Maneuvering Prior to the 1995 Cross Strait Crisis

Much has been said and written about China's "sabre-rattling" prior to the 1995 Presidential elections in Taiwan. But much less has been noted about the internal dynamics of Beijing leading up to the said "rattling".

According to Richard C. Bush in his book Untying the Knot Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, then Chinese leader Jiang Zemin (江泽民) was criticized by his colleagues for allowing Taiwan leader Lee Teng-hui (李登辉) to visit the United States.

In particular, two of Jiang's civilian political rivals - Qiao Shi (乔石) and Li Ruihuan (李瑞环) - were said to have used the Taiwan crisis to put Jiang on the defensive.

As Bush noted: "What is less clear is whether there was a split between the military and the rest of the leadership on how to respond to the Lee visit. One school of thought ... concludes that military leaders, along with some civilians, had opposed civilian policies for some time and used events like the Lee visit to impose their views on Jiang, constraining his options and forcing a tougher policy that employed military training exercises as tools for intimidation."

But others dismissed the idea of a deep division over Taiwan. Rather, they see a consultative policy process in which the leadership altered its policy consensus in order to respond to changing circumstances, and that both civilian and military leaders agreed that a tough response to Lee's visit was required.