China, the Khmer Rouge and the Ethnic Chinese in Kampuchea

A 1970s example of how China’s overseas Chinese policy was dictated largely by political consi-derations.

Once in power in 1975, the Khmer Rouge tried to turn the country into a “primitive communist country” by forcing the population to move from urban to rural areas. Ethnic Chinese too were affected, many of whom were driven to the countryside to become farmers and their properties confiscated.

“Many were also assigned to exploit virgin lands. According to many reports, the working hours in the rural areas after the Khmer Rouge seized power were extraordinarily long. They started at four in the morning and ended at nine-thirty in the evening. There were breaks in between for meals. The cadres explained to the people that long working hours were intended to “build a socialist society in a shorter period of time.”(Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

To establish a socialist state, the Khmer Rouge decided to eliminate the “enemies of socialism” which included capitalists, intellectuals, professionals, school teachers and merchants. These “enemies” were ordered to dig their own holes and were buried alive. Among them were many ethnic Chinese.

The Khmer Rouge reportedly did not differentiate between the ethnic groups when they implemented the policy. But even so, Suryadinata noted that “Pol Pot’s policy was not without ethnic overtones.” The ethnic Chinese were prohibited from using their language and had to abandon their traditions. There were even reports of arranged marriages in which ethnic Chinese girls were forced to marry Khmer cadres and soldiers. Those who resisted were reportedly sent to labor camps.

The extreme hardship forced many ethnic Chinese to flee to either Thailand, Vietnam where they became “boat people”, and other countries.

The Pol Pot regime lasted three and a half years, and the population was alleged to have been reduced from 7 to 4 million.

The Kampuchean Chinese reportedly turned to the international community for help, including the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh. But the response from the embassy was that the matter had already been reported to Beijing and the reply was that “the problem should be solved slowly.”

“It appears that Beijing did not want to intervene in Kampuchean policy towards the ethnic Chinese because it feared that it would jeopardize Sino-Kampuchean relations – relations which Beijing was trying to cultivate,” Suryadinata noted.

Since Vietnam was moving closer to the Soviets at that time, China felt that it had to side with Kampuchea in the dispute between Phnom and Hanoi. Chinese experts were also sent in to help in the reconstruction of Kampuchea.

Even though the Committee on Rescuing Khmer’s Chinese which was established in December 1977 in Paris urged Beijing to intervene on behalf of the ethnic Chinese who were harassed and even persecuted, Beijing response to the Chinese was to be “patient.”

“One can maintain that Beijing was not able to do much because the Pol Pot regime applied a similar policy towards the whole population, therefore China could not protest. Nevertheless, a more plausible explanation was that Chinese needed the friendship of Kampuchea which had actively deterred Vietnam’s ambition in the region. It did not want to create friction with the Pol Pot regime over the issue.”

China’s concern with her security became even more apparent after Vietnam occupied Kampuchea. Beijing continued to support the Khmer Rouge in their resistance against the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime. Beijing even argued that Pol Pot had the support of the Kampuchean people, even as it admitted that the regime “committed mistakes.” But it refuted the argument that the Khmer Rouge had committed genocide.