China's Invasion of Vietnam

An account of why China invaded Vietnam in 1979 after the latter invaded Kampuchea.

According to Leo Suryadinata, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea partly because of Pol Pot’s refusal to have “special relationships” with Hanoi, and Kampuchea’s “continued hostility” towards Vietnam.

Vietnam calculated that China would not dare intervene as it had secured the backing of the Soviets. But this turned out to be a miscalculation as China saw the Vietnamese action as an open challenge. Many believed that Deng Xiaoping had secured the support, or at least the implicit endorsement, of the United States.

In a report to the Chinese Communist Party, Deng noted that the Soviet Union had been expanding, and Soviet-controlled Vietnam had not only controlled Laos but also invaded Kampuchea. The “hegemony” of Vietnam was seen as a threat to Southeast Asia and the southern borders of China.

Deng added that the “self-defence” war was also a “military exercise” for China’s army which had not been engaged in warfare for 30 years and had little combat experience. Deng said that the war would be “limited” and should be completed in a month “so that Vietnam could be taught a lesson and would no longer be arrogant.”

Deng argued that Vietnam would not be able to do much as the Soviets would not invade China as its troops, numbering 430,000 in the Sino-Mongolian border, “would be unable to penetrate China.”

“If the Soviets transferred their troops from the west, it would not serve their interests. Therefore the likelihood of the Soviets launching a large-scale attack on China was slim.” (Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

“The question of the overseas Chinese was never mentioned in the report. One can certainly argue that the expulsion of the ethnic Chinese by Hanoi was considered by Beijing as another arrogant and hostile act committed by Hanoi. But the overseas Chinese issue per se was not the major cause of the war.”

In invading Vietnam, China also intended to put across the message that Vietnam was “not undefeatable” and that the war would tie down some Vietnamese troops so that Pol Pot’s troops could survive.

Suryadinata noted that if the aim of the invasion was to remind Vietnam that China would not hesitate to use force to “punish” Vietnam, then Beijing had succeeded. But if it was to force Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea, then it had failed to achieve its objective.

However, it can be argued that because of China’s invasion, Vietnam would think twice before it moved beyond Kampuchea. The invasion was also a reminder to Beijing that it needed to modernize its army and equipment if it hoped to be more effective on the battlefield.

If the objective of Beijing was to tell Vietnam not to ill-treat the ethnic Chinese, it appeared to be unconvincing because the war only created racial antagonism between the ethnic Chinese and the Vietnamese. After the Sino-Vietnamese war, there was a large exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, and Vietnamese officials reportedly made money by sending “boat people” out to the seas.

From April to August 1979, China received more than 250,000 refugees from Vietnam. Beijing was unable to cope and had to appeal to the United Nations for help, “an unprecedented act in the history of New China.” In fact, before the start of the War, China stopped the flow of ethnic Chinese into China’s southern provinces as Beijing could not accommodate the refugees.