China, India and Japan

Much has been said about the rise of Asia, with many suggesting that the continent would be pitted against existing powers in other continents.
But writer Bill Emmott noted in his book that the rise "is not just, or even mainly, going to pit Asia against (the) West, shifting power from the latter to the former."

Rather, "it is going to pit Asians against Asians" as it is the first time in history when there have been three powerful countries in Asia all at the same time - China, India (pictured) and Japan. (Bill Emmott, Rivals – How the Power Struggles Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade, Penguin Books, 2008, 2009)

"In other words, Asia is becoming an arena of balance-of-power politics, with no clear leader, rather as Europe was during the 19th century. China may emerge as the most powerful of the three, but like Britain in the 19th century it is unlikely to be capable of dominating its continent."

"A new power game is under way, in which all must seek to be as friendly as possible to all, for fear of the consequences if they are not, but in which the friendship is only skin-deep. All are maneuvering to strengthen their own positions and maximize their own long-term advantages."

Anti-Bushism, Not Anti-Americanism

In a fairly hard-hitting article, Bruce Cumings argued that what is seen as anti-Americanism in South Korea during the Bush administration is actually "anti-Bushism".

He noted that the policies of the Bush administration was responsible for the upsurge in rhetoric and protest in South Korea since 2000.

"Over 35 years of closely following Korean-American relations, I can think of no time when affairs have been allowed to deteriorate so drastically, nor can I think of an administration that has struck more dissonant notes, than the Bush administration," wrote Cumings. (Anti-Americanism in South Korea, in Insight Into Korea, Herald Media 2007).

"Through acts of commission and omission, it seriously disrupted the norms and expectations of our historic relationship with Seoul, and plunged the relationship with Pyongyang into a dangerous stalemate."

"It is difficult to see that anything has come out of the past six years that can be called a success, an achievement, or an advance of basic American interests - not, that is, until the "back to the future" somersault in February 2007, when the Bush administration essentially adopted Bill Clinton's strategy of engaging the North. And miraculously, public opinion against the United States began softening."

Cumings noted that "a virulent and violent form of anti-Americanism" developed in South Korea in the 1980s due mainly to the suppression of the Gwangju rebellion in May 1980, along with US support for Chun Doo Hwan's subsequent coup.

Describing the uprising as "the Tiananmen of an entire generation of young people", Cumings added that the uprising was a defining moment in modern South Korean history which had led to "endless anti-American demonstrations" in the 1980s.

That defining moment is "instantly recalled by people who were young in the 1980s" but who are now leaders in all walks of Korean life, including former president Roh Moo-hyun.

"Even then, and even among vociferous critics, however, they usually complain about American policies rather than Americans as such; furthermore they will jump at the chance to study or work in the United States, and send their children to study in the United States."

"In Korea, we are not looking at anything like the broad rejection of American power, culture, and values that is seen across the Middle East. Koreans are so used to things American, by virtue of the intense relationship over the past 60 years, that the vast majority are going to have not pro- or anti-American views, but very complex, mixed views."

Even so, Cumings noted that a person who is now 40, not Christian, with no relatives in the US, and no experience with Americans, and coming from the Southwest, "is likely to be very anti-American."

"These days a farmer of any age or region is likely to be anti-Americanism because of Washington's attempts to open the agricultural market to American meats and produce."

On North Korea, Cumings contended that the American war on terror and the invasion of Iraq had led to deep strains with Seoul due to a variety of reasons.

These include a lack of proper consultation in moving American troops from Korea to Iraq, and a new policy of using US troops stationed in Korea in a regional conflict that might involve China.

This led to repeated attempts by Seoul to seek assurance from Washington that the North would not be attacked without close consultations with Seoul.

"It is my understanding that the Roh Moo-hyun administration has not gotten those assurances. Since the North can destroy Seoul in a matter of hours with some 10,000 artillery guns buried in the mountains north of the capital, one can imagine the extreme consternation that the Bush doctrine caused in Seoul ... when I visited Seoul in August 2003 a prominent official told me that relations between the two militaries had never been worse."

Cumings argued that to begin afresh, Washington should normalize ties with the North, "long after all our allies except for Japan have done so (and Japan will do it the minute we do)", guarantee Seoul that the US will not use its forces in Korea in a conflict over Taiwan, and to reduce the "anachronistic American troop presence in Korea."

"It is in the American interest to find a better way to deploy its troops in Korea, now in their seventh decade. And perhaps by having an embassy in Pyongyang, American would finally gain some leverage over an antagonist that has been thumbing its nose at the United States for more than 60 years."

North Korean Nuclear Crisis Analogy

An interesting analogy from an article by L. Gordan Flake titled Inter-Korean Relations and Seoul-Washington Ties (Insight Into Korea, Herald Media 2007).

"While North Korean officials have likened the shutdown and disablement of the Yongbyon reactor to "castrating a bull," Seoul and Washington should remain focused on the potential offspring of the Yongbyon program, the "pregnant cows and young bulls" represented by the fissile material and the nuclear weapons already removed from Yongbyon, not to mention ongoing uncertainty regarding its highly enriched uranium program."

"While shutting down a balky and antiquated 5 mega-watt research reactor - that by most accounts North Korea had to struggle to keep operating just so they could shut it down - is indeed progress, to keep up with the farm analogies, it is tantamount to shutting the barn door after the cows have already escaped the barn."

Redressing Past Injustices (Japanese Collaborators) Through Law

The response paper I was referring to in my previous posting.

Law and Politics in Korean Society – Week 13

They call it repentance and national reconciliation.
They say there’s a need to solidify the foundations of a fledging nation.
They could not bear the thought of collaborators “making crafty excuses and walking shamelessly on the streets”.
They say there shall never be a return to “the evil past”.
They claim what’s needed is a national spirit.
What exactly constitute a national spirit?
Where do you go from here?

They call it an attempt at social justice.
They say it’s a way to seek national reunification.
They hope it would lead to sound international relations.
Where do you go from here?

Who are the collaborators?
Were they shameless and devious?
Or were they opportunists and realists?
How could they be prosecuted after contributing to nation building?
How could they not dominate every level of society?
How to establish with certainty what they had done?
How to prove beyond a reasonable doubt?
For those who genuinely believed that collaboration was a good thing, why should they be castigated for their beliefs?
Least of all, why should their descendants be castigated for the sins of their fathers?
The ironies of being buried as national heroes in the national cemetery?
But isn’t the world bursting with ironies since time immemorial?
Where do you go from here?

They said the “unfinished task of punishing collaborators was at the root, pain and misfortune that Korean society has gone through for almost a century”.
Would punishing the collaborators extinguish the pain?
Is this vindication?
Or is it vindictive?
Is this an internal cleansing of the nation?
As if to disinfect, sterilize and purge the entire system.
But at what cost to the patient?
Where do you go from here?

Maybe tearing at the social fabric might help.
Perhaps opening up a can of worms might be the answer.
But what if at the end of the long and tedious process “no one” is to be blamed?
Or what if “everyone” is to be blamed?
What if it’s the “system” and “history” that is to be blamed?
Where do you go from here?

A nation’s soul search for an answer.
A cathartic process.
To heal its wounds and mend its pain.
But at what cost to itself and its neighbors?
An emotional reconciliation.
A true reconciliation.
But is there such a thing as a true reconciliation?
Where do you go from here?

A nation scarred by annexation, division and war.
A nation encumbered with painful historical memories.
The tears, the bloodshed and the agonizing memories.
Scars so deep that they are still drenched in blood.
A fractious nation.
A bleeding heart.
A tormented nightmare - where the past haunts the present, and torments the future.
Where do you go from here?

No one knows the answer.
Because there are no clear answers.
Because there are no clear winners or losers.
Because the world isn’t black and white.
Because the world has various shades of gray in between.
Because the truth is somewhere in between.
Truth with a capital T, is illusive.
Truth with a capital T will remain buried, hidden and concealed in the thousands of shades of gray in between.
Some say the truth will set you free.
But maybe it won’t.

November 27, 2005
12.51 a.m.
Seoul

Reconciling Democracy and Reunification

Since 2005, I have found the issue of Japanese collaborators in South Korea, and how it has impeded national reconciliation in the country, fascinating.

That was the year I took a course on Law and Politics in South Korean Society taught by Prof Hahm Chaihark in Seoul. I was even moved to write some semblance of a poem about it and handed it up as response paper for the week. I will go dig it up and perhaps post it in a subsequent posting.

Anyway, in an article by Katharine Hyung-Sun Moon, the Wellesley College academic noted that South Korea's past has "long harassed and haunted society, and healing has been difficult." (Reconciling Democracy and Reunification, in Insight Into Korea, Herald Media 2007).

She noted that without warning, individuals have been "politically stripped and whipped for their alleged connections or family relations to chin-il-pa (collaboration with Japanese), socialist activism, pro-Americanism, anti-government radicalism, and so on."

"Depending on who is doing the judging, there has been no shortage of targets. Suspicion, accusation and condemnation, rather than reconciliation and respect, have too often determined the course of politics," Moon wrote.

Moon argued that the witch-hunting process endangers democracy, "for people may become paralyzed from thinking, speaking and acting freely today for fear of judgment tomorrow."

The accusations and condemnations had also discouraged people from working together as "a national community", especially after more than "a half century of violence, ideological indoctrination ... and political memories."

Taking the process one step further, Moon even wondered if "the ideological divides and the zero-sum political mentality that already exist in the South" will be extended to the North in the event of a North-South unification.

"Will a politics of division rule even after reunification?"

Political Regionalism in South Korea

Prof Timothy Lim from California State University argued that the legacy of "strong leaders, weak parties" is insufficient in explaining two decades (1987-2007) "of continuous and seemingly endless instability and volatility" in South Korean politics.

After all, other political systems - such as Taiwan's - underwent broadly similar process but emerged with relatively strong and stable party systems.

What set South Korea apart is what Lim described as "the impact of hyper-regionalism."

Regionalism has long-standing historical origins but was exacerbated and amplified, "if not given its most significant meaning, during authoritarian rule."

The predominant political cleavage is territorial and revolves around the deep fissures between Gyeongsang provinces in the southeast and Jeolla provinces in the southwest.

"The marriage of personalism and regionalism ... compelled political leaders to eschew clear-cut ideological or nationally-oriented policy agendas, since they had to appeal to every voter within their region regardless of class, socio-economic, or other non-territorial distinctions. The result was a further weakening of party politics," Lim wrote. (The Dynamics of Party Politics in Korea, in Insight Into Korea, Herald Media 2007).

"Most salient was the establishment of a strong presidential system, which undercut the autonomy of both ruling and opposition parties," Lim added.

Other institutional procedures contributing to the fragility of political parties include the lack of primaries, and an electoral system based on limited proportional representation and the first-past-the-post principle.

"In isolation, none of these institutional features can or should be regarded as a "cause" of party instability , but in the context of South Korean politics - with its particular cleavage structure, its legacy of strong leaders, and its culture based on interpersonal networks - each contributed to the creation of what some scholars call, a state of "hyper-presidentialism."

Korean Globalization

Korean internationalization or globalization has its history in the early 1980s but did not come of age until 1994 when President Kim Young-sam (pictured) formally outlined his vision during the APEC summit held in Sydney, Australia.

Samuel S Kim described the Sydney declaration as "more than a flash in the pan" as it led to the major reorganization of the executive branch making it more suited "for an all-out globalization drive."

"From early 1995 to late 1996, a globalization fever swept the country: no other buzzword has been more commonly used - and misused - among politicians, policymakers, business entrepreneurs, academics and journalists," Kim wrote (Globalization Helps Korea Create New Identity, in Insight Into Korea, Herald Media 2007).

Globalization meant different things to different people - a strategic principle, a mobilizing slogan, and for Korean conglomerates, "to be free of state monitoring and supervision without giving up politically connected loans or state control of labor unions, while at the same time going global to escape rising wages and political demands from labor unions at home."

Even after Kim stepped down, the globalization drive was carried on by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.

Roh called on Koreans to embrace growing Northeast Asia regionalism. His willingness to open Korea to the global economy is said to be most visible in his pursuit of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), even though the Korea-US FTA is said to be a nervous move by Korea in response to China's rapid economic growth.

Kim noted, "the underlying logic and recurring theme in all the presidential vision and policy announcements from Kim Young-sam to Roh Moo-hyun remains unchanged - that globalization is the most expeditious way of overcoming Korea's historical identity as a helpless shrimp among whales."

"There is no illusion that Korea will ever become a great power. Nonetheless, thanks to the end of the Cold War, globalization and democratization, South Korea is no longer the marginal shrimp but now a pivotal player in Northeast Asia economics, security and culture."

Shortcomings of Korean Nationalism

Prof Shin Gi-wook (pictured) argued that Korea's deeply rooted ethnic national identity can be seen in the reaction of the Korean community in the aftermath of the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre.

After the massacre, Koreans and Korean-Americans "nervously responded with a sense of collective guilt."

Many first-generation immigrants apologized for the actions of gunman Cho Seung-hui "on the grounds that they all share the same Korean ethnicity (meaning blood)."

South Korea's ambassador to Washington Lee Tae-shik even suggested that the Korean-American community needed to "repent", suggesting a 32-day fast, one for each victim killed. The South Korean government also offered to send an official delegation to the funerals of the victims.

"This episode may seem bizarre or perplexing to non-Koreans since most ethnicities ... don't have that strong sense of collective responsibility," Shin wrote. (Korea Faces Challenges of Multiethnic Society, in Insight Into Korea, Herald Media 2007)

Pioneer of Korean literature Yi Kwang-su once said that bloodline, personality and culture are the three fundamental elements defining a nation, and that "Koreans are without doubt a unitary nation in blood and culture."

Even as Shin point out that Japanese rule had reinforced Koreans' claim to a "truly distinct and homogeneous ethnic identity", he also noted that such a blood-based ethnic national identity had often become a totalitarian force in politics, culture and society.

Individuals were considered only as part of an abstract whole, and citizens have been asked to sacrifice their freedom and civil rights for the collectivity.

"Nation was also used as a trump card to override other competing identities as well as to justify violations of human and civic rights in both Koreas in the name of the "nation." The power of nationalism has thus hindered cultural and social diversity and tolerance in Korean society."

Shin also argued that this belief in ethnic unity has produced tension and conflict between the two Koreas over the last half century, especially in provoking contention "over who truly represents the Korean ethnic nation versus who is at fault for undermining that Korean unity."

Relations Between China and Africa

Aren't relations between China and Africa supposed to be hunky dory? I mean, apart from the relentless and rather tiresome western criticisms about purported Chinese neo-colonialism, and how Beijing's no-strings attached assistance to Africa had encouraged human rights abuses, fuelled corruption, and deepened African debt problems.

Not so, according to authors Wang Zhengxu and Lim Tin Seng in their article China's Growing Influence in Africa (Interpreting China's Development, Ed. Wang Gungwu and John Wong, World Scientific Publishing, 2007).

They argued that one of the biggest problems in the less-than-rosy Chinese-African ties laid in the questionable "reliability of African governments." Some of them are still ambivalent about the One-China policy, while others may succumb to "Western pressure to take stances against China."

More importantly, many African governments are unpopular and undemocratic authoritarian regimes, hence domestic pressure may rise against the pro-China policy of these governments.

"For instance, during the 2006 Zambian presidential election, one candidate promised to "chase out" Chinese investors if he were to be elected."

"In South Africa and Zambia, protests against increasing Chinese imports are on the rise and are pressuring the government to take a more cautious stance against China."

China and Indonesia

China's rapid economic growth and ascendancy may challenge Indonesia's long standing aspiration to become the first among equals in Southeast Asia.

That is the view of Lim Tin Seng in an article titled Seeking Closer Cooperation with Post-Suharto Indonesia. (Interpreting China's Development, Ed. Wang Gungwu and John Wong, World Scientific Publishing, 2007).

As the country with the largest Muslim population in the world and a key actor in the non-aligned movement, Indonesia expects itself to play a regional as well as international leadership role.

After it was elected as a non-permanent member in the United Nations Security Council, Indonesia has tried to play a role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the North Korean nuclear crisis. It has also dispatched a thousand troops to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Lebanon.

Even so, Lim noted that the policy of friendship and cooperation between Beijing and Jakarta will continue, as Beijing "continues to step up its diplomacy to engage Indonesia and the region for stability and prosperity."

China's Emerging Middle Class

An olive-shaped society with the middle class being the bulging middle is always more stable than a pyramid-shaped society with wealth polarization.

So said Yan Hao in an article titled China's Emerging Middle Class (Interpreting China's Development, Ed. Wang Gungwu and John Wong, World Scientific Publishing, 2007).

Yan said that from a political perspective, the growth of the Chinese middle class "serves obviously very well the Party and government goals of economic growth and social stability."

That's because the group is largely "supportive of and cooperative" with the Party and government, "being part of the establishment or major beneficiaries of the reform."

As a result, the middle class is unlikely to challenge "the autocratic power" of the Party and government even if it becomes stronger and larger.

Citing analysts, Yan noted that the Party is unable to secure the loyalty of the middle class through ideological indoctrination.

"It thus uses material perks and job opportunities in government and SOEs as political patronage. It is therefore unlikely that people inside the establishment will challenge something that they depend on for a living."

Even though the group is unlikely to challenge the authorities head-on, Yan said that this does not mean that they are opposed to any political reform in the course of modernization.

The middle class can be a key force that authorities can count on in its drive towards political reform, given the former's level of education, consciousness about their rights, financial independence, and worldly vision.

"The middle class can do an excellent job in promoting rule of law, good governance and civil society building in China, since the goal of political reform does not necessarily mean a Western style multi-party democracy."

How Kim Jong-il's First Born Fell From Grace

This article was published April 10th and written by Chosun Ilbo columnist Choi Byung-muk.

How Kim Jong-il's Firstborn Fell from Grace

In February 1978, Choi Eun-hee, a South Korean actress kidnapped by North Korea, was invited to the residence of Kim Jong-il, where a family party was being held to celebrate his 36th birthday.

Choi asked one chubby little child what his name was. The child shot back, "Why does she want to know my name?" Kim told the child that he should introduce himself when an adult asks his name. Throughout the party, Kim constantly kept the seven-year-old boy at his side.

As a child, Jong-nam, Kim's oldest son, got all his father's love and attention. On his birthdays, Jong-nam would dress up in military uniform and show off his insignias.

In mid-April each year, just before his birthday on May 10, North Korea mobilized teams of people whose mission was to buy presents. They traveled to Japan, Hong Kong, Germany and Austria to buy gifts for the child. Diamond-studded watches, gold-plated toy guns, electronic games, luxury brand clothes and shoes were purchased.

They would come back to North Korea with US$1 million worth of merchandise, according to a book on North Korea's "royal family" by Lee Han-young.

Kim sent Jong-nam to a private school in Geneva, Switzerland in 1980. This is how he became fluent in English and French. While Jong-nam was studying in Geneva, Kim had two more sons -- Jong-chul and Jong-un -- with a dancer named Ko Young-hee, and Jong-nam now had to share his love with two other children.

Jong-nam had always been considered as the top candidate to succeed his father, but a comment he made in the late 1990s to the children of high-ranking North Korean officials became a big problem. He vowed to open North Korea and implement reforms when he became the heir apparent.

Kim Jong-il is said finally to have lost confidence in Jong-nam in 1996, when Song Hye-rang, the boy's aunt and mother of Lee Han-young, defected to the West. Jong-nam has been wandering the world since early 2001, when he was expelled from Japan after attempting to enter the country on a forged Dominican passport.

Even after Ko Young-hee's death in 2004, Jong-nam was not allowed to freely enter Pyongyang. During his occasional encounters with journalists overseas, Jong-nam would utter a few words, but always avoided answering questions about the succession.

But in January this year, Kim Jong-nam did broach the taboo subject, saying it was a matter for his father to decide. And 10 days ago, he said it was Japan's right to defend itself by intercepting North Korea's missile, directly contradicting the North's official stance that it would consider this as an act of war. And in an interview with Japan’s TBS on Wednesday, Jong-nam said, "Would I be traveling in Macau dressed like this [in sweats] if I was the successor?"

His frank comments suggest that he has been removed from the list of possible successors. It seems that not even Kim Jong-il, who is treated like a deity in North Korea, can get his children to turn out the way he wants them to.

Hmm, but I don't quite understand the bit about why Jong-nam was not freely allowed to enter Pyongyang even after Ko Young-hee's death.

China's Tertiary Enrolment Rate

With jobs increasingly hard to come by for new Chinese graduates during the current economic slowdown, the reality that China's tertiary enrolment rate is lower than most countries does take some getting used to.

In an article titled China's Booming Higher Education (Interpreting China's Development, Ed. Wang Gungwu and John Wong, World Scientific Publishing, 2007), Quan Xiaohong and Zhao Litao noted that from a long-term perspective, China has yet to produce enough college graduates for its growing economy.

Although the gross enrolment rate at the tertiary level increased to 19 per cent in 2004, it was still far behind many countries.

Middle income countries typically have a gross enrolment rate of 29 per cent, while high income level OECD countries averaged 71 per cent in 2004.

China's tertiary enrolment rate was even lower than some developing countries like Mexico (23 per cent), the authors noted.

Indigenization of Christianity in Korea

Writer Chai-shin Yu argued in the epilogue of his book that it is impossible for churches to do successful missionary work without understanding the cultural basis of the community.

He also called for a greater indigenization of the Catholic faith in Korea. (The Founding of Catholic Tradition in Korea, Ed. Chai-Shin Yu, Asian Humanities Press 2004).

For a start, a tradition that is unique to Korea is the existence and importance of "elderly female evangelists."

"Although they were theologically untrained, they were very earnest in prayer, often healed the sick, and taught the Bible with an Asian interpretation," Yu wrote.

Moreover, in Korean churches, the ministers are seen as highly respected leaders with absolute authority.

"Although the Old Testament does depict the prophets as men of God, the Korean minister's authority comes from the Confucian tradition and its virtual caste system."

Early church buildings in Korea were built not in a contemporary western style but with traditional brick and straw. In Korean churches, men were separated from women by a curtain between the two seated groups. This was influenced by the Confucian teaching that male and female should not sit together after the age of seven.

Yu added rather emphatically that "the church in Korea still adopts western theology without criticism and brings it in as if it were the absolute truth. It has already been 200 years since the introduction of Catholicism and 100 since the introduction of Protestantism, but the exegeses of the Bible that are available in Korea are for the most part purely American. We do not find many real Korean Biblical sources or Christian references. Sermons in the churches are almost entirely dependent on western references."

He suggested that "ideally, the Korean church will integrate the spiritual life of traditional Korea with the absolute gospels of western thoughts to make an indigenous Korean Christianity."