Korean Confucianism versus Shamanism

While Korean women were often seen as inferior to men given the Yi Dynasty's emphasis on neo-Confucianism, two categories of women stood out as notable exceptions - the professional shaman (mudang) and the professional entertainer (kisaeng).

As Martina Deuchler noted, "although treated with contempt, these women rendered indispensable professional services."

Indeed, early documents hinted of their importance in the preceding Koryo dynasty where shamans not only received official recognition, but were also called upon to pray for rain in times of drought.

But the shamans' most valued function was in the art of healing and in exorcising evil spirits. Hence, it came as little surprise that shamans were feared for their power to communicate with the spirits, and Yi Dynasty officials were said to have viewed shamans as dangerous manipulators "who subjected the rational human world to the irrational."

To neutralize the shamans' influence, Yi Dynasty officials relegated them to base status and banned them from cities. But despite that, Shamanism survived 500 years of Confucian suppression - "vivid testimony to its inherent strength in Korea's religious tradition."

As Deuchler noted: "The paucity of references to shamanism in literary sources does not signify a Confucian victory over indigenous "superstition". The shaman's lore was transmitted orally from generation to generation."

Confucianism and the Low Status of Korean Women

Those who had taken pains to remind me that Korean men are chauvinistic and Korean households male-dominated would be happy to know that their views have been validated by Korean studies expert Martina Deuchler.

Okay, maybe not.

But Deuchler did point out in the preface of Korean Women View From the Inner Room that Confucianism had the effect of ensuring that men were "the structurally relevant members of society" and that women were relegated to "social dependence".

But this subservience of women had not always been the case as women were, during the Koryo period (918 - 1392), largely in command of their own lives.

Deuchler wrote: "Residence patterns, inheritance rules, and social and ritual recognition provided women with a firm and independent standing in Koryo society. In fact, the high status of Koryo women indicates that Korean society during that period was structurally quite different from the society that developed later on during the Yi dynasty. The introduction of Confucianism brought about a decisive change."

"Indeed, Confucianism subordinated women to men, assigned them to stereotypic social categories - chaste woman, devoted wife, dedicated mother - and confined them spatially in the inner rooms of the house."

But despite the pervasive onslaught of Confucianism, not all social groups adhered to the doctrine to the same extent, and it is possible that Confucianism never, according to Deuchler "managed to put its roots as deeply into Korean soil as scholars have heretofore assumed".

After all, only upper class families could afford separate living quarters for men and women, and allowed their women folk to ride in sedan chairs when they go on with female servants, mainly at nights, and away from the prying eyes of men.

As Deuchler noted: "Perhaps even more important, living on the periphery of Confucian consciousness, the lower classes were only mildly indoctrinated, and they preserved older social patterns."

But how pervasive were these "older social patterns"? I get the sense that in a rigidly hierarchical society like Yi Dynasty Korea, even those living "on the periphery" aspired to move up the social ladder, or at the very least mimic upper class behavior.

Volatile Korean Sentiments Towards Japan

Korean volatile sentiments toward the Japanese may be understandable, given Japan's colonization of the Korean Peninsula, and more so in an event as momentous as the 1973 kidnapping of opposition figure Kim Dae Jung on Japanese soil. But surely it was hard pressed for Tokyo to deal with such volatility, and being caught in a damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don't situation?

On the one hand, pro-government forces in Korea condemned Japan for investigating into Kim's kidnap, arguing that the move was an intrusion into Korean sovereignty. But while it is perhaps understandable for insecure and undemocratic regimes to blow the do-not-interfere-into-my-domestic-affair horn, what was unique in this case was Seoul's constant reference to Tokyo's wartime aggressions.

As a pro-government legislator loudly and self-righteously berated: "Historically, Japan has used its officials and power to carry out all sorts of imperialist acts in China, Manchuria, and Korea, as in the murder of Korea's Queen Min in 1895 and the holding of Prince Yong Chin as a hostage during the Japanese invasion of Korea. Given this past record, no Japanese has any right to publish inflammatory articles or reports about us, even if our own public agencies did have some role in the Kim case."

But yet on the other hand, many Koreans felt that Japan should investigate into Kim's kidnap or risk being seen as a willing accomplice of the Park Chung Hee regime.

As one Korean put it: "Let the Japanese be forewarned of the Korean people's condemnation if they can do no better than calculate their own benefit regardless of what happens. Our fervent wish is that the Japanese will be neither so easily excited, nor so callously indifferent, over the Kim Dae Jung affair."

Some observers at that time even predicted that if the Japanese government was seen as an accomplice of the Seoul government, a massive anti-Japanese movement might even have erupted.

In the face of such delicate volatility, not to mention predicament, what can Japan do, or not do?

Pulsating Heartbeat of the Korean People

In the aftermath of the kidnapping of then opposition figure Kim Dae Jung in the 1970s, a surprising editorial written by Sunwoo Hui appeared in Chosun Ilbo.

Surprising because it was reportedly written past midnight after the government censors had gone home, and that Hui's perogative as editor allowed him to change the editorial at the last minute.

Urging the authorities to proper explain the government's role in the kidnapping of Kim, the editorial ended with this passionate, yet lyrical call:

"At this crucial juncture, our deepest desire is for a high-minded and resolute decision from the highest levels of our nation's statesmen and officials. Today the mountains and rivers bequeathed to us by our ancestors are shaded by rich, green growth; staple grains ripen in the fields; a bird's song rises in the sky; a calf's bleat drifts leisurely over the meadows. Wagons wind across the hills and dales, and the villages are bursting with human activity. Soon the people will make cakes from the new rice to offer to their ancestors' spirits. These people - whence comes the chilling fear that dampens their spirits? These innocent and law-abiding people - why must their hearts be troubled? O God! Send down thy forgiveness and blessing upon us!"

But clearly, Hui's guerilla-like tactic could only be used once, and the government censors, not to mention the Korean CIA (KCIA) would ensure that such surprises do not occur again.

Park Chung Hee Predicting his own Downfall?

Could it be possible that former South Korean President Park Chung Hee had a knack for prophesizing his own demise?

During the 1969 general referendum on his third presidential term, Park reportedly asserted that "only when I die will I vacate this [presidential] seat."

How ironic that Park's prediction turned out to be true, for he was assassinated in office in 1979 by his intelligence chief Kim Jae Kyu.

South Korean Curfews in the 1970s

The more I read Letters From South Korea, the more I feel as if I am reading the ranting and ravings of anti-government dissidents. But then I suppose this is to be expected, given the mood of the times and the nature of those very letters.

For instance, when discussing about the midnight curfews, an excerpt suggested that such night-to-dawn curfews allowed the government to "freely commit injustices while the people are not on the streets."

The excerpt added: "Order is maintained to protect the bandit, which is really frightening when the bandit is your own government. Illegal manipulations of the elections, for example, are largely done during curfew times when the people are confined to their homes. When the people are wholly powerless and the government almighty, then all 24 hours of each day are like a curfew."

Xu Jiatun's Early Assessment of Lee Teng-hui

Xu Jiatun (许家屯) was China's representative in Hong Kong in the late 1980s but escaped to the United States in 1990, reportedly due to differences of opinion with Deng Xiaoping (邓小平)over the 1989 Tiananmen (天安门) incident.

But apparently as early as 1989, Xu sent an assessment to Beijing that a shift in the balance of power was occurring in Taiwan from mainlanders to Taiwanese. Apart from predicting that the island's separatist trend would grow, Xu also concluded that the probability of peaceful reunification would decline and the chance of a military solution would grow.

According to Richard C. Bush, what is most interesting about Xu's assessment of Lee Teng-hui (李登辉) as a separatist was "that he based it on Lee's ethnicity, not on his views. That is, Lee must have been in favor of some degree of independence simply because he was Taiwanese."

On hindsight, it appeared that Xu was progressive and insightful. Unlike some modern mandarins in Beijing who continued to be in a state of denial till this very day, he saw and acknowledged way back in the late 1980s a trend that was becoming increasingly obvious, undeniable, and most importantly, irreversible.

KCIA During the 1970s

The Korean CIA (KCIA) was a force to be reckoned with during the Park Chung Hee era, and it seemed that nothing was too small for their interference.

For instance in 1973 a professor "demonstrated that Korean instant noodles were made of such low-grade ingredients that a laboratory rabbit, fed them continuously, died." But as these results were about to be made public, the KCIA intervened to squelch them.

And unsurprisingly, the KCIA also maintained closed surveillance on then opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, but again unsurprisingly, denied that it had done so.

In an excerpt from Letters From South Korea, a Korean noted that "any claim that the KCIA has not maintained surveillance of an important figure like Kim Dae Jung can only make any Korean wonder if there are no limits to brazen dishonesty."

The excerpt added: "We all know very well that the intelligence network at home extends to even the least significant person. To be asked to swallow another of the government's shameless lies makes us choke on our own fury."

Chinese Ethnocentrism

During the 2004 Olympics, Renmin Ribao (人民日报), the Chinese Communist Party newspaper, suggested that although Chinese were at a genetic disadvantage vis-a-vis black athletes when it came to track and field, they were suited to sports that required agility and technique, such as gymnastics.

This, according to Richard C. Bush, was one of several indications that Chinese ethnocentrism remained strong.

But I think as far as the Chinese were concerned, it was just calling a spade a spade, politically-incorrect as such straight-talking might be.

The Arrest of a Korean Pastor During Martial Law

In one of my earlier entries, I mentioned that Christianity had played a pivotal role in Korea's anti-Japanese resistance movement.

But it is also apparent that the religion had also played a not insignificant role in (South) Korea's battle against authoritarianism, particularly during the Park Chung Hee era which lasted from 1961 to 1979.

In an account from Letters from South Korea, Reverend Eun Myong Ki of Nammun Church in Chunju city in Chulla Bukdo province was said to have been arrested in 1973 for several "misdemeanors".

These include leading a team to oversee the counting of ballots after Park Chung Hee narrowly defeated Kim Dae Jung, instigating a public meeting, regularly maintaining an anti-government posture, and opposing government restrictions on the freedom of the people.

Reverend Eun was also described as particularly outspoken in his opposition to the declaration of martial law and further constitutional revisions that aimed to entrench Park's arbitrary powers.

When he reportedly noted that "the Emergency Martial Law is for the permanent extension of the present regime masquerading behind the name of unification", authorities accused him of "spreading rumors".

As a result of Reverend Eun's arrest, the number of worshippers were said to have increased substantially.

Maneuvering Prior to the 1995 Cross Strait Crisis

Much has been said and written about China's "sabre-rattling" prior to the 1995 Presidential elections in Taiwan. But much less has been noted about the internal dynamics of Beijing leading up to the said "rattling".

According to Richard C. Bush in his book Untying the Knot Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, then Chinese leader Jiang Zemin (江泽民) was criticized by his colleagues for allowing Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui (李登辉) to visit the United States.

In particular, two of Jiang's civilian political rivals - Qiao Shi (乔石) and Li Ruihuan (李瑞环) - were said to have used the Taiwan crisis to put Jiang on the defensive.

As Bush noted: "What is less clear is whether there was a split between the military and the rest of the leadership on how to respond to the Lee visit. One school of thought ... concludes that military leaders, along with some civilians, had opposed civilian policies for some time and used events like the Lee visit to impose their views on Jiang, constraining his options and forcing a tougher policy that employed military training exercises as tools for intimidation."

But others dismissed the idea of a deep division over Taiwan. Rather, they see a consultative policy process in which the leadership altered its policy consensus in order to respond to changing circumstances, and that both civilian and military leaders agreed that a tough response to Lee's visit was required.

Letters From South Korea

Just picked up the book Letters From South Korea by T.K.* published in 1976, and my achievement thus far was reading the back of the book jacket.

Based on that little write-up, and even though I do not agree with the overall castigation of the Park Chung Hee regime, I found the following descriptions rather stirring.

"Here is recorded the anguish and joy, the desperation and the courage, the suffering, the martyrdom of T.K.'s people in their heroic and deeply moving struggle against the churning wheels of Park's police state machinery.

"One cannot fully appreciate the heavy chains on South Korea until one hears the cries from prisoners and their families which emanate from these pages. Equally important, though, is to appreciate the creativity, the constant daring, and occasional wit with which T.K. and his friends circumvent and subvert the otherwise suffocating blanket of authoritarianism. This book is the witness."

Sounds promising enough for me to read beyond the book jacket!

* A pseudonym

Mao Running a Factory in Afterlife?

China's phenomenal economic growth had certainly resulted in massive upheavals, as Tim Harford had rightly pointed out in his book The Undercover Economist.

But what was revealing was when he pointed out that among the confused, unemployed and dislocated Chinese, "a group of workers in Sichuan (四川) came to believe that Mao was running a factory in afterlife - according to socialist principles, naturally. One account claims that some of them killed themselves with the aim of joining him."

Though interesting, I would really like to know the exact source for this refreshing bit of information.

Separately, Harford made a fairly common mistake in his book when he referred to Hong Kong as a "country" when he noted that "over half of all investment into China in 1990 came from the tiny country of Hong Kong."

Before Hong Kong was reverted to Chinese rule, it was generally referred to as a colony, and after its reversion, a special administrative region. Depending on the context, describing Hong Kong or Taiwan as a country usually invites a swift rebuke from China.

And even though I have no intention of nitpicking, there is something seriously wrong with the way Harford spelt the name "Zhou Shien Pin". Harford was clearly referring to a mainland Chinese name, and all such names are spelt using hanyu pinyin (汉语拼音). But in hanyu pinyin, "Shien" clearly does not exist, though it might exist in Taiwanese or Southeast Asian Chinese names.

Taiwan and Nazi Germany

The polemics in Taiwan can sometimes be a source of comic relief, such as the brawls and fist-fights in the legislative chamber.

But it can also be a source for concern, such as when supporters of the Taiwan administration accuse opposition politicians who travel to China "of conspiring with the enemy to weaken the Chen government's program" and compare them to "European leaders who collaborated with Nazi Germany in the 1930s."

As a scholar put it, in the current climate of deep division about how to cope with China, each side suspects the other's motives and each group believes the other to be traitors.

Shanghai's Changing Skyline

In his concluding chapter, Tim Harford in his book The Undercover Economist expressed amazement at how the city of Shanghai had transformed in the decade since he had last visited.

He noted: "In just a decade, the builders of Shanghai had put up a fair imitation of Manhattan. What New Yorkers would have made of it, I don't know. It made us Londoners feel like country bumpkins."

In his description of the several prominent buildings dotting the skyline of China's most metropolitan city, Harford noted that "not every design was in the best of taste: one had a domed penthouse that looked like it had been stolen from the set of a fifties flying-saucer movie." I wonder which building he was referring to.

Anyway, I can certainly relate to Harford's amazement at how fast Shanghai had changed. I remember that Pudong Shangri-La was once the tallest building in Pudong (浦东) as recently as in 1999. But by 2004, it had already been overshadowed by other taller and more prominent-looking skyscrapers that I had trouble locating it when I crossed over to Pudong from Puxi (浦西).

Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao

Tony Saich had given a nice contrast between former and current Chinese Premiers Zhu Rongji (朱镕基) and Wen Jiabao (温家宝).

On his appointment as Chinese Premier, Zhu was said to have announced a dazzling array of policy priorities for reform, ranging from cutting the bureaucracy to revamping the grain system, and restructuring social welfare.

As Saich noted: "With energy dissipated across so many policy areas, it was impossible for him to keep on top of all of them, and with a recalcitrant bureaucracy and considerable vested interests digging in, his most ambitious schemes have been diverted."

Consequently, Zhu had to pull back and set his sights on one or two main priorities, and "to try to keep the momentum moving forward while making grand statements about the remaining objectives."

In contrast, Wen announced no grand strategies, and had made it clear that he would continue to restructure state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and bad policy loans, while paying more attention to the rural sector.

Personally, I am of the view that while Zhu might be indeed be more "colorful" than Wen, his successor's quiet determination and steady, incremental approach might eventually win the day.

Japanese Dogs Versus Chinese Pigs

The Nationalists were described as "pigs" by Taiwanese when the former relocated to Taiwan in the aftermath of the Chinese civil war.

That was because they had brought about inflation, unemployment, food and housing shortages, as well as the deterioration of public health. The new rulers also claimed that Japanese colonialism had weakened Taiwan's roots in Chinese culture, and that strong action was necessary to restore them and to free the islanders from their "slavery".

These moves, unsurprisingly, led to resentment on the part of Taiwanese, who summed up the situation by nothing that "the dogs (the Japanese) had left, but the pigs (mainland Chinese) had come."

As Richard C. Bush commented, "dogs, since they did protect property, were ranked more highly."

Really? Some Chinese would beg to differ as almost every part of the pig's body could be turned into a delicacy, but not that of a dog's.

Surely Bush had heard of stir-fried pig's intestines, pig's liver cooked with sliced ginger, as well as braised pig's trotters, among countless other pig-related dishes/delicacies?

Tax Collection in China

Relations between the local and central authorities in China have evolved over the centuries, but when it comes to tax collection, it seems that a new model had evolved since 1994.

That year, Beijing decided that, for the first time in China's history, the country should establish separate systems for collecting local and national taxes. Prior to that, all taxes were collected by local authorities, who in turn passed a portion of their collection to the central government. But the system also invariably created problems of leakage and misreporting at all levels.

After 1994, Beijing established a two-tier tax collection system - a state system specifically dedicated to collecting taxes for the Center, and a separate system in each province that collected taxes that could be used solely within the province.

To bring about these changes, Beijing first negotiated with the provinces in late 1993 and promised to phase in the adjustments in a way that would not take any current income away from the provinces.

As Lieberthal wrote: "As a result of these reforms ... the Center's revenue intake has significantly increased, but local government expenditures have also grown as the Center has remitted substantial funds back to lower levels."

This new system, Lieberthal concluded, not only gave the Center a surer fiscal base and a larger role in determining where public funds are allocated throughout the country, it also allowed provinces considerable flexibility on how to spend tax revenues in their own locales. By 2001, fiscal revenues were 90 per cent greater than in 1997 and 120 per cent greater than in 1996.

But clearly, these figures would have been much higher if not for widespread tax evasion as well as corruption.

Why Taiwan's Economy is Not Hollowing Out

If you fear that the Taiwanese economy is hollowing out due to the massive relocation of its industries to mainland China, fear not.

According to T. J. Cheng in an article "China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and Superconductivity", the purported "hollowing out" of Taiwan's economy proved to be a false alarm.

Why? Because outward FDI had contributed to industrial upgrading rather than decline, and had also brought Taiwan a high level of foreign exchange earnings. Furthermore, most medium and large firms active in outward investments have also continued to invest and expand their production in Taiwan.

And while it is indeed true that most companies which had relocated to mainland China had either reduced or terminated their production in Taiwan, their overseas operations did lead them to procure intermediate and capital goods from big firms in Taiwan.

As Cheng concluded: "Although the share of the manufacturing sector in Taiwan's GDP decreased and the share of the service sector increased, these developments were entirely expected. All matured economies in the West have gone through such structural changes."

Korea and Christianity

Korea and Christianity (edited by Chai-Shin Yu, Korean Scholar Press, 1996) is a collection of articles about the development of Christianity in South Korea.

Such as the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in 1890. By resorting to intimidation and gangster-like behavior, the Catholics appeared unreasonable, spiteful and thuggish. They sounded like trouble-makers and gave Catholicism a deservedly bad name, especially those who felt that they did not have to obey the laws of the land, since their loyalty was first and foremost to the church. This gave the impression that Catholics were working against the interest of the nation.

The Catholics had also often appeared arrogant. For instance, in the midst of a governmental investigation, a Catholic priest told his believers that he would ask his country (France) to send a warship to Korea and take them to France. The apex of arrogance! In comparison, Protestants appeared more astute by trying to make friends with government officials, and by largely avoiding politics.

But overall, Catholic priests seemed to have a disproportionate influence and power over the civil and criminal justice system of the area that they live in. This was reportedly one of the reasons why many had converted to Catholicism, since Catholic priests were able to protect the interests of the ordinary people, and induced fear among local officials.

Then there were also the mutual criticisms between Catholics and Protestants. Among other things, the Protestants accused Catholics of falsifying the bible, and of not being truthful to the bible's doctrine. Even though there were also similar criticisms by Catholics against Protestants, overall, I felt that the Protestants' case seemed a tad more convincing.

In the discussion about the creation of an indigenous Korean Christianity, apart from the example cited of having hymns sung to traditional Korean melodies and lyrics, I am still unsure what an "indigenous Korean Christianity" entails, both in terms of doctrine and substance.

Overall, the book managed to shed light on the complexities of the development of Christianity, as well as the role of the religion in Korea.

Certainly, Christianity played an important role since the end of the Chosun dynasty, particularly its role in the anti-Japanese resistance movement. The religion had also played a pivotal role in the spread of hangul (the Korean alphabet) and most importantly, the formation of a (mainly South) Korean national identity.

Especially thoughtful, I thought, was the following assertion by one of the writers:

"The development in Korea is the only one in modern missionary history worldwide in which the church acted without advancing the cause of colonialism and imperialism."

Perhaps, just for that, Christianity should be celebrated in Korea?

Health Care System in Singapore

In his book titled The Undercover Economist*, Tim Harford cited the case of Singapore when detailing the state, and ways of fixing the U.S. health care system.

Unless I am gravely mistaken, Harford's central argument about health care is that medical goods and services are among the most difficult to distribute, and that a failed market system is the defining feature of the U.S. health care system. More specifically, as Harford argued, "it's the lack of information that is most serious."

But in the case of Singapore's health care system, Harford noted that the system has been successful for almost two decades and that the typical Singaporean lives to the age of 80.

"The cost of the system (both public and private) is a thousand dollars per person - less than the cost of the bureaucracy alone in the United States. Each year the typical Singaporean pays about seven hundred dollars privately (the average American pays twenty-five hundred dollars privately) and the government spends three hundred dollars per person (five times less than the British government and seven times less than the American government)."

Harford then went on to say that the reason why Singapore's success is uncommon is "probably that policy debates get stuck with one side claiming that we should rely on the market, and the other side asserting that the government would do a better job. So, government or market?"

Harford also pointed out that Singapore's government had the power to tackle the problem head on "by using forced saving and catastrophe insurance to make sure costs were manageable but keeping the power of patient choice at the heart of the system."

All I can say is - these all sounded rather vague and murky to me.

Maybe what Harford is trying to say is that while it is good for governments to occasionally intervene, it is not possible in most instances since Singapore is an aberration? And that while governments can indeed replace markets, it is much better for them to try and fix the market?

* Exposing why the rich are rich, the poor are poor - and why you can never buy a decent used car! (As seen on the front cover of the book)

Pyongyang A Journey in North Korea

Recently I have degenerated. I have been reading comics, particularly one that was drawn/written by a French-Canadian cartoonist who spent some time in Pyongyang.

I found some of Guy Delisle's accounts nostalgic as they gelled with my own experience in North Korea. It seems that the experiences of the typical foreigner in North Korea are fairly similar, with many being subjected to similar routines and itineraries in a city that had been described as a "phantom city in a hermit kingdom". Of course, United Nations and World Food Program staff have different itineraries, and perhaps get to visit different places and see somewhat different things within the country.

Even though I visited the International Friendship Exhibition Hall, I had no idea that the highway which began in Seoul was deliberately built to end at the Hall. Neither did I know that the Hall was dug into the side of a mountain to withstand a nuclear attack. I also did not know that at least half of those residing in Pyongyang served as informants at one time or another.

Referring to Chinese guests in Pyongyang hotels, the cartoonist noted that "you don't have to be a psychic to know they're Chinese. The leave the door open, watch television in their underwear, and yell to each other from room to room until late into the night."

Another funny account was when the author noted that the hotel he stayed in had light bulbs not exceeding 40 watts. He mused that he was going blind but thought that perhaps reading George Orwell's 1984 "might be worth it."

But I guess it is less funny, or plain sobering, when the author wrote that North Koreans "live in a state of constant paradox where truth is anything but constant".

Taishang in China

The growing business linkages between China and Taiwan are certainly apparent, as are the increasing numbers of Taiwanese businessmen who had made their presence felt on the mainland, especially within Shanghai and its surrounding areas.

These growing linkages had in turn raised a related concern that Beijing could use the growing interdependence as a form of leverage for political blackmail and coercion.

But not so, according to T. J. Cheng in an article titled "China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and Superconductivity."

According to Cheng, there is no reason to assume that having business interests in China "ipso facto" makes Taishang (Taiwanese business people) an active pro-unification force.

"Moreover, even those Taishang who feel particularly at home in China realize that they can gain most when the governments across the Strait are divided and in competition for their loyalty."

Cheng also argued that given the choice between Beijing and Taipei, Taishang are more inclined to give their loyalty to the latter.

The Wang-Koo Talks

It seems that if I am reading about Taiwan, Richard C Bush's name would inevitably crop up which I guess is unsurprising, given that Bush previously served as chairman of the board and managing director of the American Institute in Taiwan.

Anyway, in an article titled "Lee Teng-hui and Separatism", Bush noted that the then opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) raised questions about the direction of cross-strait relations.

"In the spring of 1993, for example, it criticized the government for the lack of transparency surrounding the Koo-Wang talks that were to be held in Singapore at the end of April. This challenge forced the government to limit the agenda of the talks to functional and technical issues."

Exile is the Nursery of Nationality

In an account, Steven Phillips noted that the oft-quoted observation of the famous 19th century historian Lord Acton that "exile is the nursery of nationality" fits perfectly with Taiwan's experience. (Steven Phillips, "Building a Taiwanese Republic: The Independence Movement, 1945- Present, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker's Dangerous Straits The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis)

Actually it also fits in perfectly well with Korea's experience.

China's Population

We all know that China is the world's most populous nation.

Indeed, China's population of nearly 1.3 billion people is greater than the combined populations of the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and the fifteen countries that formerly made up the Soviet Union.

In an account by Kenneth Lieberthal, China adds the equivalent of the population of Australia to its demographic base every 21 months, and it adds a population nearly equal to Taiwan's every two years.

Wowee.