Anti-Bushism, Not Anti-Americanism

In a fairly hard-hitting article, Bruce Cumings argued that what is seen as anti-Americanism in South Korea during the Bush administration is actually "anti-Bushism".

He noted that the policies of the Bush administration was responsible for the upsurge in rhetoric and protest in South Korea since 2000.

"Over 35 years of closely following Korean-American relations, I can think of no time when affairs have been allowed to deteriorate so drastically, nor can I think of an administration that has struck more dissonant notes, than the Bush administration," wrote Cumings. (Anti-Americanism in South Korea, in Insight Into Korea, Herald Media 2007).

"Through acts of commission and omission, it seriously disrupted the norms and expectations of our historic relationship with Seoul, and plunged the relationship with Pyongyang into a dangerous stalemate."

"It is difficult to see that anything has come out of the past six years that can be called a success, an achievement, or an advance of basic American interests - not, that is, until the "back to the future" somersault in February 2007, when the Bush administration essentially adopted Bill Clinton's strategy of engaging the North. And miraculously, public opinion against the United States began softening."

Cumings noted that "a virulent and violent form of anti-Americanism" developed in South Korea in the 1980s due mainly to the suppression of the Gwangju rebellion in May 1980, along with US support for Chun Doo Hwan's subsequent coup.

Describing the uprising as "the Tiananmen of an entire generation of young people", Cumings added that the uprising was a defining moment in modern South Korean history which had led to "endless anti-American demonstrations" in the 1980s.

That defining moment is "instantly recalled by people who were young in the 1980s" but who are now leaders in all walks of Korean life, including former president Roh Moo-hyun.

"Even then, and even among vociferous critics, however, they usually complain about American policies rather than Americans as such; furthermore they will jump at the chance to study or work in the United States, and send their children to study in the United States."

"In Korea, we are not looking at anything like the broad rejection of American power, culture, and values that is seen across the Middle East. Koreans are so used to things American, by virtue of the intense relationship over the past 60 years, that the vast majority are going to have not pro- or anti-American views, but very complex, mixed views."

Even so, Cumings noted that a person who is now 40, not Christian, with no relatives in the US, and no experience with Americans, and coming from the Southwest, "is likely to be very anti-American."

"These days a farmer of any age or region is likely to be anti-Americanism because of Washington's attempts to open the agricultural market to American meats and produce."

On North Korea, Cumings contended that the American war on terror and the invasion of Iraq had led to deep strains with Seoul due to a variety of reasons.

These include a lack of proper consultation in moving American troops from Korea to Iraq, and a new policy of using US troops stationed in Korea in a regional conflict that might involve China.

This led to repeated attempts by Seoul to seek assurance from Washington that the North would not be attacked without close consultations with Seoul.

"It is my understanding that the Roh Moo-hyun administration has not gotten those assurances. Since the North can destroy Seoul in a matter of hours with some 10,000 artillery guns buried in the mountains north of the capital, one can imagine the extreme consternation that the Bush doctrine caused in Seoul ... when I visited Seoul in August 2003 a prominent official told me that relations between the two militaries had never been worse."

Cumings argued that to begin afresh, Washington should normalize ties with the North, "long after all our allies except for Japan have done so (and Japan will do it the minute we do)", guarantee Seoul that the US will not use its forces in Korea in a conflict over Taiwan, and to reduce the "anachronistic American troop presence in Korea."

"It is in the American interest to find a better way to deploy its troops in Korea, now in their seventh decade. And perhaps by having an embassy in Pyongyang, American would finally gain some leverage over an antagonist that has been thumbing its nose at the United States for more than 60 years."