Volatile Chinese Nationalism

In one of my earlier postings, I mentioned that Chinese leaders do realize that nationalism is not like a switch that they can turn on and off as and when they like.

Anne Stevenson-Yang basically provided further evidence when she noted that the "fiercely nationalistic press campaigns" directed by the Propaganda Bureau after the NATO bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the plane collision off Hainan island in 2001 "may have had unintended repercussions."

For instance, after the September 11 attacks, the chatrooms of the Chinese portals were filled with people talking about how China "needs its own bin Laden" and how, in a sarcastic reference to the NATO bombing, the pilots of the two planes that hit the World Trade Center must have been "using maps from 1972, when the World Trade Center was built in 1973."

So much so that by the third day since the attacks, the Propaganda Bureau saw fit to issue "guidance", and this was followed by a suppression of strong nationalistic views.

Hardly surprising, since nationalistic sentiments could easily - or if left to their devices - spiral out of control.