Japanese Treatment of Koreans in the 1920s and 30s

The resentment that Koreans have for the Japanese seems to go beyond the colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Perhaps it also extends to the treatment of Koreans in Japan?

According to Apichai Shipper, Koreans started working in Japanese factories, mines and construction sites during the 1920s and 1930s, and most of them came from the depressed rural areas of southern Korea.

"Japanese people saw them as tough, rough, wild, unwashed, and ignorant of Japanese language and culture. Officials from both the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted in their reports that Koreans were "lazy" and "used their extra money for gambling and sake. One report attributed the increase in the crime rate to the "bad habits and vices" of the Koreans, claiming Koreans to be "very wild and deeply emotional; and as a result, they like to argue and fight," Shipper wrote. (Apichai W. Shipper, Criminals or Victims? The Politics of Illegal Foreigners in Japan, Journal of Japanese Studies 31:2 2005)

Some officials even worried that certain Koreans were harboring ill will toward Japan and its citizens. These officials spread rumors about Koreans in Japan following the Great Kanto Earthquake on 1 September 1923, claiming that Koreans were setting fires, looting, and poisoning wells in a planned attack on the Japanese.

The Tokyo police made matters worse by authorizing a radio broadcast that warned Japanese against Koreans, who "were burning houses, killing people, and stealing money and property."

On September 3, 1923, the Home Ministry sent a telegram to all subordinate government units in Japan stating that Koreans had started fires and carried bombs as part of a Korean plot against the Japanese during the confusion following the earthquake.

The Ministry also instructed local authorities to take strong measures to prevent Korean subversion in their areas. It organized vigilante corps, comprising both army reservists and civilian volunteers, to search the streets for Koreans. At least 2,000 Koreans died at the hands of these vigilantes.

Shipper added: "It turned out that the rumors were false, and the government, particularly the Home Ministry, knew this. Here, government officials were indirectly responsible for these violent acts of hatred by Japanese citizens against innocent Koreans."

Yet another piece of evidence to explain why there is so much bad blood between the two countries.

KMT Forces Once Operated Out of Burma

After the Chinese civil war, about 12 thousand Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers found refuge across the border in Burma, where they were beyond the reach of the shaky, post-independence Burmese government.

Apparently, these soldiers continued to fight the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as guerrillas, and grew further in strength by recruiting local bandit groups. They also made repeated forays into China's Yunnan (云南) Province, killing CCP cadres and clashing with Chinese military forces. Unsurprisingly, these guerrillas were supported by both Taiwan and the United States.

According to Denny Roy, the Burmese government knew that the U.S. was involved and hence appealed to Washington to remove the guerrillas from Burmese territory. But the initial U.S. response was that "it had no influence over KMT remnants in Burma."

But after Burma appealed to the United Nations for help in 1953, the new Eisenhower administration began pressuring Taipei to withdraw these soldiers to Taiwan.

Was this the same Lin Haiyin?

A certain Lin Haiyin was mentioned in Yvonne Chang's book, and was described as the chief editor of the literary supplement of Taiwan's United Daily News (联合报) from 1953 to 1962.

This particular Lin was said to be widely regarded as the person most responsible for bringing about the revival of literary supplements in Taiwan newspapers.

Lin had also reportedly half-jokingly remarked that she was chosen for the job because she spoke Mandarin with an impeccable Beijing accent.

Brought up in Beijing, her linguistic ability was certainly useful, but her ethnic origin was said to be equally valuable.

Chang wrote: "It was to the advantage of the Nationalists as minority rulers to include sympathetic native Taiwanese in their cultural bureaucracy. Being female was also a plus, since cultural policies conceived within a harsh political reality might be softened somewhat by a feminine facade of gentleness and benevolence, which partly explains the high percentage of women editors at the time."

"In addition, Lin possessed a dynamic personality, resourcefulness, and disarming forthrightness, enabling her to establish extensive networks of cultural agents and to mediate between them and the government."

Was this the same Lin Haiyin (林海音) who wrote the book "cheng nan jiu shi" (城南旧事) ? Was she a native Taiwanese who grew up in Beijing, hence her "impeccable Beijing accent"?

The Bo'ao Conference

I may have covered one of the Bo'ao (博螯) conferences held in China's Hainan (海南) island, but had not actually thought much about the significance of the conference, until I read Edward J. Lincoln's book "East Asian Economic Regionalism".

What Lincoln said about the meeting in April 2002 which brought together business people, government officials, and academics in a close imitation of the well-known annual World Economic Forum gathering in Davos Switzerland was exactly right.

He wrote: "The meeting itself appears to have been badly run, causing many complaints about accommodations and logistics. Technically, the Bo'ao conference was a non-government affair, with initial input from the Philippines, Australia and Japan. However, the Chinese government ended up with effective control of the event."

Lincoln added: "However badly it may have been run or how heavy-handed the Chinese government's de-facto control, creating a new forum of this sort was a very simple exercise in regional leadership. The Japanese could have created a similar forum at any point in the past twenty years, but they failed to do so. Instead, they were put in the position of having their arm successfully twisted by the Chinese government to have Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi appear at the conference to make the keynote speech."

So Japan missed the chance to adopt a higher regional profile in the past, and Beijing had apparently stolen the thunder from Tokyo.

But if it is any (back-handed) consolation for Japan, the event was so badly organized that Koizumi reportedly flew into a rage.

As for my own experience, given my lowly status as a non-dignitary, I did not fly into any rage, even though there were certainly many minor and not-so-minor inconveniences. But guess by then I had spent enough time in China to take things in my stride. I even remember going for a swim in the hotel's outdoor swimming pool. The water was murky and cloudy though.

Richard C. Bush's Book on Taiwan

In his book, Richard C. Bush offered a fresh perspective on why economic links between China and Taiwan had not led to political reconciliation.

In "Untying the Knot Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait", Bush argued that contrary to Chinese and international perceptions, both former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui (李登辉) and present leader Chen Shui-bian (陈水扁) had not and did not harbor separatist tendencies.

One of Bush's central premise was that Beijing had wrongfully assumed that both Lee and Chen harbored separatist tendencies, and were uninterested in reunification.

Bush wrote: "Beijing misunderstood and misrepresented the intentions of Lee and Chen. It regarded their opposition to the one-country, two-systems formula as opposition to unification itself. In the PRC's eyes, they were separatists, promoting either two Chinas or Taiwan's independence. A disagreement over how Taiwan might be a part of China was translated, in Beijing's mindset, into a dispute over whether Taiwan saw itself as a part of China."

By analyzing the statements of the two leaders, Bush noted that both leaders essentially had three goals, none of which included separation from China. The goals were: 1) getting China to renounce the use of force, 2) ensuring more international space for Taiwan, 3) ensuring equal treatment of the island.

Bush added: "This is not to say that Lee and Chen did not contribute to the deadlock but that the reason for the stalemate did not lie in their fundamental goals. Rather it is the function of the interaction of three factors: their serious substantive concerns about China's approach to unification; Beijing's relatively inflexible response to their concerns; and an increasingly competitive political environment on the island."

Bush concluded that "it was that interaction that produced conceptual deadlock and a spiral of mutual antagonism and mistrust," adding that while the tactics adopted by Lee and Chen have changed, the principles have not.

Certainly not a view that will find ready nor wide acceptance, especially within China, but at least it is a newer way of looking at cross-strait ties.

Japan as Humpty Dumpty

It is strange for Japan to be compared with the former communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

But that was exactly what T. J. Pempel did when he said it was clear that the old Japanese regime had been displaced and that the transition was underway in the late 1990s. But what was unclear, he noted, was how that transition would play out, and what new equilibrium would replace the old.

"What was clear, however, was that, like Humpty Dumpty, the old regimes in Japan, just as in the former communist countries, could not be put back together again." (T. J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy)

Unless the yoke is intact, I can just imagine the gooey mess of egg yolk mingled with the egg white. Might make a nice omelet though.

Another Casualty of the Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution threw up countless casualties, and the case of Zhang Zhixin can be seen as a mere drop in the bucket.

Arrested during the mass movement which began in 1966, Zhang's "crime" was to have suggested that Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) - Mao Zedong's (毛泽东) chief personal target in the Cultural Revolution - had not been wrong and disloyal in everything he said.

She was kept in harsh conditions in prison, with an inmate overseer who was promised a sentence reduction if she could make Zhang repent. Zhang, however, remained steadfast.

Finally, Zhang's stubborn support for Liu produced a decision to execute her. The provincial leadership approved the execution, though it was unclear why the case reached such a high level.

"The day before the execution, Zhang's vocal chords were cut out with anesthesia "to make sure she would not shout reactionary slogans" at her public execution. She was shot the following day." (Kenneth Liberthal, From Revolution Through Reform)

Certainly one of the darkest chapters in contemporary Chinese history.

Slaves of the Japanese Colonial Empire

When the Nationalists forces withdrew to Taiwan in 1949, one of their chief aims was to safeguard their minority rule over the locals.

And one way to do so was to assert their cultural superiority, and by "re-sinicizing" the "descendents of the Yellow Emperor" who had lived under Japanese colonial rule for half a century.

"This meant that the social effects of a relatively successful Japanization program had to be reversed," wrote Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang.

But unfortunately, pejorative terms like "nuhua" (奴化, or to transform into slaves) used in the government official language had the unfortunate effect of fostering discontent and leading to a sense of alienation among the island's formal colonial subjects.

After all, it was bad enough to have so many political masters - especially when the new political masters were sometimes much worse than their former colonial counterparts, but to be described as a slave was certainly adding insult to injury.

Volatile Chinese Nationalism

In one of my earlier postings, I mentioned that Chinese leaders do realize that nationalism is not like a switch that they can turn on and off as and when they like.

Anne Stevenson-Yang basically provided further evidence when she noted that the "fiercely nationalistic press campaigns" directed by the Propaganda Bureau after the NATO bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the plane collision off Hainan island in 2001 "may have had unintended repercussions."

For instance, after the September 11 attacks, the chatrooms of the Chinese portals were filled with people talking about how China "needs its own bin Laden" and how, in a sarcastic reference to the NATO bombing, the pilots of the two planes that hit the World Trade Center must have been "using maps from 1972, when the World Trade Center was built in 1973."

So much so that by the third day since the attacks, the Propaganda Bureau saw fit to issue "guidance", and this was followed by a suppression of strong nationalistic views.

Hardly surprising, since nationalistic sentiments could easily - or if left to their devices - spiral out of control.

Wang Shuo versus Jin Yong

Anyone remember the 1999 incident involving mainland Chinese writer Wang Shuo (王朔) and popular Hong Kong martial arts novelist Jin Yong (金庸)?

I was in Beijing then and remember the controversy as reported in the media, but the issue only made more sense to me recently when I read Yvonne Chang's book on "Literary Culture in Taiwan: Martial Law to Market Law."

In the book, Wang Shuo was described as the "brilliantly cynical, hugely successful bad boy of PRC literature, television and film." In 1999, he published some negative comments on the writings of Jin Yong, "the erudite Hong Kong writer and businessman whose martial arts novels rank among the most popular ever read by modern Chinese readers."

Of course the challenge to someone of Jin's stature stirred up a controversy that spread in the Chinese newspapers, in magazines, and on the Internet.

Declaring that his criticism was actually motivated by a sense of frustration, Wang reportedly said: "I was one of the makers of contemporary Chinese culture, especially the new culture of Beijing, which included literature, film, and music. But today, everyone, including my daughter's generation, has lost his/her head over the culture of Hong Kong and Taiwan. I do not understand why things have declined so rapidly."

But what struck Yvonne Chang as revealing was Wang's - and people like Wang on the mainland - "fundamental assumptions about what constitute worthy literary projects for Chinese writers".

She wrote: "The "popular" tastes of the Chinese reading public run against the idealist vision cherished by the modern Chinese intellectual class. The prevalence of elitism in literary discourse becomes even more conspicuous when evoked by unlikely candidates - Wang Shuo himself is considered "popular" by most critics and his membership in the intellectual class is by no means unequivocal."

I am not sure if I can agree with Wang that "things have declined so rapidly," as mainland interest in popular culture from Hong Kong and Taiwan is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, the phenomenon is understandable particularly in the early 90s due to the trendier and "hipper" image portrayed by Hong Kong and Taiwan culture, as compared to their mainland counterparts.

And besides, by taking on someone as popular as Jin Yong, there was the impression among many quarters that Wang was trying to heighten his popularity.

But nevertheless, the issues and debates that came out of the controversy - particularly the question of just who is supposed to have a "monopoly sway" on popular culture - were interesting and worth looking into.

Who Says China Is A Threat?

I remember feeling distinctly uncomfortable earlier this year after reading John Mearsheimer's "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", especially when he wrote about how China aimed to displace the United States as the primary power in the region, and how Washington had to take steps to prevent the Middle Kingdom from challenging American global and regional preeminence.

But of course, I did not have the intellectual rigor to articulate my discomfort, until I read an article by David Shambaugh, who argued that Mearsheimer's logic and application of offensive realism on China were "unsustainable."

Shambaugh wrote: "It is a classic example of an international relation theorist, who is not well-grounded in regional area studies, deductively applying a theory to a situation rather than inductively generating theory from evidence. As a China specialist, I do not recognize the China that Mearsheimer describes, and I see no evidence of his "Chinese hegemony" thesis and thus reject his policy prescription of preemptive containment." (David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order", International Security 29:3 Winter 2004/2005)

Shambaugh noted that contemporary international relations involve more than just relations among great powers, and even great power interactions "are not intrinsically zero-sum Hobbesian struggles." Rather, they are "complex mixtures of interdependence, cooperation amid competition, and structural adjustments."

"Just as one nation (China) rises, it does not ipso facto follow that another (United States) must fall - or even decline relatively," Shambaugh added.

You know, after reading so much literature - if not hysteria - about the China threat, it is such a great relief to finally, if not occasionally, hear a slightly saner, more rational, and certainly more balanced voice on China.

Possible Psychological Warfare on Taiwan

A Taiwanese analyst suggested that China could wreck havoc on Taiwan by dispatching "boat people", or economic refugees.

Quoted by Denny Roy, the analyst reportedly said that 100 boatloads would be enough to cause the same kind of capital flight and a downturn in the stock market that resulted from the missile exercises of 1995-96.

Termed "psychological warfare", Roy noted that the "soft weapon" of a flood of poor Chinese could quickly overwhelm Taiwan social services networks and drain the island's economy.

"Even if the boat people came in small numbers, Taiwan would immediately understand that China could send more, drawing on a huge supply, and that Taiwan could not stop them all." (Denny Roy, "Taiwan's Threat Perceptions: The Enemy Within," Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, March 2003)

Sounds like a brilliant, yet scary idea, which I guess is the point after all.

Which reminds me of a hip western restaurant in Beijing that once suffered the same fate when it "offended" certain people. The retaliation, it seemed, was that dozens of peasants were dispatched to the restaurant to do two things - 1) sit wordlessly at the tables with their drinks, and 2) look sullen. Of course, urban customers who entered the restaurant were terrified by what they saw, and left the restaurant almost immediately.

The restaurant, in turn, lost their earnings for the day and learnt that they were at the mercy of someone more powerful. So without firing a shot or issuing a verbal threat, the intimidation had achieved what it set out to accomplish.

Chinese Korean War Defectors

Apart from saving Chiang Kai-shek's (蒋介石) regime, it seems that the Korean War had other repercussions for Taiwan.

Such as a minor influx of Chinese - mainly defectors from the Korean War - from Sichuan province (四川) to Taiwan.

Apparently, to clear the way for a Korean War armistice in July 1953, Beijing dropped its demand that Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war be repatriated to their homelands.

"Understanding the potential for a political victory, the ROC organized the delivery of welcome letters and 14,000 gifts to encourage defections. Taipei also sent advisers to the camps to tutor Chinese prisoners in correctly responding to interview questions so as to ensure they would not be sent back to China," wrote Denny Roy in Taiwan: A Political History.

Taipei's efforts apparently bore fruit.

More than 14,000 of a total of 20,000 Chinese POWs went to Taiwan, arriving on the island in July 1953. To mark its public relations coup over the mainland, Taipei proclaimed January 23 "World Freedom Day."

Cosmetic Surgery to Get "the Korean look"

Apparently, people swept up in the "Korean wave" don't just stop at watching Korean soap operas and movies, or savoring Korean cuisine.

They also go for cosmetic surgeries, it seems.

According to a Taiwanese magazine, the wave had resulted "in an increase in facial reconstruction (in Taiwan) that makes the face smaller and thinner and slightly more Korean looking." (Taiwan Review, March 2006)

And if you're worried about the standards in Taiwan, fear not. According to the article, the island's surgical standards are as competitive as those of South Korea, the United States and Europe. What more, "the density of hospitals and clinics in Taiwan offers greater accessibility and convenience."

As for price, cosmetic surgeries in Taiwan are said to be 20 per cent cheaper than in Korea, and 60 to 70 per cent cheaper than in Japan and the United States.

But what if the craze is over and you want to deconstruct the look?

Hong Kong's Martin Lee

Was recently reminded of Martin Lee (李柱铭), one of Hong Kong's most well-known pro-democracy activists, while reading an account of the territory's history.

In 1991, Lee told a House of Representatives human rights committee that "Britain's hand over of 5.5 million Hong Kong people to China may be likened to the hand over of 5.5 million Jewish people to Nazi Germany during World War II." (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 1945-1992)

Sometimes reading about fairly contemporary history can be such great fun. It put issues in such great perspective.

I only hope that those comments have not come back to haunt Lee. People usually have short memories, but certainly not the CCP.

The Decline of Japan in the 1990s

While reading T. J. Pempel's account of the decline of Japan in the 1990s, I wonder if the bigger problem lies in the purported structural flaws of the Japanese system, or in the *oversight* of such flaws during the decades prior to that.

After all, financial scandals, bureaucratic ineptitude, corruption etc are nothing new in most societies, let alone occasional and one-off incidents like the sale of HIV-tainted blood and the Aum Shinrikyo poison gas subway attack. (T. J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy, Cornell University Press 1998)

As a Chinese saying goes, ice that is three-feet thick is not the result of one day's freezing (冰结三尺, 非一日之寒). Hence, shouldn't the blame then be directed at those who had overlooked the country's structural flaws, and not the actual flaws themselves? And wasn't this oversight a case of being "bedazzled" by the "glitter" of the country's earlier phenomenal economic growth?

Funerals of Kim II-Sung and Chiang Kai-shek

There seems to be a chilling similarity between the funerals of former North Korean Leader Kim II-sung (김일성) and his Taiwanese counterpart Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石).

I think most of us have heard or even seen footages of the massive grief, not to mention hysteria, in the wake of Kim's death.

But in Taiwan too? Gosh.

According to Yvonne Chang, during Chiang's funeral in 1975, "crowds of civilian mourners form long lines on the desolate-looking streets of Taipei, many weeping on their knees and some climbing up construction fences to pay their last respects." (Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, Literary Culture in Taiwan: From Martial Law to Market Law, Columbia University Press, 2004)

Okay, at least it wasn't mass hysteria in Taiwan, especially given Chiang's reign of terror on the island. Kim's reign of terror, on the other hand, was at least undertaken with a massive brainwashing of minds to love-and-worship-thy-Great-Leader-as-God. And bet you will not find in the Hermit Kingdom anti-social behaviors such as climbing over construction fences.

But the slight similarity was still a little unnerving.

Media Controls in China

We all know about media controls in China, but if you need further details, check out Anne Stevenson-Yang's article.

In the article, Yang wrote that the State Press and Publications Administration (PPA) has members of the staff "exclusively devoted" to reading the Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报) and the Southern Weekend (南方周末) - newspapers that frequently pursue stories on official corruption, and have a following among well-educated urban Chinese.

The Propaganda Bureau also sponsors groups of retired editors in each city to read newspapers and magazines for content that "does not conform to current propaganda instructions".

Yang added: "Should the editors flag something as non-conforming, an internal Party report goes to the PPA, which makes a phone call or issues a notice to the publication's editor. Such notices are received with great seriousness, because the PPA has the preemptive right to stop publication without notice, while Propaganda may remove editors from their jobs. In a serious case, the Party's report will also lead to administrative detention ("reform through labor") for an editor or lead to civil charges that put him or her in jail." (Anne Stevenson-Yang, "The Absent-Minded Reform of China's Media", in China's Leadership in the 21st Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation, Ed. David. M Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan)

Oh well.

But what a fascinating job it is - to be able to sit around all day reading newspapers and magazines! Someone please find me a job like that.

Is Taiwanese Literature Considered "National Literature"?

Some discussions within the Taiwanese literary community may sound like hair-splitting, but they are invariably tied with the island's history and past influences.

Such as whether Taiwanese literature should be considered "national literature."

According to Yvonne Chang who teaches at University of Texas at Austin, "Taiwanese literature" has been gaining legitimacy in the public sphere since the mid-1990s, and many who earlier harbored reservations about the term are also claiming it as their own, and redefining it in very different ways. (Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, Literary Culture in Taiwan: Martial Law to Market Law, Columbia University Press 2004)

But others have countered by asking if works written by Taiwanese writers during the colonial period should be seen as Chinese, Taiwanese, or Japanese. They also asked if mainlanders in Taiwan - those who settled on the island since 1949 - could be considered "local writers", since some of them insisted on calling themselves "Chinese writers."

So you see, hair-splitting is not just something that is confined to politicians and academics, especially, or particularly, in Taiwan.

Treatment of Classical Literature in China and Taiwan

It is perhaps unsurprising that there are marked differences within Taiwan and China not just in politics and society, but also in their treatment of classical literature.

In post-1949 China, gentry literature of the country's feudal past was sometimes renounced for ideological reasons. Numerous political idioms designed to mobilize the masses also made their way into and were added to the literary vocabulary.

In contrast, the prose-style in post-1949 Taiwan tended to be more literary, retaining many more archaic expressions and allusions to classical literature.

According to Murray A. Rubinstein, the Taiwan phenomenon is "a direct result of the cultural policy of the Nationalist government, which promoted traditional culture partly as a means to assert its own legitimacy as a Chinese government." (Murray A. Rubinstein, Taiwan A New History, East Gate 1999)

Hence, Rubinstein added, the selection of works by such writers as Hsu Chih-mo (Xu Zhimo, 徐志摩) and Chu Tzu-ching (Zhu Ziqing, 朱自清) contributed to the popularity of the "former's exotic, flamboyant, European-flavored aestheticism and the latter's genteel, refined, traditional Chinese sensibility."

Well said.

Jiang Zemin's Glasses

First of all, I have to qualify that I have no personal vendetta against former Chinese President Jiang Zemin. (江泽民)

I just found it amusing when Anne Stevenson-Yang wrote the following about Jiang: "Sichuan News was rumored to have gotten into trouble for writing disrespectfully about President Jiang Zemin's (widely ridiculed) eyeglasses. Since the organization was not making money, it was weakly positioned to call on local authorities for help in mounting a defense." (Anne Stevenson-Yang, "The Absent-Minded Reform of China's Media", in China's Leadership in the 21st Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation, Ed. David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan)

Actually all Sichuan News did was to reflect the thinking of the masses. But apparently that was not supposed to be the main role of the Chinese media.

Alternative Futures for the Korean Peninsula by Nicholas Eberstadt

I once described Russia as being pretty much like an old uncle who had fallen on hard times. By being involved in the Six-Party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, I had suggested that Russia hoped to firstly, retain some kind of remnant influence it has on North Korea, and secondly, benefit economically if things turn out well between Pyongyang and Washington.

But when I read in Nicholas Eberstadt's article (Korean Scenarios: Alternative Futures for the Korean Peninsula, Strategic Asia 2004-5) that Moscow made an under-the-table payment of $10 million to Pyongyang to attend the February 2004 round of six-party talks, I cannot help but think that Russia is even more pathetic than I imagined it to be.

Since I am on the article, I think it is probably true for Eberstadt to say that North Korea had funded its nuclear weapons program even during the mid-1990s famine. But I would have preferred to see more evidence and substantiation.

But I applaud Eberstadt for painting North Korea in a rational and non-adventurous light, especially when he wrote:

"The fact that North Korea's greatest nuclear advances to date have occurred under the aegis of the Bush administration, arguably the U.S. government most explicitly hostile to Pyongyang's international policies and purposes of any yet elected, should underscore the fact that North Korea's achievements in this ongoing crisis have not been adventitious."

In my own words, the George W Bush administration is largely to be blamed for the current crisis and impasse.

Japan's One-Party Dominance

Quoting Fukui and Fukai, Ethan Scheiner noted that Japanese voters were lured at election time “mainly by the lure of pork barrel, only marginally by policy issues, and even less by ideals and visions.” (Ethan Scheiner, Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State, Cambridge 2006)

As a pragmatic Asian voter, this makes perfect sense to me, and I wonder if all the discussion about Japan’s one-party dominance is not just a debate about form versus substance, i.e. having the external façade of democracy, defined as at least a functional two-party system, versus an all-embracing one party that is able to cater to the needs of its people.

In the case of Japan, even if a two-party system were to be attained, it’d probably be, as Scheiner had predicted, a breakaway from the LDP, and if so, can we expect the system to have competing views, visions and policies?

Newspaper Distribution in Beijing - The Little Red Caps

For those of us who used to subscribe to Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报), here is an authoritative account of why those newspaper vendors periodically show up at our homes and offices to collect the monthly (or quarterly) subscriptions.

In 1996, the Daily established its own distribution company "Little Red Cap" (or 小红帽) by hiring members of the Post Office Publication Distribution division, and having them set up a network of delivery stations, warehouses, and part-time employees to do house-to-house deliveries.

By and large, the Little Red Cap worked hard to build a reputation as a supporter of the local government by publicizing its policy of hiring workers who had been laid off from state-owned enterprises.

"Although much attacked by the postal administration, Little Red Cap had the support of the Beijing local government, and, ultimately, the nationally based postal administration could not penetrate Beijing's protectionism," wrote Anne Stevenson-Yang. (Anne Stevenson-Yang, "The Absent-Minded Reform of China's Media", in China's Leadership in the 21st Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation, Ed. David M Frankelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan)

The success of the Little Red Cap also led to other imitators such as the Little Yellow Cap (Beijing Morning News) and the Little Blue Cap (Beijing Economic Daily).

"Soon, any daily with enough circulation to support its own distribution company established one," Stevenson-Yang added.

This account makes for an interesting case study of the media industry's transformation, and of course, the protectionism that invariably goes on in all parts of China.

But personally, the account reminded me of the smiley and rosy-cheeked middle-aged lady who used to come to my office to collect the quarterly subscriptions. I cannot remember her name now, but unlike many nuisance visitors to my office, her sense of professionalism, as well as her courteous and non-intrusive manners left an impression on me. Not to mention the free gifts of telephone directories and calendars that she gave out from time to time.

And oh yeah, she always wore a red cap when she came.

Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis - Libyan vs Ukraine Model

In an article, John S. Park noted that while the United States and Japan advocated the use of the Libyan model as a potential solution for the North Korean nuclear crisis; China, South Korea, Russia and North Korea on the other hand, looked to Ukraine as a potential model.

Under the Libyan model, Libya gave up its nascent nuclear weapons program in 2003 in return for admission into the international system. This, according to the U.S., was a clear indication that "offering carrots against the background of a hard-line approach bolsters international non-proliferation efforts." ("Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2005)

But the Ukraine model, on the other hand, works through persuasion, rather than coercion. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine, based on its territory, inherited Soviet nuclear missiles, and overnight became a "formidable de facto nuclear power."

Concerned by the prospect of nuclear proliferation, the U.S. and Russia jointly persuaded Ukraine that dismantling its inherited nuclear arsenal would be more advantageous than retaining it. And to further allay Ukraine's concern, the former Soviet republic was offered a multilateral security guarantee, and other economic rewards.

If only I had known all these in Beijing in 2003 ...

China's Morality Crisis

Carol Lee Hamrin wrote in her article that given China's power struggle, greed and consumerism, the country has ended up with "the worst of both socialism and capitalism."

Hamrin also wrote: "Endemic cheating in the education system and fraud in consumer products and services have prompted heated public debate on the Internet about the lack of integrity and honesty." (Carol Lee Hamrin, "Social Dynamics and New Generation Politics" in "China's Leadership in the 21st Century, The Rise of the Fourth Generation", Ed. David M Frankelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan)

She can't be more right, especially when she pointed to the "growing critique of the moral and emotional anarchy of consumerism."

Which is part of the reason why the authorities came up with several morality campaigns, the latest right now being the "ba rong ba chi" (八荣八耻) campaign, which aims to instill a sense of morality and civic mindedness amongst the Chinese.

八荣八耻 consist of :

以热爱祖国为荣, 以危害祖国为耻,
以服务人民为荣, 以背离人民为耻,
以崇尚科学为荣, 以愚昧无知为耻,
以辛勤劳动为荣, 以好逸恶劳为耻,
以团结互助为荣, 以损人利己为耻,
以诚实守信为荣, 以见利忘义为耻,
以遵纪守法为荣, 以违法乱纪为耻,
以艰苦奋斗为荣, 以骄奢淫逸为耻.

A rough translation - It is an honor to love one's country, serve the people, believe in science, put in hard work, remain united, help out one another, be honest, abide by the laws, but it is contemptible to harm the country, betray the people, to be ignorant, to enrich oneself by hurting the interests of others, to break the laws, and to be extravagant.

Taiwanese Writer Wu Zhuoliu

It is hard not to feel for the Taiwanese loss of identity during its colonization by Japan from 1895-1945.

Indeed, it can be argued that the loss, as well as the complex intermingling of Chinese, Japanese and Taiwanese influences, still exert a profound bearing on the island's modern-day development.

In a novel by Taiwanese writer Wu Zhuoliu (吴浊流) titled Asia's Orphan (亚细亚的孤儿), the protagonist was said to have surveyed the "material hardship and spiritual decay wrought by colonial rule and the imperialist war."

"Unable to identity with the Japanese colonialists or to bear with his traditional family and regressive hometown, he smuggles himself to the mainland in the hope of finding succor, only to be disdained as a Taiwanese and suspected of being a Japanese spy. A similar fate awaits him when he returns to Taiwan. Disowned by the cultural metropole, the ancestral homeland and his native land, the distraught Hu Taiming eventually goes mad." (Angelina Chun-Chu Yee, "Constructing a Native Consciousness: Taiwan Literature in the 20th Century", in "Taiwan in the Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View", Ed. Richard Louis Edmonds and Steven M. Goldstein)

The story ends with a poem the demented Hu scribbled on the wall:

"Willing to be educated intellectuals,
How could we stoop to be downtrodden people?
Where are the axes for slaying tyrants?
Dreams full of heroes.
Our Han soul shall never die,
Defiantly we shed this body.
"Foxy, foxy!"*
What do you want?
A slave's life is full of remorse.
When despots reign, what to do?
Together let's recover our ancestral land,
Six million people, rise!
Vow to die a righteous death!"

* A disparaging term the Japanese used on the Taiwanese.

Taiwan was briefly a Republic in 1895

Shortly after the annexation of Taiwan by Japan in 1895, there was little resistance on the part of the Qing courts, partly because of fears over Japanese reprisals as well as setbacks in negotiations over the ceding of the Liaotung Peninsula.

But within Taiwan, then Governor Tang Ching-sung and his aides had reportedly taken advantage of the situation to carry on anti-Japanese resistance under an island regime labeled the "Taiwan Republic".

The desperate act of forming a Republic was described as an attempt to delay a Japanese occupation, so that one of the western powers, France in particular, "might be prompted to come to the defense of Taiwan or be induced to take possession of the island in lieu of Japan." (Murray A. Rubinstein, Taiwan: A New History)

Said to have established amid a festive atmosphere, the Republic vanished from the scene just 12 days later.

Would this short-lived attempt at republicanism be considered the shortest in world history?

Jiang Zemin and Theory of the Three Represents

Still on Guoguang Wu's 2003 article which I mentioned in my entry yesterday.

In his article, Wu noted that since it was largely Jiang Zemin (江泽民) who propagated the Theory of the Three Represents, and given the subsequent elevation of the Theory to the same status as Mao Zedong (毛泽东) Thought and Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) Theory, Jiang will henceforth be the "kingmaker" and "final arbiter of future ideological disputes."

If true, this will have a far-reaching effect, given that since relinquishing all officials positions in 2003, Jiang is still well and alive, and said to be living in Shanghai.

But overall, I am a little skeptical about Wu's forecast. Unless there are recent developments to suggest otherwise, I am doubtful as to whether Jiang can play any meaningful role as "kingmaker" or "final arbiter of future ideological disputes."

Part of my skepticism stemmed from the fact that even though Jiang had been building up his power assiduously over the years, he will never - whether dead or alive - be accorded the same status and honor as Mao, and to a lesser extent, Deng. He simply did not have the revolutionary nor political credentials.

Then there is also the fact that while the Theory of the Three Represents is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution, it did not bear Jiang's name.

Of course Jiang might not be content to sit around in his old age playing chess or walking his dog. But it remains doubtful if he can exert any significant political influence.