possible to see an extended struggle for control of Inner Asia involving three separate nationalities as a minor spat among members of the same family.”

Perhaps the Chinese will not agree entirely, especially with Mann’s further assertion that it is “a strange distortion of history” for China to “impose Chinese-ness retrospectively on a unique non-Chinese people who were ruled by Tibetans ... before they carved out their own kingdom.”

Mann also asserted that if by being a successful conqueror, “Genghis become Chinese”, and if as a result all Mongols are seen as Chinese, then China has a claim on Mongolia, independent though it is at present.

China's Hui Minority

Currently reading a book purchased in China’s Ningxia province on the country’s Hui minority, who are invariably Muslims.

As author Wang Zhengwei noted, unlike the Hans, Miaos and Qiangs, ethnic Huis are not indigenous to China. Yet, unlike ethnic Koreans or Khazaks, they do not hail from foreign lands. Rather, the community was formed through “the great binding force of the Islamic culture” (伊斯兰文化的巨大凝聚力) where Muslims from different countries and speaking different languages were brought together in China’s ethnic melting pot.

Huis are hardly distinguishable from the Hans in terms of language and in their names. They have adopted Chinese last names and Chinese as their native language. But some last names are somewhat more unique to the Huis, such as Na, Su, La, Ha, Ma, Hai, Sai and Shan. (纳，速，拉，哈，马，海，赛，闪). The only outward distinguishable feature is the Muslim attire that some Huis still don.

Many Huis still observe several aspects of Muslim culture and tradition, such as burying the dead (as opposed to cremation) quickly (within 3 days), abstaining from wine, blood, animals that had died of unnatural causes, and “unclean” animals such as pigs, dogs, donkeys and other ferocious animals. They do not worship plants, animals, or idols, nor do they believe in demons and spirits. After 1949, male Huis have been prohibited from marrying more than one woman.

Given China’s vast changes, Wang noted that the Huis have also been swept up in the changes. Those who are religious are mainly those living in the countryside or in Hui-dominated areas, and among the old and illiterate. Rapid urbanization has meant that many Huis have not been able to pray 5 times a day, nor do they manage to find time to visit mosques or participate in religious activities. Some Huis also drink and smoke.

Wang argued that the Chinese Communist Party has shown “respect and sensitivity” toward Hui culture and tradition as early as in 1936 when the Red Army passed through Ningxia and Gansu provinces. A directive was reportedly issued making it clear that “no troops should be based in mosques, consumption of pork is prohibited, destroying of ethnic Hui scriptures is prohibited, cleanliness should be observed, Hui culture and customs must be respected, and using of Hui utensils is disallowed.” (禁止驻扎清真寺，禁止吃大荤，禁止毁坏回文经典，讲究清洁，尊重回民的风俗习惯，不准乱用回民的器具) (王正伟 回族民俗学 宁夏人民出版社 2008)

On Hui customs, Wang wrote that when a Hui woman is pregnant, she is not allowed to attend weddings or funerals, or consume rabbit as it is believed that doing so would lead to the birth of a child with cleft palate. When a child is born, the first person to step into the delivery room should be a male who is smart, honest and brave if it is a baby boy, and a female who is gentle, kind and hardworking if it is a baby girl. Usually, boys will be circumcised when they are between 5 to 9 years old.

Wang noted that historically the Huis had sometimes been “politically persecuted” during which their aversion to pork was ridiculed.

“为了区分回民与汉民, 以是否吃猪肉来检验, 以至引起更多回民的反抗与斗争.” (“To distinguish between Huis and Hans, the consumption of pork became a litmus test. This had resulted in even more struggles and battles among the Huis.”)

At different periods during the Ming to Qing dynasties, the Imperial Court attempted to stop Huis from intermarrying, using their family names, and from staying together as a united community. Huis were forced to marry Hans and settle down in Han-dominated areas.

The more the Huis were persecuted, the more they struggled to maintain their distinctive identity.

During Kuomintang’s rule over China, some newspapers reportedly published untruths such as saying that pictures of pigs were displayed in mosques, and that pigs are the forefathers of the Huis. These had naturally led to strong anger and consternation among the Huis on a nationwide basis.

One of the most famous Huis in Chinese history is most certainly admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) whose original name was Ma Sanbao. Wang wrote that Zheng’s family name was bestowed on him by the Emperor.

Chen Liangyu

A last entry from the book 中共政局全破译, 极目 编著, 新文化图书有限公司, 2007.

On disgraced former Shanghai leader Chen Liangyu (陈良宇, pictured center), the author described Chen as 作风霸道，生活糜烂, or “arrogant in manners, and decadent in lifestyle.”

During the period when Chen was detained for his misdemeanors, Chen imagined that he would only be given a light punishment by the Party. But when more evidence against him surfaced, he reportedly went on a hunger strike and cursed current Shanghai mayor Han Zheng (韩正) for having “sold out Shanghai”. But how Han had done so was not explained.

When Chen felt that his time was up (大势已去), he attempted three suicides. His son was reportedly deported to China and Chen tried to help his son obtain a lighter punishment, even though again, how his son was involved and how and whether a lighter punishment was obtained was not explained.

When Chen was handed over to the judiciary departments, he was said to have become “totally disillusioned” (彻底绝望), and loudly cursed Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong.

He claimed that if his son’s life cannot be protected (保不住), the lives of Jiang and Zeng’s sons will also be at stake. (休想保得了)

The author added that what Jiang and Zeng had done had made his supporters 泄气心寒 (demoralized and disappointed) and made them reconsider their loyalties to Jiang and Zeng.

On those who had stepped down after the 16th Communist Party Congress, the author had the following assessment.

Wu Guanzheng (吴官正) – “shown good performance during the five years and had emerged as an important pillar for Hu Jintao. The role he had played in the 16th Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) was secondary only to those played by Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong. The five years of success in tackling corruption is inextricably linked to him. He had accomplished a major act by attacking the “old nest” of the “Shanghai clique” and overturning Chen Liangyu and his cronies. As compared to Wei Jianxing (尉健行) under the 15th PSC, his performance was much more outstanding.”

Luo Gan (罗干) – “Even though he was Li Peng’s (李鹏) follower for over a decade, he was a person that all parties found acceptable. During the five years of the PSC, he firmly supported Hu Jintao and did massive work on political and legal reforms, especially in improving public order and reforming the judiciary.”

Zeng Peiyan (曾培炎) – “His position was obtained through Jiang. Before he was elected as vice-premier in 2003 he was involved in a car accident. During his 5 years as vice-premier, his performance was rather average” (似乎平淡). He is an expert in economics.

Huang Ju (黄菊) – “When he died before the 17th Party Congress, the following accolades were bestowed on him (优秀的党员, 杰出领导人, and 忠诚的共产主义战士 or “outstanding party member, outstanding leader, and a loyal warrior for communism”.). These accolades were inappropriate. In Shanghai, he assisted Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. And when he joined the State Council he seemed to be able to do only one thing – read from prepared text. Jiang pushed him (as well as Jia Qinglin) to the pinnacle of power. This was a major mistake (一大失误) which is against the Party and the people (有违党心民心). His wife, younger brother and secretary were all involved in corruption, and he could hardly escape the connections. The only thing is that he has passed away so there will be no further investigations.”

Zeng Qinghong

Chinese leader Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) is said to be able to assume full control of China due to the help of two leaders – Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红, pictured). The latter had often been portrayed as an extraordinarily astute character.

Even though Zeng was a protégé of former leader Jiang Zemin (江泽民), he made sure – after becoming a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSB) - that he worked with Hu, while avoiding any appearance of open assistance from Jiang, though he had reportedly secretly assisted the “Jiang clique”.

Soon after the new PSB line-up was announced after the 16th Party Congress, Zeng was pictured at the Xibaibo (西柏坡) Memorial with Hu. Xibaibo is a small village located in Pingshan County, Hebei province. From May 1948 to March 1949, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army set up their headquarters in the village. Since then, Xibaipo had been symbolically seen as one of the pivotal origins of New China. So when Zeng was pictured there with Hu, the rumor going round at that time was that “it is impossible for two tigers to live in the same mountain.”

But events have proven these rumors wrong as Zeng actively supported Hu. Through his leadership at the Central Party School, Zeng promoted and propagated Hu’s thinking. Zeng also reportedly made important contributions in the reform of the personnel system and inner-party democracy within the Party using his “superb intelligence.” (利用高智商为胡锦涛谋划)

“胡锦涛提拔那么多 ”团派”, 没有曾庆红的赞同是不可能的. 胡扳倒了那么多腐败高官, 直至拿下陈良宇, 都有曾庆红的支援. 海外媒体称, 扳倒陈良宇, 是胡曾连手干的.” (中共政局全破译, 极目 编著, 新文化图书有限公司, 2007.)

“Without Zeng’s approval, it is impossible for Hu to promote many within the “tuanpai” (literally “league faction”, which means cadres and government officials who originated from the Communist Youth League). Zeng’s support was also important in leading to the fall of several corrupted senior officials such as Chen Liangyu. The foreign media reported that the fall of Chen Liangyu was due to the joint effort of Hu and Zeng.”

Zeng was also described as “progressive” as he had visited Zhao Ziyang during the disgraced former Chinese Premier's final days.

“曾庆红在出席委内瑞拉期间赶上赵紫阳与世长辞, 他曾对记者发表看法, 肯定赵紫阳做过一些有益的贡献 (同时不得不说赵犯了”严重错误”). 二是参加纪念胡耀邦诞辰90周年座谈会, 会议由温家宝主持. 曾在会上发表热情洋溢的讲话,充分肯定胡耀邦, 表达了对胡耀邦的敬仰.”

“Zhao died when Zeng was in Venezuela. Zeng reportedly spoke to reporters and reaffirmed the useful contributions made by Zhao (even though he also added that Zhao had committed “serious errors”). He also attended the 90th anniversary seminar of Hu Yaobang’s birth which was chaired by Wen Jiabao. Zeng made a warm and exuberant speech and positively reaffirmed Hu Yaobang, and expressed his respect and admiration for Hu.”

曾庆红是靠江泽民上去的. 他为江泽民立下汗马功劳. 江泽民执掌中共的13年中, 经济, 社会和政治的稳定, 都有曾庆红的贡献. 曾庆红出生 “满门英烈” (毛泽东当年在井冈山对曾庆红的父亲曾山家庭的评语) 家庭, “根红苗壮”. 非常之人有非常之功. 曾庆红的劣势是身上罩着”上海帮” 的阴影 .“上海帮” 已经走向垂暮, 陈良宇的垮台更令它声名狼藉… 但”上海帮” 并非都是坏人 (“团派”也并非都是能人), 曾庆红是一个好人, 而且是一个开明的政治强人. 中共的颓势,令他心焦如焚. 但又苦无良策, 无力回天. 他看透了, 回家去了.

“Zhao owed his rise to power to Jiang, and had assisted Jiang tremendously. During the 13 years when Jiang was in power, Zeng made important contributions to economic, social and political stability. Zeng came from a revolutionary background (this accolade was bestowed by Mao Zedong in Jinggangshan on Zeng’s father Zeng Shan). Zeng is an extraordinary person with extraordinary deeds. Zeng’s disadvantage was his association with the “Shanghai clique” which was gasping for its last breath. The fall of Chen Liangyu made the clique even more disreputable. But not all within the “Shanghai clique” are bad guys (just as the “tuanpai” are not all competent men). Zeng is a good person and an open-minded political strongman. The decline of the CCP was extremely worrying to him but he could not think of a way to salvage the Party. He has seen through it and has decided to call it quits.”

曾庆红在中央干了18年, 铺佐两位总书记,够辛苦的. 凭他的智谋, 为党内外的协调出了大力. 支援胡锦涛的观点和工作有些建树. 激流勇退, 显示出落落大方. 因年龄退下, 对中共高层是个损失. 江泽民支援他退下, 令人费解.

“Zeng has worked in the Central government for 18 years and had assisted two secretary-generals. It was extremely hard work. With his intelligence and ability, he has made important contributions both within and outside the party, especially in supporting Hu. He has exemplified graciousness in stepping down citing his age, and this is a lost to the Party. It is puzzling as to why Jiang supported Zeng’s retirement.”

While the author gave high marks to Zeng, he also pointed to a “devious” side of Zeng during Hu's visit to Hong Kong in 2007 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China.

Over 1000 Falungong practitioners from Taiwan were barred from entering the territory and the author said this was instigated by Zeng to “apply pressure” on Hu. But how so? It was not explained in the book.

Another incident depicting the “devious” side of Zeng occurred the same year in August when Hu was in Russia to witness a military drill organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

During the visit, two Chinese scholars reportedly said that China wanted to dispose of its American bonds, a move which had supposedly angered Bush. Zeng had reportedly instructed the scholars to make the comments. Hmm.

Lee Myung-bak and Park Chung Hee

In a highly personalized book about the life of South Korean Lee Myung-bak (pictured), a group of Chinese authors (including possibly two ethnic Korean-Chinese) wrote that Lee’s real name was “Sang Gyong” (相京). But his mother convinced Lee’s father to change it to Myung-bak (明博), meaning “bright” and “broad” as she had a vivid dream about the moon when she was pregnant with Lee.

In tracing Lee’s life, the authors wrote somewhat extensively about Korea’s recent history and development, including how former President Park Chung Hee was mesmerized by the idea of expressways, seeing these super highways as a sign of a country’s progress. (韩国总统李明博，朴键一 焦艳 姬新龙 王晓玲 著，红旗出版社2008)

In 1964, a proposal by Park to build an expressway from Seoul to Busan was derided by everyone except Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung. Critics queried the need for having an expressway when the country “had hardly any cars.” Some even said that "the Taewongun (father of the last ruling Korean king) had already destroyed the country by building Gyongbokgung (palace), and Park was trying to perform a similar feat.”

It turned out that the expressway eventually played a contributory role in Korea’s development. Moreover, the good example and exemplary spirit and hard work set by Chung had “set a glorious example for the Korean business world, and even the ordinary people.” (郑周永在这个工程中表现出来的极大热情和坚韧精神也给整个韩国企业，甚至是普通民众树立了光辉榜样。)

Indeed, it was Park who had first mooted the idea in 1977 of relocating the country’s capital. Park’s concern then was to move the capital further away from the Demilitarized Zone, presumably away from any impending warfare between the two Koreas.

The authors also noted that over the past decade leading to the 2007 presidential election, Koreans, originally progressive, had turned conservative. Because even though progress had been made over the decade in eradicating corruption and improving welfare, economic development had become sluggish, unemployment had risen, and income gap had become more apparent.

Many accused the government of not providing a sound environment for the growth of Korean enterprises, adding that the aggressive trade unions pressing for higher pay had eroded the country’s competitiveness.

Lao She

The Lao She Memorial Museum in Beijing published a book about Lao She (老舍, pictured), a collection of the literary giant’s ruminations about his own life, some of which I found delightfully endearing. (老舍这一辈子,老舍纪念馆, 2006)

Lao She came from a poor family and was weak as a child; hence he did not enter school until he was nine. Prior to nine, he could not read a single word. He was reportedly taken to school, “much like an unrespectable puppy” (像一条不体面的小狗) by a wealthy relative.

Describing his time in England during his late 20s, Lao She mused that his English was so good that “I could speak it such that it doesn’t sound like English, neither does it sound like German” (我的英语就很好。我能把他说得不像英语，也不像德语。), adding that “I could artistically mix some English words into Chinese characters, like putting a chicken and rabbit in the same cage. The English made me bewildered with what they had said, but I can also speak to them such that they couldn’t stop blinking their eyes. They understood what they had said, and I understood what I had said. That’s more than adequate.” (我很艺术的把几个英国字均派在中国字里，如鸡兔之同笼。英国人把我说得一愣一愣的。我可也把他们说得直眨眼。他们说的他们明白。我说的我能明白，也就很过得去的。)

With the London subway, Lao She mused that “if I want to head to hell I will have no worries whatsoever.” (有了他，上地狱也不怕了) He noted that even “if the English hardly smiled and looked as if they were going to cry, deep down they are downright humorous.” (脸板得要哭似的，心中可是很幽默)

Lao She said he started writing at 7 in the morning but by 9 am “panting would become extremely exhausting.” (九点以后便连喘气也很费事了) “To be so engrossed in writing is a joy, even if what had been written is nothing to speak of. (能写入了迷是一种幸福，即使所写的一点也不高明。) Such self-deprecation. Love it.

The realities of working as a writer who had to support a family meant that materials intended for longer pieces of work had to be used for shorter pieces to generate an immediate income. This, according to Lao She was depressing as “what was intended for wholesale distribution had ended up as retail sale.” (由批发而改为零售是有点难过)

On fatherhood, Lao She was almost hilarious when he noted that “just when I thought I had come up with a line that would put Shakespeare to shame, the little one will pull at my elbow and whispered “shall we go to the park to look at the monkeys?”. This is why till this day I have not become Shakespeare.” (我刚想起一句好的，在脑中盘旋，自信足以愧死莎士比亚 。。小济拉拉我的肘，低声说“上公园看猴？”于是我至今还未成莎士比亚。)

“The worst was when the little fatty started teething. That was really unbeatable. Not only was he merciless in the day, he even worked the night shift … When he was teething, no one should think of getting any sleep. When his teeth were all out, everyone had turned into red-eyed tigers (through lack of sleep). (遇上小胖子出牙，那才真叫厉害，不但白天没有情理，夜里还得上夜班 。。他出牙，谁也不用打算睡。他的牙出利落了，大家全成了红眼虎。)

Lao She claimed that if he slept early, he slept like a log. “Even if someone carried me away I wouldn’t have known.” (有人把我搬了走我也不知道)

On the undeserved reputation of dogs in Chinese vocabulary, Lao She felt a sense of injustice, arguing that dogs are loyal, brave and faithful creatures, and wondered why traitors are called “running dogs” (走狗). He noted that cats are lazy and would leave their owners if no food were provided. So why shouldn’t traitors be called “running cats”(走猫)instead?

Mao Zedong's Daughters

A short account of why two of Mao Zedong’s (毛泽东) daughters Li Min (李敏, pictured left) and Li Ne (李讷) bore the family name “Li” instead of “Mao”.

There was even speculation that the two girls took Mao’s third wife Jiang Qing’s (江青) family name, whose maiden was Li Yunhe (李云鹤).

Incidentally, Li Ne is Jiang’s daughter, but Li Min’s mother was He Zhizhen (贺子珍), Mao’s second wife.

In a highly personalized book written by Wang Guiyi (王桂苡), a long-time friend of Li Min, part of the explanation was that in Li Min’s school records, her father’s name was listed as Li Desheng (李得胜). And Li Desheng was the name used by Mao during the war against the Kuomintang. Zhou Enlai on the other hand used the name Hu Bicheng. (胡必成) (毛泽东的女儿李敏，辽宁人民出版社, 1997)

During chaotic and turbulent periods, it is common for Chinese to adopt different names, partly to reflect their revolutionary zeal, and partly to avoid detection. But there was no explanation of why there was no desire on either side to restore their rightful names after the chaotic periods were over.

Malaysia and China Established Diplomatic Ties in 1974

Malaysia was the first ASEAN member to establish diplomatic ties with China in 1974.

The rapproche-ment between China and the United States was said to have made it possible for Malaysia to respond to China’s “diplomatic offensive.”

Malaysian leaders also believed that China would be committed to a policy of non-interference and co-existence if “it was allowed to play its legitimate role.” Malaysia sided with Albania in 1971 in admitting China to the United Nations, and this reportedly paved the way for establishing diplomatic ties between Malaysia and China.

Equally important was the personality factor.

“Unlike Tungku Abdul Rahman, the former prime minister who was considered rather pro-ethnic Chinese, Tun Razak had an image as the champion of the Malay interest. Therefore he could afford to move closer to the PRC without causing an uproar among the Malay population.” (Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

The visit of Tun Razak to China was also said to be timed to garner more Chinese votes during the 1974 Malaysian general election. Indeed, the National Front won a major victory that year, receiving not only the majority of the Malay vote but those of the ethnic Chinese as well.

Malaysian leaders were also concerned with the national status of the ethnic Chinese and viewed the establishment of diplomatic ties as a means to resolve the issue. At that time, China claimed that Chinese overseas were its nationals unless the country concerned had diplomatic ties and signed a dual nationality treaty.

China's Invasion of Vietnam

An account of why China invaded Vietnam in 1979 after the latter invaded Kampuchea.

According to Leo Suryadinata, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea partly because of Pol Pot’s refusal to have “special relationships” with Hanoi, and Kampuchea’s “continued hostility” towards Vietnam.

Vietnam calculated that China would not dare intervene as it had secured the backing of the Soviets. But this turned out to be a miscalculation as China saw the Vietnamese action as an open challenge. Many believed that Deng Xiaoping had secured the support, or at least the implicit endorsement, of the United States.

In a report to the Chinese Communist Party, Deng noted that the Soviet Union had been expanding, and Soviet-controlled Vietnam had not only controlled Laos but also invaded Kampuchea. The “hegemony” of Vietnam was seen as a threat to Southeast Asia and the southern borders of China.

Deng added that the “self-defence” war was also a “military exercise” for China’s army which had not been engaged in warfare for 30 years and had little combat experience. Deng said that the war would be “limited” and should be completed in a month “so that Vietnam could be taught a lesson and would no longer be arrogant.”

Deng argued that Vietnam would not be able to do much as the Soviets would not invade China as its troops, numbering 430,000 in the Sino-Mongolian border, “would be unable to penetrate China.”

“If the Soviets transferred their troops from the west, it would not serve their interests. Therefore the likelihood of the Soviets launching a large-scale attack on China was slim.” (Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

“The question of the overseas Chinese was never mentioned in the report. One can certainly argue that the expulsion of the ethnic Chinese by Hanoi was considered by Beijing as another arrogant and hostile act committed by Hanoi. But the overseas Chinese issue per se was not the major cause of the war.”

In invading Vietnam, China also intended to put across the message that Vietnam was “not undefeatable” and that the war would tie down some Vietnamese troops so that Pol Pot’s troops could survive.

Suryadinata noted that if the aim of the invasion was to remind Vietnam that China would not hesitate to use force to “punish” Vietnam, then Beijing had succeeded. But if it was to force Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea, then it had failed to achieve its objective.

However, it can be argued that because of China’s invasion, Vietnam would think twice before it moved beyond Kampuchea. The invasion was also a reminder to Beijing that it needed to modernize its army and equipment if it hoped to be more effective on the battlefield.

If the objective of Beijing was to tell Vietnam not to ill-treat the ethnic Chinese, it appeared to be unconvincing because the war only created racial antagonism between the ethnic Chinese and the Vietnamese. After the Sino-Vietnamese war, there was a large exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, and Vietnamese officials reportedly made money by sending “boat people” out to the seas.

From April to August 1979, China received more than 250,000 refugees from Vietnam. Beijing was unable to cope and had to appeal to the United Nations for help, “an unprecedented act in the history of New China.” In fact, before the start of the War, China stopped the flow of ethnic Chinese into China’s southern provinces as Beijing could not accommodate the refugees.

China, the Khmer Rouge and the Ethnic Chinese in Kampuchea

A 1970s example of how China’s overseas Chinese policy was dictated largely by political consi-derations.

Once in power in 1975, the Khmer Rouge tried to turn the country into a “primitive communist country” by forcing the population to move from urban to rural areas. Ethnic Chinese too were affected, many of whom were driven to the countryside to become farmers and their properties confiscated.

“Many were also assigned to exploit virgin lands. According to many reports, the working hours in the rural areas after the Khmer Rouge seized power were extraordinarily long. They started at four in the morning and ended at nine-thirty in the evening. There were breaks in between for meals. The cadres explained to the people that long working hours were intended to “build a socialist society in a shorter period of time.”(Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

To establish a socialist state, the Khmer Rouge decided to eliminate the “enemies of socialism” which included capitalists, intellectuals, professionals, school teachers and merchants. These “enemies” were ordered to dig their own holes and were buried alive. Among them were many ethnic Chinese.

The Khmer Rouge reportedly did not differentiate between the ethnic groups when they implemented the policy. But even so, Suryadinata noted that “Pol Pot’s policy was not without ethnic overtones.” The ethnic Chinese were prohibited from using their language and had to abandon their traditions. There were even reports of arranged marriages in which ethnic Chinese girls were forced to marry Khmer cadres and soldiers. Those who resisted were reportedly sent to labor camps.

The extreme hardship forced many ethnic Chinese to flee to either Thailand, Vietnam where they became “boat people”, and other countries.

The Pol Pot regime lasted three and a half years, and the population was alleged to have been reduced from 7 to 4 million.

The Kampuchean Chinese reportedly turned to the international community for help, including the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh. But the response from the embassy was that the matter had already been reported to Beijing and the reply was that “the problem should be solved slowly.”

“It appears that Beijing did not want to intervene in Kampuchean policy towards the ethnic Chinese because it feared that it would jeopardize Sino-Kampuchean relations – relations which Beijing was trying to cultivate,” Suryadinata noted.

Since Vietnam was moving closer to the Soviets at that time, China felt that it had to side with Kampuchea in the dispute between Phnom and Hanoi. Chinese experts were also sent in to help in the reconstruction of Kampuchea.

Even though the Committee on Rescuing Khmer’s Chinese which was established in December 1977 in Paris urged Beijing to intervene on behalf of the ethnic Chinese who were harassed and even persecuted, Beijing response to the Chinese was to be “patient.”

“One can maintain that Beijing was not able to do much because the Pol Pot regime applied a similar policy towards the whole population, therefore China could not protest. Nevertheless, a more plausible explanation was that Chinese needed the friendship of Kampuchea which had actively deterred Vietnam’s ambition in the region. It did not want to create friction with the Pol Pot regime over the issue.”

China’s concern with her security became even more apparent after Vietnam occupied Kampuchea. Beijing continued to support the Khmer Rouge in their resistance against the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime. Beijing even argued that Pol Pot had the support of the Kampuchean people, even as it admitted that the regime “committed mistakes.” But it refuted the argument that the Khmer Rouge had committed genocide.

China's National Security Prevailed Over Ideology

Am reading a rather dated book written by a former professor Leo Suryadinata (pictured) – China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension (Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

Suryadinata noted that when China’s national security and territorial integrity clashes with ideology, the former invariably prevailed.

One example was the Indo-Pakistan dispute where from the international communist standpoint “Beijing should have sided with India rather than Pakistan”. India at that time was not a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and tolerated the communist party, while Pakistan was a member of SEATO and banned communist activities.

But yet China sided with Pakistan because India has assisted Tibetan rebels who threatened China’s territorial integrity. Moreover, India had a border dispute with China and was on good terms with the Soviet Union – China’s then adversary.

“The Chinese leaders perceived the Russian threat to be real, and the cooperation between India and the Soviet Union persuaded the PRC to take the Pakistani side.”

Confessions of a North Korean Agent

In the days after former North Korean agent Kim Hyun Hee was arrested for blowing up a South Korean airliner, Kim expected extreme torture and punishment in order to get her to confess.

But instead, it was psychological warfare that broke down her defenses.

As Kim recounted, the South Korean agents were "true professionals" who treated her with "the utmost respect."

"They knew that doing so would bring quicker results than any physical violence or direct questions. By simply being forced to live among them, I, a fellow Korean, was slowly but inevitably breaking down." (The Tears of My Soul, William Morrow and Company, 1993).

These included telling Kim jokes in Korean to gauge her reaction, since Kim had earlier lied about her nationality, claiming she was Japanese.

It also included showing her around Seoul, where Kim was said to be impressed by "everyone's uninhibited manners, their animated expressions, their colorful clothes."

Even the sale assistants at the cosmetic counters amazed Kim as their courtesy was alien to her. In the North, shop assistants tended to be "rude and brusque, since there’s no much to be sold anyway."

And of course, the amount of food in the South came as sheer astonishment to Kim, who was also saddened that she could not bring her family to the South, especially when she recalled that her mother had considered herself lucky to come across a spoiled watermelon.

"I was struck by the simple, easygoing atmosphere of Seoul. The North seemed such a sterile place by comparison. There were fewer people, hardly any cars, and strangers never spoke to one another in the streets. There was a basic lack of humor in day-to-day life. Seoul by comparison seemed so vibrant and full of energy."

"But what struck me most were the roadside peddlers, whom I spotted at every stoplight. In the North I had been told that roadside peddlers were the lowliest people in the South. But the merchandize they were selling was anything but lowly – expensive watches, high quality tools, elegant clothes and shoes. Never could this have been possible in North Korea, where the price of a single watch could feed a family of five for seven months. The peddlers here looked as though they were earning a fortune from their sales. How could they be called poor?"

"At nightfall we drove up Namsan Mountain (pictured) so that I could see the lights of the city spread out below me. The sight was so beautiful, and I knew that I had fallen in love."

"Agreeing to drive out into Seoul had been my last mistake, and also my liberation. My captors must have anticipated the effect that it would have on me. I couldn't shake the feeling that the first 26 years of my life had been something of a sham."

"I felt a surge of hatred for Kim Il-Sung as I realized in one brief moment that all my work, plans and training, indeed my entire life, had been founded upon lies."

Despite the lies and betrayal, Kim concurred that it was not easy to overcome a lifetime of conditioning. She found herself defending the North Korean regime every time the agents castigated the North.

"I wanted to point out that North Koreans were real flesh and blood people. It seemed terrible that there was so much ignorance on both sides, and a national tragedy that people of the same heritage were so divided. We had the same language, the same customs, and the same common history, and yet we were at each other’s throats."

The last paragraph reflects my exact sentiments.

Religion and Sex in the DPRK

After former North Korean agent Kim Hyun Hee was arrested for blowing up a South Korean airliner in 1987, she was put in a room watched over by a female Muslim guard who prayed five times a day.

The guard would face southwest and prostrate herself toward Mecca, "a strange practice" to Kim at that time, "praying to a God that one couldn’t even see."

Kim recounted that North Koreans were taught from birth that religion is abhorrent, unnatural, and above all counter-revolutionary. They were told that religious practitioners were hypocrites, "and I would react in contempt whenever I heard someone use the word "faith"." (The Tears of My Soul, William Morrow and Company, 1993).

"I felt that it was far superior and more rational to look to the Great Leader (pictured) as our hero and inspiration, who was visible to us all the time. But I noticed the serene expression on the guard's face, the look of total piety, and I wondered whether North Koreans felt as reverent in front of Kim Il Sung's or Kim Jong-Il's portraits."

Kim added that under North Korean law, anyone who insults the Kim family "is punished by being bludgeoned to death with an iron bar."

As for sex, Kim remembered that from childhood, North Koreans were taught that sex was forbidden outside marriage. Even throughout college, men and women were separated. And once a couple was married, sex was permitted only for procreation, "since our socialism had little use for concepts such as romance. North Korea was a distinctly unsensual society."

But despite that, Kim said it was ironic that their superiors expected female agents "to be able to seduce men and manipulate them as a mission might require."

In the days after Kim was arrested for blowing up the airliner, questions were asked about Kim’s relationship with her older male companion Kim Seung Il who succeeded in killing himself after the two were found out.

Kim maintained that the older Kim was "the perfect gentleman", but "I was after all a mature young woman and I could see how other cultures might naturally suspect some romantic involvement between us."

At one interrogation, Kim was asked: "You stayed in the same room while travelling. I suppose nothing happened between you?"

"Of course not," I snapped. "He was like a father to me."

"Did you stay in rooms with a double bed or twin beds?"

"Twin."

"Where did you change your clothes?"

"In the bathroom."

"When you took a bath, did you lock the door?"

"Yes, dammit!"

"Have you seen Shinichi (Seung Il's Japanese name) naked?"

My jaw dropped. "What?"

"For example, did you ever notice the surgical scar on Shinichi's abdomen?"

"No, but I knew that he had had a stomach operation."

"Tell me," said Okubo, her eyes boring into me. "Have you had sex with other men besides Shinichi?"

I was so flabbergasted that I couldn't say anything. She took this as an admission of guilt and proceeded. "How many men have you had sex with?"

No response.

"Did you ever have an orgasm?"

No response.

"Did you ever seduce men as part of your job as a spy?"

No response.

"Was Shinichi the best lay you ever had?"

"Fuck you!" I shouted at her, in English. "He was an old man, for God's sake!"

"Ah!" Henderson piped in. "So you're saying that he tried but was unable to?"

I stared at him, my blood boiling. I groped for a response, but I was so enraged that I could only, between deep breaths, sputter something incoherent.

"Too bad," said Okubo. "I understand from the autopsy that he was rather well endowed."

That did it. I jumped across the table before anyone could react and dealt her a classic martial arts blow – a palm-heel strike to the nose. I heard the cartilage crack, and blood splattered everywhere.

Rationale For Blowing Up A South Korean Airliner in 1987

In her memoirs, Kim Hyun Hee recounted the rationale told to her by North Korea authorities on why she had to help blow up a South Korean airliner in 1987.

South Korea was said to be in considerable turmoil and the political climate was "more volatile than at any time since the War of Liberation." The constitution was also being revised, and elections were supposed to be held at the end of the year.

By destroying the plane, the North hoped to heighten the sense of chaos and hopefully prevent the Seoul Olympics (pictured) from being staged the following year.

"But that is just the beginning. If we succeed in preventing the Games from taking place, and if we succeed in worsening the political turmoil, there may well be the chance that our two Koreas could then be reunited. And that, as you know, is the great goal of our generation. If you comrades succeed in this mission, you will be nothing less than national heroes." (The Tears of My Soul, William Morrow and Company, 1993).

Even though flabbergasted, Kim admitted that "for a moment" she had not thought about the moral issues involved and the consequences of killing possibly hundreds of people. She saw the act as a "purely technical operation, a mere stepping stone toward the great goal of Korean reunification."

Best of all, Kim was promised that given the extreme secrecy and importance of the mission, this act of sabotage would be the last mission for her and her older male colleague Kim Seung Il. Apart from the concern that it would not be safe for them to continue working in the field of espionage any more, they would also have performed the highest possible service for their country. As heroes, they would have retired with every luxury the Party can provide. Kim (Hyun Hee) was also promised that she could return to her family.

Recalling her excitement at being able to reunite with her family, Kim recounted that at the time, she only had the "vaguest notion" as to how her mission would actually lead to Korean reunification.

"To this day I have a hard time understanding politics – I just took what he said at face value."

But the catch was, if the mission failed, the agents had to bite on liquid hydro-cyanic acid which was located in the filter of a cigarette. Once bitten, the cyanide will gasify and be absorbed into the bloodstream. Death is virtually instantaneous, so that the mission will be kept secret. "Remember that when you forfeit your physical lives, your political lives will continue for all eternity."

The elder Kim protested about the dangers of smuggling explosives in the midst of a war (Iran and Iraq were then at war), and argued that if things went wrong, it was not just a case of the agents getting into trouble, but "our whole nation will look ridiculous." But despite his protestations, the mission was nevertheless given the go-ahead.

The younger Kim said she was keen to complete the mission and return home, given how much she had missed her family, in particular her father.

"In many ways my father was an enigmatic man. I knew that he was proud of me and that as a Party official he was among the most privileged of North Koreans. But something told me that he resented the government dearly for taking me away. Love, unfortunately, was not part of Kim Jong Il's national agenda."

A North Korean Agent In Europe and China in the 1980s

Kim Hyun Hee (pictured after her arrest) was trained for several years as a North Korean spy before she blew up a South Korean plane in 1987.

Part of that training involved living in European countries and working with a much older colleague Kim Seung Il who passed off as either her father or adopted father when the two travelled together overseas.

In her memoirs, Kim recalled that in Copenhagen and Paris, she was repelled by the "abundance of pornography shops and the frequent appearance of prostitutes." In Switzerland, she was disgusted by "what seemed to be the flauntings of absurdly wealthy people – the mink coats, the Daimler limousines, the diamond earrings."

"But I had been raised for 22 years to believe that everything about the West was evil, so I was seeing this new world through well-programmed eyes," Kim wrote. (The Tears of My Soul, William Morrow and Company, 1993).

Yet Kim admitted that she could not remain unimpressed by Europe's beauty, where "Switzerland in particular was breathtaking. I fell in love with the Alps the moment I saw them, and our hotel on Lake Geneva seemed right out of a postcard."

Kim was also impressed by how chic women in Paris were, and was amazed that "middle-aged women dressed as daringly as 20 year olds."

"These pleasures were offset, however, when my purse was snatched by a motorcycle rider as I was crossing a street. Not to mention the incident when a Parisian cabbie cheated us by running up a hundred-dollar fare because of our ignorance."

The two Kims were given 10,000 thousand dollars to cover their expenses, "and it was expected that we would bring gifts back to North Korea for our departmental superiors as well as for our president."

This was said to be standard practice whereby field agents must "show their honor at being sent abroad."

"The gifts were unremarkable by western standards – they tended to be practical things like ballpoint pens and cigarette lighters, which were scarce in North Korea. Technically we were not allowed to spend any money on ourselves, except as needed to carry out our assignment, but Mr. Kim bought himself an expensive gold-plated watch anyway. Watches were a prized commodity in North Korea, and to own one was a mark of respect. Kim would later tell me that his family considered it to be the finest purchase he had ever made."

"I myself had a longing to buy a small mermaid statue in Geneva, but since the mermaid's torso was bare, I knew that I could never have brought it back to Pyongyang. Instead I bought a necklace with a gold cross hanging from the end. Its symbolism meant nothing to me, but Seung Il, though he said nothing, glared at me when he saw me wear it. Interestingly, though, I was commended for it by Chief Kwang upon my return. He considered it perfect as part of my disguise. I of course refrained from mentioning that I had bought it purely for pleasure."

"I must admit that some of my "professionalism" as an agent, if indeed I'd had any to begin with, sort of faded away in Switzerland. The landscape had a fairy-tale quality, and I did not want to leave."

Even then-Communist Hungary impressed Kim as food, clothing and luxury items were far more abundant than in North Korea. Kim remembered being awestruck by the variety of goods being sold.

As for China, Kim recalled that the Middle Kingdom was not as strange as she had earlier feared since it was a neighbor of North Korea and communist as well.

Yet she was "depressed" to discover that the Chinese lived better than the North Koreans.

"It seemed to me that North Korea was the poorest country on earth. In China the shops were at least fully stocked and the restaurants were cheap and well serviced."

DPRK in the 1960s and 70s

Kim Hyun Hee painted a revealing account of life in North Korea during the 1960s and 70s in her memoirs The Tears of My Soul (William Morrow and Company, 1993).

A daughter of a senior North Korean official, Kim remembered growing up privileged as her family lived in an apartment and "always had cooking oil in the house to be able to fry food."

"I would later learn that cooking oil was very common in the South, and that everyone could fry food," Kim wrote.

Growing up, Kim remembered how she was imbued with fearful anti-American sentiments and constantly warned of imminent attacks by "the Yankee Imperialists."

After the sinking of the USS Pueblo (pictured) in January 1968, Kim recalled that the atmosphere in Pyongyang became tense amid rumors of a possible outbreak of war with the United States. Families reportedly began to pack food and clothes and even prepared to evacuate the city.

During this period, two of Kim Il Sung's close advisers, Ho Bonghak and Kim Changbong were purged. This was followed by a government-issued order to remove their names from school textbooks.

"In typical Orwellian fashion we would in unison all blot out their names with black ink or carve them out with a penknife. They have become "unpeople.""

When Kim Il Sung ordered women not to wear pants in summer, children would reportedly patrol the streets and "carefully check the clothes of pedestrians."

"If anyone had forgotten to wear their Kim Il Sung pins on their jackets, we children would demand their names, and they would be reported immediately to their supervisors at work."

Children were also told that to defeat the "American imperialists", they had to gather scrap iron, bottles and other recyclable products that could be sold for foreign currency. Quotas were assigned and those who failed to do so were publicly admonished, while collecting the most scrap turned out to be "a great source of competition" among the children.

"We were also instructed to search … and collect the skins of rabbits and dogs, as well as (to this day I don’t recall why) maggots. Maggots were most commonly found in the dung heaps at the public outhouses, where the toilets did not flush, and again we competed intensely. As for the dung itself, we were also required to collect that! When great heaps had been accumulated, they were eventually shipped to farmers for use as fertilizers, and each person would be graded according to the quantity and quality of the dung collected. Later on, when rationing tickets were issued, those grades with which we had been rewarded were taken into account."

Speaking of grades, Kim recalled that in school, everyone’s grades were publicly displayed, and that there were four subjects in school – revolution, academics, labor and ethics.

Hmm, how much of Kim’s account still remains relevant today?

The Tears of My Soul

February has turned out to be an emotional reading month, what with Lung Yingtai's Big River Big Sea, and now with Kim Hyun Hee's The Tears of My Soul (William Morrow and Company, 1993).

Kim is (present tense coz she is still alive) of course the North Korea spy who blew up the Korean Airlines flight 858 in 1987, killing 115 passengers.

In the aftermath of the bombing, investigators found an idealistic young woman (she was 25 then) who had been transformed by her country into a killing machine.

As the jacket of the book indicated, Kim's story is "poignant, shocking and utterly compelling."

When Kim failed in her mission which she was told would help reunify her country, she tried to commit suicide by biting on a suicide capsule hidden in a cigarette but failed. She was put on trial and received the death sentence, but eventually received a presidential pardon.

During interrogations, Kim initially refused to cooperate let alone confess, but eventually her psychological defenses collapsed, especially after one of the investigators reportedly said:

"There were 115 people aboard that plane. Most were innocent workers, with no political connections whatsoever. They worked their asses off in that boiling hot desert to feed and clothe their families and to give an education to their children. They had been away from home for months and were returning with the money they had knocked themselves out to earn. We don't know why you did it, but you deserve to be struck by lightning for what you have done.

"I know that you didn't act alone and that you were probably put up to it against the price of your life, at least subtly. But damn it, you owe it to the families of those victims to confess so that we can act against those who were truly responsible for this crime. If we lose the essence of our humanity, what more are we than mere animals in the wild; mad, uncivilized beasts? You've just about lost your humanity, young woman. How can we be expected to treat you as a human being? Why should we?"

"Your government has little regard for human life, and I regret that you were one of their pawns. If you had done something noble, there might have been some honor due to you. But taking innocent lives is not honorable. It's evil and it's damned foolish. And you, not realizing just how foolish it was, are all the more foolish yourself … You can think of it like this: You can confess and give absolution of a sort to the families who have lost their loved ones. Or you can die with the blood of 115 lives on your hands, for a country that cares no more for your life than that of a fly. Not even God would want to save you then."

Powerful words those were.

Lung Yingtai's Great River Great Sea 1949 - Continuation

Japanese who argued that they too should be sympathized as war victims should heed the words from the mouths of babes.

Such as Andreas Walther the 19 year-old son of Lung Yingtai (pictured) who reportedly said:

如果你知道德国人给全世界带来多大的灾难，你哪里有权利去为这受虐的一百万德国人叫不公平？苏联死了两千万人怎们算啊？你知道两千万个尸体堆起来什么样子？(大江大海一九四九, "Great River Great Sea Untold Stories of 1949")

(If you know the extent of disaster that Germany had inflicted on the world, what right do you have to lament the injustice of the one million Germans who were tortured? Then what about the 20 million who died in the Soviet Union? Do you know how 20 million corpses look like when they are piled up together?)

Walther, incidentally, is of German-Chinese descent.

Walther's maternal grandfather Lung Huaisheng, who was an officer in the military police under Chiang Kaishek's Kuomintang government, fled with his family to Taiwan in 1949.

Lung Huaisheng often wept as he took out the shoe soles that his mother knitted and gave him when they saw each other for the last time at the train station.

Yet, Lung never understood – or even attempted to understand - her father's grief until five years after his death.

在父亲过世了五年之后，我才知道，他真的是从那血肉横飞的枪林弹雨中九死一生走出来的。他才十八岁，满脸惊惶，一身血污逃到长江边时，后面城里头，紧接着就发生了南京大屠杀 。。。

如今站在下关长江边上，长江逝水滚滚，我更明白了一件事；我们有缘跟这衡山龙家院的少年成为父子父女，那么多年的岁月里，他多少次啊，试着告诉我们他有一个看不见但是隐隐作痛的伤口，但是我们一次机会都没有给过他，彻底地，一次都没有给过。

As Lung wrote, 这世界上所有的暂别，如果碰到乱世，就是永别。

Lung Yingtai's Great River Great Sea 1949

Thanks to KK for lending me the latest book by Lung Yingtai, a book which I have been trying to get my hands on since October.

Titled 大江大海一九四九 (or "Great River Great Sea Untold Stories of 1949") it is a compilation of stories of those who had, or who had not, survived the bloody and protracted Chinese civil war.

The book detailed how lives had been irreversibly changed by the unforgiving tides of history, and contained heart-wrenching accounts of those who had left behind relatives, friends and hometowns to begin uncertain lives in alien lands.

I sighed at the mindlessness, futilities and ironies of war.

Such as the 89 year-old former soldier who was held by the Japanese as a prisoner of war. When Lung contacted Li Weixun, Li reportedly said "I now know why all my fellow soldiers had died and I, Li Weixun, had lived till today. I am waiting for this phone call."

Such as Lung's description of a site where over 3000 corpses were uncovered, and where their "mainly 17-year old" eyes were still open "like dried fishes staring blankly into the skies."

三千多具尸体，扔在护城河里。全是四十九军的国军，胸前绣着“铁汉”二字，是王铁汉的部队。因为冷，每个被挖出来的人，虽然面色铁青，但是眉目清楚，很多没有合眼，突出的眼睛对着淡漠的天空，像腌过的死鱼。这三千多具尸体，很多，大概也是十七岁。

Such as this former soldier’s account:

印象最深？他说，哪个印象不深？说是援军马上要到，要你坚守，然后你战到全连死光，援军还是没来，印象深不深？明知往东走是个口袋，全军会被围，被歼，结果最高指令下来，就是要你往东去，印象深不深？粮食断绝，弹药尽空，补给不来，连马的骨头都吃光了，然后空军来空投，稻草包着子弹，一包一千发，直接投下，每天砸死十几个自己的官兵，你说印象深不深？伤兵成千上万的倒在雪地里，没有任何掩护体，然后机关枪像突发暴雨一样叭嗒叭嗒射过来，血浆喷得满头满脸，糊住了你的眼睛，印象深不深？

This is possibly a book that will be etched in my mind for a long time to come. And to think that I do not even like war-related books. But Lung has always been an all-time favorite Chinese writer.

In the final chapter of the book, Lung wrote:

在蒙蒙的光阴隧道里，妻子仍在寻找丈夫，女儿仍在寻找父亲，兄弟仍在寻找兄弟。那被寻找的，是天地无情中一堆破碎的骸骨呢，还是茫茫人海中一个瘦弱的，失忆的老人？ .。。。

太多的债务，没有理清；太多的恩情，没有回报；太多的伤口，没有愈合；太多的亏欠，没有补偿 。。。太多，太多的不公平，六十年来，没有一声“对不起”。我不管你是哪一个战场，我不管你是谁的国家，我不管你对谁效忠，对谁背叛，我不管你是胜利者还是失败者，我不管你对正义或不正义怎么诠释，我可不可以说，所有被时代践踏，污辱，伤害的人，都是我的兄弟，我的姐妹？

I usually try to translate, but for powerful prose like the ones cited above, perhaps I should not attempt to.

China-Japan Relations

Kishore Mahbubani singled out for praise the example of how China had made peace with Japan, when taking the United States to task for not seizing the many opportu-nities available to improve ties with Iran.

Indeed, Kishore noted that the political differences within the China-Japan relationship are just as difficult and intractable as other relationships, and even more so, given that thirty-five million Chinese were killed in the Japanese occupation.

"Nevertheless, since China has a deep national interest in preserving good ties with all of its neighbors, it is prepared to accept Deng’s advice to “swallow bitter humiliation." (The New Asian Hemisphere, The Irresistible Shift Of Global Power To the East, Public Affairs, 2008)

The Chinese leadership also took a long term view “in a way that few western leaders seem capable of doing", and that, in Kishore's view, is especially remarkable given that few major nations have been "as painfully humiliated as China has been in the past two hundred years."

"If the Chinese wanted to focus on their previous wounds and humiliation, they would have plenty to work with. The decision not to do so reflects a very carefully thought-out strategy. Eventually, as China becomes strong and powerful, its neighbors will have to adapt to its rise and acknowledge China's power."

And when that time comes, or that time may even have arguably arrived, Kishore noted that China will not need to impose its views on others, yet others will eventually adjust, especially if China succeeds in its "single-minded goal of promoting economic development."

The "New" Former Chinese Leaders

A succinct and interesting summary of the "newer" Chinese leaders who had recently stepped down from power can be found in 中共政局全破译, 极目 编著, 新文化图书有限公司, 2007.

万里, 难得的政治家, 64时是支援学生的. 胡温能把万里搬出来, 64 平凡是迟早的.

Wan Li – an extraordinary politician who had supported students during the June 4th incident. It is a matter of time before the verdict of June 4th is reversed.

宋平, 胡锦涛的大恩人, 他的意见定会对胡有利. 可称开明者.

Song Ping (pictured, file photo, stepped down a longer time ago) – Hu Jintao’s greatest benefactor, his views are beneficial for Hu, and he is known as someone with an open mind.

乔石, 和胡耀邦, 赵紫阳齐名的开明政治家, 曾在64期间支援赵紫阳

Qiao Shi – An open-minded politician similar to Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and has supported Zhao during the June 4th incident.

朱熔基, 千古奇相, 有胆有识, 一位开拓者. 有失误, 但心地善良.

Zhu Rongji - an extraordinary person since time immemorial, possess courage and insight, an explorer, made mistakes but has a kind heart.

李瑞环, 敢与和江泽民唱反调的人, 开明政治家, 仗义执言的君子.

Li Ruihuan – someone who dares to oppose Jiang Zemin, an open-minded politician, and a righteous and upright gentleman.

尉建行, 正人君子, 一个两袖清风的人, 只是太软弱.

Wei Jianxing – an upright gentleman who is uncorrupted, but too weak.

李岚清, 有学者, 艺术家风度, 退下后以音乐为爱好.

Li Lanqing – has the demeanor of a scholar and artist, and has turned to music as a hobby after he stepped down from politics.

刘华清,军头之一, 江铁杆. 转而支持胡锦涛, 还算明智.

Liu Huaqing – one of the military leaders who had turned his support to Hu Jintao, certainly a sensible thing to do.

李鹏, 大白薯一个, 号称”李副科长”. 镇压64急先锋, 三峡祸患制造者.

Li Peng – a useless fool, also known as “deputy director Li”, a frontrunner in cracking down on June 4th participants, and the originator of the Three Gorges' tragedy.

江泽民, 大言不惭, 在17大主席团中排在胡后. 像个老太太, 老态龙钟. 搞乱党, 政, 军,酿成全面腐败的人. 法轮功人士的仇敌.

Jiang Zemin – shameless in some of the things he said, and was ranked behind Hu Jintao after the 17th party congress. Looks like an old woman, and moves at an incredibly slow pace. The person responsible for messing with party, politics and military, and pervasive corruption. Also the common enemy of Falun Gong practitioners.

On reversing the June 4th verdict, the author said that it is unlikely for Qiao Shi and Wan Li to raise any opinion as they do not want to re-look at this “problem which is a pain in their hearts.” (他们不想涉及这个心中痛的问题.) But the views from Zhu Rongji and Li Ruihuan are said to be important because both of them are likely to tell the truth. (他们两个会说真话).

As for Wei Jianxing, Li Lanqing and Liu Huaqing, they are not expected to take a stand. But both Li Peng and Jiang Zemin will have “many opinions” and they’d be more interested in thinking for themselves, but on the grand pretext of thinking for the party. (意见会很多, 他们只是为自己考虑, 为党考虑只是冠冕堂皇).

胡锦涛对李鹏的意见会表示尊重,不同意的,也会给他作些解释. 江泽民的”沟通”, 不是征求意见的问题, 而是讨价还价的问题, 本质上是一场较量. 江, 朱, 二李 (李鹏,李瑞环) 被称为 “新元老”, 此四人的意见举足轻重.

("Hu Jintao will respect Li Peng's opinions, but will explain to him in areas of disagreement. As for the "communication" with Jiang Zemin, it is not an issue of seeking Jiang's opinion, but a question of bargaining, because this is in essence a competition. Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and the two Li's – Li Peng and Li Ruihuan – are known as the new former leaders, and their views and opinions carry considerable weight.")

Zhou Qiang and Hu Chunhua

Some of the names thrown up as potential hopefuls for China's sixth generation leaders include Zhou Qiang and Hu Chunhua (pictured). (中共政局全破译, 极目 编著, 新文化图书有限公司, 2007)

这可能是个如日中天,不可限量的人物. 胡锦涛精心策划,培养李克强为接班人,又培养周强. 团中央书记, 个个是接班人. 周强可能成为中共第六代,第七代传人之一呢. 周强, 1960年4月生,湖北黄梅人, 毕业于西南政法大学,研究生学历.

(This is possibly the center of attraction and a person with immense potential. Hu Jintao who had earlier groomed Li Keqiang as a successor is now grooming Zhou as a successor to the sixth or seventh generation leadership. Zhou was born in April 1960 and holds a masters degree from Xinan Political and Legal University.)

北京大学学中文的…可能成为治党治国的专才呢 (后获中央党校研究生学历,学的是世界经济). 让常人想不到的是, 1983 年 8 月 在北大毕业后, 他就坏着一颗宏大的心, 自愿去西藏, 此后一直扎根世界屋脊, 长达23年. 内地去西藏的人都知道, 那时内地人很难生活的地方. 胡春华能坚持23年, 是作出了重大的牺牲的 (可能短寿几年).

(Hu studied Chinese in Peking University … and can possibly be a talent in running both the party and the country. He later acquired a masters degree from the Central Party School where he studied world economics. His voluntary decision to head to and work in Tibet came as a surprise to many. He lived on the roof of the world for 23 years. Those who have been to Tibet are aware that it is a harsh and difficult place to live in. But yet Hu managed to do so for 23 years. He has made incredible sacrifices (which also meant that he might have shortened his life span by a few years.)

在1989 年 64前的三月, 胡锦涛制止拉萨僧侣骚乱时,胡春华就曾任联络组组长,实为胡锦涛的秘书. 似乎胡春华对西藏情有独钟, 也是因为胡锦涛对他的信任所致. 他的前途不可限量.

("In March 1989, just prior to the June 4th incident, Hu was coordination leader when Hu Jintao tried to restrain the disturbances caused by monks in Lhasa. This meant that he was Hu’s secretary. Hu has a special affection for Tibet, and this seemed partly because of the trust that Hu Jintao has for him. His future is beyond estimation.”)

The Democratic Party of Japan

Can the rise to power of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) after half a century of uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) bring profound changes to Japan?

It depends, wrote Yoichi Funabashi, editor in chief of The Asahi Shimbun.

In an article titled Tokyo’s Trials Can the DPJ Change Japan (Foreign Affairs, November/December 2009), Funabashi recalled that the only time since World War II that Japan was not run by the LDP was during the maverick Morihiro Hosokawa’s (pictured) brief tenure as prime minister from late 1993 to early 1994.

"Hosokawa’s greatest mistake was rising to power by advocating political reform but then, once in office, following traditional policies for fear that voters were not ready for real change. In fact, the Japanese needed and wanted change then. And they do now. The DPJ must not repeat Hosokawa’s mistake. It must display strong and innovative leadership and provide a genuine alternative to the LDP's rule."

Since it was founded a decade ago, the DPJ has consistently criticized bureaucratic control of the state. It has even called for a Meiji Restoration in reverse, referring to the mid-19th century movement that destroyed shogunate feudalism through a top-down overhaul of the existing bureaucracy. The DPJ wants to bring about change through grassroots reform.

But as Funabashi pointed out, while the DPJ’s vision seemed to be more open, varied and accommodating to citizen participation than the LDP, its policy descriptions are "long on how to distribute income and short on how to generate it in the first place."

And despite a general consensus within the DPJ, the party's heavyweights hold diverging views on important issues such as Article 9 of the Constitution. And meanwhile, the party's views are said to be becoming more similar to the LDP's. Issues such as support for farmers and for child rearing highlight the similarities between the two parties.