Korean Women

This is a decade-old depiction of Korean women found in Passport Korea (World Trade Press, 1998).

Author Kevin Keating noted that South Korea holds the title for the Asian country most averse to female bosses and paying women what their male counterparts are paid.

"Whatever power Korean women have is more likely to stem from their families or husbands' high social standing than from their own personal, occupational or professional standing."

Keating also added that Korea remains a male-dominated society where women help men put on their coats, let men go through doors first, and in general are expected to play supportive roles as "whatever a women does publicly has to make men look good."

Only through hard work and a great deal of time spent proving herself can a woman hope to be treated as an equal. Still, they must be on guard "not to upset males egos."

Cynical Quotes About the CCP

These quotes were found in 一面之词 (One-sided View, 胡平，Hu Ping, 明镜出版社, Ming Jing Publishing Press, 1998).

过去，共产党要我们把毛泽东奉为神，因此对他的指示必须绝对服从。

如今，共产党又要我们把毛泽东当作人，因此对他的过错必须多加原谅。

这真是太惬意了；毛享有神的权利，但只负人的责任。天下的便宜事都让他占完了。

In the past, the CCP wanted us to treat Mao Zedong like God, hence we have to absolutely obey his orders.

But now, the CCP wants us to treat Mao Zedong like a human being, hence we have to forgive his mistakes.

This is way too cushy. Mao enjoyed the rights of God, but only has to bear the responsibilities of human beings. He seemed to have taken advantages of all the best deals under the sun.

早期的共产党领导人讲话，讲的都是自己相信的事情。

后来的共产党领导人讲话，自己已经不再相信，但还指望别人相信。

现在的共产党领导人讲话，大概是连别人会相信这一点也不相信了。

When early CCP leaders speak, they say things which they themselves believed in.

Later when CCP leaders speak, they do not believe in what they said, yet they expected others to believe what they said.

Now when CCP leaders speak, they do not even believe that others will believe what they said.

A Martin Lee Story

Hong Kong's most well-known democracy activist Martin Lee (李柱铭) recounted in 1996 a personal incident which took place in 1990 when discussions were underway about the territory's somewhat uncertain future.

"When I got home my 8-year old son Joey was already in bed. He is a wonderful character and was a very lively, happy child. But that evening, when I went to kiss him good-night, he was sobbing his heart out ... I asked him, "Joey, why are you crying?"

"He said, "Oh, Daddy, I'm worried that I won't ever be able to have a birthday present from you in the future." I assured him that he would always have a present, but he replied, "How can you promise me that after 1997? You've already said you won't leave Hong Kong in 1997, and this evening I watched the television program. After 1997 they are going to arrest you, they are going to put you in prison. How can you give me a present then?"

"The episode made me very sad because in my fight for democracy and human rights, I knew there would be personal sacrifices, but I realized then the likely cost to those dearest to me." (Sally Blyth and Ian Wotherspoon, Hong Kong Remembers, 1996, Oxford University Press).

Interestingly, for me at least, is that Lee was selected in 1985 to sit on the Basic Law Drafting Committee. He was only removed four years later after he condemned the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, and for his role in the founding of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Movement in China, an organization branded as subversive by Beijing.

So Lee had not always been a pariah in the eyes of the Chinese authorities.

Hong Kong TVB Trivial

In 1998, a TVB reporter was chided by Su Xu, a Chinese embassy official in France, for having "embarrassed" then Premier Zhu Rongji (朱镕基) by asking the latter to comment on the protest action by Journalists Without Frontier.

The group had apparently hurled handbills at Zhu, demanding the release of Chinese journalist Gao Yu.

The embassy functionary threatened to sever all "cooperative relations" with the station if the reporter failed to fall in line.

This episode was mentioned in an article by Carol Lai and Andy Ho titled How Free is the Press (in Chris Yeung, ed, Hong Kong China The Red Dawn, Prentice Hall, 1998) as an example of China's "carrot-and-stick tactics to bring Hong Kong's media into line" after the handover.

Naturally, the incident incited strong reactions in Hong Kong at that time, and was seen as a violation of the territory's free-wheeling press freedom.

Tung Chee Hwa and Post-Handover Hong Kong

In a 1998 article by Willy Wo-lap Lam (林合立), some hawks within the Hong Kong branch of China's Xinhua News Agency were said to be attempting to "claw back territory" by telling the Central Government that Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa (董建华) was not up to his job - and that he needed to be "supervised" by mainland cadres.

"After all, bad blood between Xinhua and Tung goes back to pre-handover times, when the former backed the candidacy of top judge Yang Ti-liang (杨铁梁) for Chief Executive," Lam wrote in Beijing's Hong Kong Policy in the First Year of Transition (in Chris Yeung, ed, Hong Kong China The Red Dawn, Prentice Hall, 1998).

If only the said supervision had gone ahead as planned and with intensity!

The article also noted that when Tung assumed the position of Chief Executive, he aspired to achieve the stature of "an East Asiatic strongman in the mode of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) and Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀)", the two politicians he reportedly admired most.

Lam also had this cautionary tale to add: "When asked about the secret to maintaining Hong Kong's viability, Politburo member Li Ruihuan (李瑞环) cited in 1993 the fable of the Yixing (宜兴) teapot. The value of the priceless teapot from Yixing, Zhejiang province, lay in the layer upon layer of residue accumulated through decades of constant use. Some time in the Qing dynasty, such a vessel fell into the hands of a foolish woman who offered it for sale in the market. A connoisseur was willing to pay a lot of money for it. While waiting for the man to return with the money, the woman scrubbed the teapot clean, rendering it worthless. Unfortunately, in the nine months since the handover, Hong Kong has experienced the same kind of cultural and political cleansing in the name of promoting patriotism and "Chinese values". The fate of One Country Two Systems, one of the unique enterprises of humankind, hangs in the balance."

Hong Kong and China's Clapping Culture

It is always interesting, if not illuminating to re-read old books in my possession. Or at least books that I will soon get rid of later this week.

In Chris Yeung's Hong Kong China The Red Dawn (Prentice Hall, 1998), the author noted that former Hong Kong chief executive Tung Chee Hwa was embroiled in a controversy when he proposed that members clap their hands to show their approval of a procedural matter.

"It conjured fears that the mainland's culture of clapping hands would intrude into the territory."

Yeung added that the fact that Tung's move stirred a controversy showed that many people are still extremely sensitive about the infiltration of mainland's political culture.

Michael Chiang's Private Parts

I tried selling Singapore playwright Michael Chiang's Private Parts and Other Play Things - A Collection of Popular Singapore Comedies (Landmark Books, 1994) online but it remained unsold for several months. Sigh. Guess it will end up at the used book section of the public library.

I must have read the book 14 years ago and cannot remember anything about the contents whatsoever.

But when I flipped through it this week, I found two paragraphs I highlighted at that time.

1. Edward: "We are witnessing this so-called liberalization in Singapore (pictured). It started with the easing of censorship. The more open-style of government. The let's-hear-what-everybody-has-to-say philosophy. Great! but deep down, people don't change. These perceptions and prejudices remain as narrow as ever."

2. Mirabella: "Was I that wrong about you? Did I see something that wasn't there? I've always been so sure of everything. Were you the one honest man I hoped for? Or were you just one more betrayal?"

Warren: "Oh Mirabella. I never betrayed you. Yes, I could have loved you. But it just wasn't out place and it wasn't our time."

What was I thinking at that time when I highlighted the portions? Funny they still manage to strike a chord in me.

In The Shadow of the Moons

I first read Nansook Hong's In the Shadow of the Moons - My Life in the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Family (Little, Brown and Company, 1998) a few years ago.

Even though details surrounding the Moonies - a religious, though many call it a cult, movement - were eye-opening and shocking, I saw the depictions merely as the outcome of a group of disturbed people who had deliberately twisted the teachings of Christianity to suit their own purposes.

But when I picked up the book again this week, I began to wonder if the Korean backgrounds of the Moons might have contributed to the blind obedience to the teachings of the Unification Church. Of course I have to concur that that there are all kinds of cult groups in the world from all cultural backgrounds. But still, I wondered if the pecularities of the Unification Church had its grounding in at least some elements of Korean culture.

Unification church head Reverend Sun Myung Moon claimed he had been chosen by God to complete Jesus' mission in restoring the Garden of Eden, and that he was the Second Coming. Marriage is at the center of the Church's doctrine. Moon held that because Jesus was crucified before he could marry and sire sinless children, the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth had not been opened to mankind. It is therefore Moon's role as Lord of the Second Advent to complete the work Jesus left undone. With his wife, Moon sired "the first sinless True Family of God by producing children born free of original sin." The rest of humankind can become part of this sinless legacy only by receiving marriage blessings from the Church.

As Moon's former daughter-in-law Hong wrote: "Those beliefs, isolated from the theology in which they are embedded and the culture from which they sprang, admittedly sound bizarre. But what of the miracles of Jesus? Or the parting of the Red Sea? Are Bible stories of virgin births and resurrection not equally fantastic? All belief is a matter of faith."

The Church forbade followers from smoking, drinking, gambling and sex outside of marriage. Yet the First Family were said to have violated those very same rules. Followers had to love their True Parents more than themselves, their spouses, and their children. Followers also had to contribute to a fund known as "indemnity fund". The payment symbolizes the Church's teaching that all of humanity shares in the debt owed for the betrayal of Jesus, and that everyone must all pay for this collective sin.

Moon and his family moved to the United States in 1971 on the pretext that he was directed by God to do so as the US was said to be on the verge of a moral collapse similar to that which destroyed Rome in the first century.

Moon taught that Korean is the universal language of the Kingdom of Heaven, but yet his youngest children reportedly did not even speak the language. Moon taught that gambling is a sin, yet as Lord of the Second Advent, he claimed it was his duty to "mingle with sinners in order to save them," and that he had to understand their sin in order to dissuade them from it. Moon even reportedly match-made Jesus to an elderly Korean woman because the Unification Church teaches that only married couples can enter the Kingdom of Heaven, and that "Jesus needed the intervention to move through those gates."

In a defence of the Church, Hong noted that there was an innocence and gentleness about the Church's beliefs that is seldom reflected in the denunciations of its members as "cultist". "We may have been seduced into a cult, but most of us were not cultists; we were idealists."

The True Family was said to have treated the staff like indentured servants. The kitchen sitters and baby-sitters slept six to a room in the attic. They were given a small stipend but no real salary. The situation was little better for security guards, gardeners and handymen. The Moons' attitude was that church members were privileged to live in such close proximity to the True Family. In exchange for that honor, they were ordered around by even the youngest of the Moons. The Church also taught that wives are subservient to their husbands, just as children are subservient to their parents. Moon even noted that "wives should be struck every now and then to keep them humble."

Moon reportedly taught his children that they were little princes and princesses, and they acted accordingly.

"It was embarrassing to watch and amazing to see how accepting the staff were of the verbal abuse meted out by the Moon children. Like me, they believed the True Family was faultless. If any of the Moons had complaints with us, it must reflect not on their expectations but on our own unworthiness."

Hong was match-made to Moon's eldest son Hyo Jin when she was merely 15, a move she did not hesitate as "this was every Unification girl's dream." "To be Hyo Jin Moon's wife meant I would one day be the Mother of the Church. I felt humbled and honored. That Hyo Jin himself was no girl's idea of Prince Charming did not even occur to me. A blessing was the uniting of two souls, not just the union of two human beings."

Shortly after marriage, Hyo Jin reportedly went to his mother to complain about Hong's "lack of sexual maturity."

"She called me to her one day to discuss my wifely duties. It was very awkward. I had trouble following her euphemisms about being a lady during the day and a woman at night. We must be friends to our husbands in the day but fulfil their fantasies at night, she said; otherwise they will stray. If a husband does stray, it reflects a wife's failure to satisfy him. I must try harder to be the kind of woman Hyo Jin wants. I was confused. Hadn't Sun Myung Moon chosen me for my innocence? Was I now expected to be a temptress? At fifteen?"

After years of abuse at the hands of her husband and the growing awakening to the absurdities of the Church's teaching, Hong decided to pack her bags, take her children ("the only thing holy about my marriage"), leave and "reclaim her life."

"Accepting the Reverend Moon for the fraud I now know him to be was a slow and painful process. It was only possible because that realization, in the end, did not shake my faith in God. Moon had failed God, as he has failed me and all his idealistic and trusting followers. But God had not failed me ... It was God alone who comforted me, a woman-child in the hands of a husband who treated me either as a toy for his sexual pleasure or as an outlet for his violent rages." As Hong concluded: "The evil at the heart of the Unification Church is the hypocrisy and deceit of the Moons, a family that is all too human in its incredible level of dysfunction. To continue to promote the myth that the Moons are spiritually superior to the idealistic young people who are drawn to the church is a shameful deceit."

China's Increased Global Role and the Impact on the US

China's increased global role and influence pose a variety of diplomatic, economic and security challenges for the United States, but all of which are negative.

China's interaction with regional organizations around the world will complicate US regional diplomacy and makes it harder for the US to engage regional organizations in support of American objectives. Chinese leaders appear to be conscious of US sensitivities about Chinese involvement in the Middle East and Latin America, and this is likely to restrain their diplomatic initiatives in these regions.

"China will find it easier to increase its influence in regions or countries that are not top priorities for the United States (such as sub-Saharan Africa). This may set up a competitive dynamic where the United States feels pressure to increase the attention and resources it devotes to countries and regions that would otherwise be considered low priority," wrote Phillips S. Saunder in China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October 2006.)

In the case of Asia, China's increasing influence could conflict with important US interests. But as Saunders pointed out, the US has considerable hard and soft power resources, and is "well-positioned to compete effectively with China if necessary."

As for China's increased influence in international organizations, Saunders predict that this is likely to complicate US efforts in pursuing a global agenda that includes democracy, human rights, and labor issues. This dynamic is already apparent in Burma, where both China and India had been dealing with the junta without raising human rights issues.

Turning to the short-term willingness of Chinese firms in securing access to energy and other natural resources at prices that are not commercially viable, Saunders noted that this may make it difficult for US firms to compete, especially given the opaque corporate structure of Chinese national oil companies and their likely access to state-subsidized loans.

To tackle such competition, the US could engage China in discussions about international rules for state financing and support for investment in energy resources. But like other late entrants into the international energy game, Beijing will be reluctant to give up these "perks." But efforts to engage the Chinese central and local governments on improving energy efficiency are expected to be more successful, and may also provide commercial opportunities for US companies.

Saunders' conclusion was that China's increased influence needs to be kept in perspective. Chinese military power projection capability remains limited. Chinese businesses are taking their first steps in efforts to become global multinationals. And even though China is an export powerhouse, 60 per cent of its exports are produced by foreign invested firms. China's global influence is increasing, but China still operates within the framework of global institutions established by the United States.

"Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick was correct when he argued that China has been a major beneficiary of the existing international system over the last 25 years and that it needs to take more responsibility for sustaining this system. The United States should look for opportunities to influence Chinese definitions of global interests and attitudes toward international norms in positive directions ... the relationship is not a zero-sum competition ... engagement and dialogue are critical aspects of US efforts to turn China into a responsible stakeholder that will play a positive global role."

South Korea's Presidential Elections

In the wake of Lee Myung-bak's electoral victory in yesterday's South Korea presidential elections, Washington-based analysts offered their analysis in a talk held at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars.

Charles Armstrong noted that even though Lee is a conservative, he is hardly a traditional Korean conservative, and is unlikely to reject the policies of the previous two administrations. He also noted that Lee's popularity is widely spread out among all age groups, which is a sharp contrast to opponent Lee Hoi Chang who "found it hard to attract people below 50 years old."

On how Lee will deal with North Korea, Armstrong predicted that Lee will demand more reciprocity from the reclusive regime. Armstrong noted that North Korea is not an issue in this election due to the lack of discernible differences among the candidates. In fact, Lee even came across as more attractive because of his Hyundai background. Moreover, young South Koreans perceive North Korea "neither with fear or affection, but mainly indifference."

As for the implications of Lee's win on the United States, Armstrong predicted that Lee, who is pro-American, will improve relations with the US. But a few areas of friction remain, and these include redeployment of US Forces in South Korea, the issue of North Korea, and whether the US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement will be passed by Congress, and if not, how this would affect bilateral trade and even ties.

Armstrong also noted that Lee is not a throwback to the past, and there will not be a return to the "good old days of the US-ROK alliance."

Other analysts noted that despite political reforms over the years, South Korea's political system still remains fluid, and such fluidity will be an obstacle for improving corporate governance and tackling corruption. One analyst also predicted a revival of an imperial presidency where there is strong leadership in setting economic direction, though that in itself is not incompatible with improving corporate governance and ensuring better coordination between government ministries.

An imperial presidency will also promote business policies to encourage business and growth. But in the case of Lee, analysts believe it might be difficult for the president-elect, given his CEO background, to push for tough and difficult corporate and governmental reforms.

China's Energy Security

China has sought to address its energy security by setting up an energy leading group in 2004 headed by Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) to make policy decisions on energy security. Implementation is said to be handled by the Energy Bureau, a sub-ministerial body under the State Development and Reform Commission.

However, Western energy experts doubt that these bodies have sufficient bureaucratic stature to craft and implement a coherent policy for energy security. They also noted that the policy making offices are under-staffed and have routinely approached Chinese national oil companies for policy suggestions (when the offices are supposed to be developing national policy to regulate the activities of Chinese oil companies).

Concerns about the impact of rising energy prices on domestic output and employment prompted the Chinese government to allow the gap between subsidized domestic oil and gasoline prices and world prices to increase significantly in 2004-2005. As a result, Chinese producers and consumers were paying artificially low prices for energy, and therefore consuming too much, while Chinese refiners and energy producers had economic incentives to export gasoline rather than selling to domestic consumers at a loss.

These conditions produced scattered oil and gasoline shortages that forced a number of Guangdong (广东) factories to shut down production in summer 2005. The Chinese government eventually responded by raising domestic prices.

Interestingly, Chinese national oil companies are said to be pursuing independent strategies in securing access to oil and natural gas fields, which sometimes result in two Chinese companies bidding against each other for the same development opportunity. (Phillip C. Saunders, China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October 2006).

China's Soft Power

The possibility of China wielding its soft power has emerged as a discernible trend over the last few years.

As Phillip C. Saunders pointed out, China has carved out a new identity as a successful "authoritarian development state." Some believe the approach of reforming the economy while limiting political freedom represents a new model with considerable appeal to authoritarian leaders in developing countries. China's manned space flights are also cited as evidence of scientific and technological success that creates soft power.

But since China's development model draws heavily on orthodox development economics and benefits from special factors such as a large domestic market and labor supply that cannot be replicated by most other countries, many believe that this will limit China's attractiveness as a model for others. Other put-offs include China's domestic problems, social inequality, environmental degradation, and periodic political clampdowns. A slowdown in growth or a major political incident would also highlight these issues and will "significantly reduce China's ability to employ soft power as a diplomatic tool."

On the part of the Chinese government, it had been devoting significant resources to promoting Chinese language and culture as a mean of promoting its soft power. Foreign student enrollment in Chinese universities had increased from 85,000 in 2002 to 110,000 in 2004. About 75 per cent of foreign students are from Asian countries, with South Korea (43,600) and Japan (19,000) sending the most students in 2004 (China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October 2006).

"Appeals to cultural and linguistic affinities are especially important in dealing with countries with considerable ethnic Chinese minorities. Malaysia and Indonesia, which previously viewed their ethnic Chinese populations with suspicion, now regard them as an asset and comparative advantage in building economic relations with China."

Interestingly, the first American Confucius Institute was established at the University of Maryland in 2004 (pictured). And as Saunders noted, "Confucius institutes may further marginalize Taiwan by promoting the use of simplified Chinese used in the mainland rather than the traditional characters used in Taiwan."

Chinese Arms Sales as a Potential Foreign Policy Tool

Phillip C. Saunders predicted that continuing improvements in China's defence industry will not only increase the future quality of its arms, but also the relative importance of arms sales as a foreign policy tool.

Right now, because China's defense industries still cannot produce state-of-the-art weapons systems, Chinese arms compete on the basis of price rather than capabilities. Customers tend to be cash-strapped developing countries in South Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East that are willing to trade advanced capabilities for lower cost.

"Willingness to finance purchases or to provide arms at "friendship prices" is often an important selling point. Some countries, such as Kuwait and Thailand, have purchased Chinese arms as a symbol of political cooperation." (China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October 2006).

China's "Flattery" Diplomacy

For those of us who used to watch (or are still watching) the nightly national bulletins (新闻联播) on prime-time Chinese television, it is clear that top Chinese leaders' meetings with foreign dignitaries usually dominate the first half of the bulletin.

According to Phillip C. Saunders, Beijing emphasizes form and hospitality to ensure that foreign leaders have enjoyable visits, thus creating "an implicit sense of obligation." (China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October 2006).

"This tactic is particularly effective with leaders of smaller countries, who are often flattered by the attention."

China also pressures diplomatic partners to make concessions or enter into agreements to make high-level visits successful. For example, Philippine President Arroyo's September 2004 visit to Beijing was upgraded from an official visit to a state visit once the Philippines agreed to sign a joint agreement for seismic exploration in the South China Sea, and to recognize China as a market economy.

Evolvement of Joint Ventures in China

In the past, joint ventures with foreign firms investing in the country were the primary means for China in acquiring new and foreign technology.

But since China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign firms were able to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries. This enabled such firms to avoid sharing technology with their Chinese partners.

This provides incentives for Chinese firms to pursue technology by acquiring foreign companies. For example, Huawei (华威), a major Chinese telecommunications manufacturer, has expressed interest in purchasing the British firm Marconi. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp (SAIC), a leading Chinese auto manufacturer, on the other hand, purchased Korean automaker SsangYong Motors for $500 million in October 2004. Access to Korean firms' technology, research and development capability was said to be an important motive for the deal (Phillips C. Saunders, China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October 2006).

Beijing also has other means of acquiring technology. It has signed technology sharing agreements with more than 50 countries, including Russia, Israel and major western European countries. These agreements allow China to acquire technology legitimately. Illegal methods include organized espionage or from individuals who know that bringing commercially valuable technology to China will be helpful in securing employment.

Expanding Chinese Political Influence

According to Phillip C. Saunders, China has a range of motives for building political influence with countries in various regions of the world.

The first is to isolate Taiwan as the global competition with Taiwan for exclusive diplomatic recognition is a zero-sum game. And countries potentially susceptible to financial enticements from Taipei to switch diplomatic recognition invariably receive special attention from Beijing.

The second is to protect Chinese interests from adverse international actions. The prototypical example is China's effort to prevent the UN Human Rights Commission from considering resolutions critical of its human rights conditions. Other examples include Beijing's successful efforts in exempting developing countries from binding obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and in organizing opposition to Japanese efforts to join the UN Security Council.

The third is to advance Chinese diplomatic goals. China's campaign to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the late 1990s illustrates its efforts in using political influence to achieve specific policy objectives. Since 2004, Beijing has also sought to persuade countries to declare China a "market economy" not subject to stringent anti-dumping actions under WTO rules.

Beijing has also practiced what Saunders called "ricochet diplomacy" (China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October 2006), or using declarations by small countries to press large trading partners to recognize China as a market economy. For example, Singapore's and Malaysia's declarations of China's market economy status in May 2004 were used to press other ASEAN states to follow suit, which they did at the China-ASEAN summit in Laos in November 2004. China is using its recognition as a market economy by 37 countries to press the European Union for a similar status.

The fourth is to limit Japan's international goal. Among other things, China supports the US-Japan security alliance so long as it restrains Japan. But Beijing also fears that the alliance might play a negative role in efforts to achieve Taiwan unification. Indeed, Japan's power and economic presence in Asia are seen as obstacles to greater Chinese regional influence.

Pragmatic Chinese Foreign Policy

When strategic concerns or foreign policy conflicts have threatened to interfere with the conditions necessary for growth, Chinese leaders have made pragmatic compromises to keep the economy growing.

So said Phillip C. Saunders in an occasional paper titled China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, October 2006).

Such compromises include: 1) welcoming trade and investment from political suspect sources including political rival Taiwan, and 2) making concessions in order to ensure access to US markets. This can be seen when the US used the renewal of China's most-favored nation status in the 1990s to press for human rights improvements, whereupon Beijing grudgingly made the concessions necessary to maintain trade ties.

Other compromises include 3) curtailing nuclear cooperation with countries such as Pakistan and Iran, and reduced or eliminated assistance to Syrian, Iranian and Pakistani missile programs in response to US pressures, 4) taking a tolerant attitude towards the assertion of sovereignty by Taiwan leaders and the increased US arms sales to and security cooperation with Taipei, and 5) suppressing anti-Japanese protests when such sentiments have escalated to the point where they threaten economic ties.

Japan-South Korea Territorial Dispute

Remember the territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea which erupted in a phenomenal way in 2005?

It started on March 16 when Japan's Shimane Prefecture passed an ordinance to designate February 22 as Takeshima Day. This added fuel to fire to the long-simmering controversy over the ownership of islets known to Japan as Takeshima, and to the Koreans as Dokdo. Koreans were infuriated with the ordinance, which was passed in the symbolic year of 2005 - the centennial of the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty of 1905. Many Koreans felt that the Japanese government had tacitly approved the move, and was further evidence of efforts to justify Japan's colonial rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945.

Writing in Japan Echo (August 2005), Osaka University professor Park Il noted that he could not think of any Korean president who had been as fiercely critical of Japan as Korean president Roh Moo-hyun, particuarly in the weeks surrounding the controversy.

"The only possibility I can think of is Syngman Rhee, the nation's first president, who in the 1950s pursued a foreign policy of a harshly anti-Japanese nature."

Regarding the ordinance, the Japanese government had offered the excuse that ordinances were matters for local government bodies to decide on, and that the central government must not interfere in local matters.

Refuting this argument, Park noted that Tokyo certainly did not sit silently by when Governor Hashimoto Daijiro of Kochi Prefecture proposed an ordinance in 1999 to prevent nuclear-armed vessels from calling on the Port of Kochi. Instead, Tokyo protested loudly, saying that Kochi was intruding upon the central government's right to conduct diplomacy, and the bill was eventually rejected.

Park also took the Japanese government to task for not having intervened earlier.

Apparently, the 1999 fisheries agreement between Japan and Korea put the question of territorial boundaries on hold. It stipulated that the waters in the vicinity of Takeshima was not part of the exclusive economic zone of either country, but fall instead in a neutral zone to be jointly managed by Tokyo and Seoul.

At that point, as Park pointed out, it should still have been possible for either country's boats to fish freely in the area. But Korea then strengthened its hold on the islets using military personnel stationed there permanently, and Japanese fishing boats have since been prevented from approaching the islets and fishing around them. Fishing being a major industry in Shimane, local fisheries petitioned authorities in Tokyo several times for help in gaining access to the fertile seas around Takashima, but each time they were advised not to stir up trouble.

"If the Japanese government, upon hearing the complaints of these fishers, had entered into talks with the Korean government to seek a solution, and if the talks had fruitful results, the prefecture assembly might never have bothered to designate a Takeshima Day."

Another Japanese View on Chinese Nationalism

Terumasa Nakanishi noted that "history" is simply a Chinese foreign policy tool, and that anti-Japanese sentiments in China were mainly driven by the agenda of Beijing's "authoritarian leaders." He also argued that what China calls history is often based on a self-serving - and highly suspect - interpretation of the past.

The Kyoto University professor said even though Chinese appeared to be boycotting Japanese products and protesting about the content of Japanese history textbooks and visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni war shrine, the main target of the anger was actually Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Arguing that Chinese leaders have used the past as a "cudgel to browbeat Japan", Nakanishi claimed that the Chinese had often overstated their case. He also took Beijing to task for its "selective memory", and accused the Chinese authorities for treating history in an arbitrary manner.

For example, the 1932 Lytton Commission report on Manchuria had reportedly rejected Japanese "defensive" activities there. Nakanishi wrote that the League of Nations team that visited Manchuria was "the target of skilled operations by the Chinese intelligence agency, using spies, agents, and even the sexual allure of Chinese women." The Chinese also staged a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations, and "used just about every means imaginable to paint Japan in a bad light."

"The result was a report that offered the one-sided judgment that Japan was an aggressor ... in 1933, when the League's General Assembly voted 42-1 to accept the report and demand that Japan withdraw its forces from Manchuria, it felt that it had been "crucified" by the international body and simply quit in a huff. In doing so, our country ended up playing right into China's hand," Nakanishi wrote in Japan Echo (August 2005).

"In order to advance China's national interests and their own political objectives, the rulers in Beijing have no compunctions about playing games on the international stage, mobilizing the people through various maneuvers and appealing to international opinion with consummate skill."

While stating that the relationship between China and Japan is "politically cold but economically hot", Nakanishi berated the Japanese foreign ministry for what he called a "spineless diplomacy."

He complained that the Japanese tend to put all their cards on the table from the beginning, and do not know the importance of bluffing. The Japanese also find it hard to start out with a "tenacious and overstated position and working from there to a negotiated settlement. So the Japanese are always like open books to their Chinese counterparts, and they find themselves unable to make their case effectively, whether in business or in diplomacy."

"In response to the latest rounds of demonstrations, the Japanese government is talking about "dealing with the situation calmly and demanding an apology and compensation." Starting out by presenting this sort of minimal demand is precisely what the Chinese want us to do. The proper approach would be to make a great racket complaining about the Chinese violence and appealing to the rest of the world to recognize the wrong we suffer. This is the only way to get through to China ... the fact that the Japanese have yet to equip themselves with the ability to display strategic anger, an indispensable tool of diplomacy, show that they have failed to learn the lesson of their 20th century failure."

And in an assertion that had certainly riled many Chinese, Nakanishi insisted that Japanese military intervention in China was not the cause of anti-Japanese activities in China, but the result of it. He argued that with or without Japanese aggression, "China is always moved by an anti-Japanese spirit; this is a constant risk of which today's Japanese need to be aware."

A Chinese View of Anti-Japanese Protests

Even though many in Japan suspected that the outbreak of large-scale anti-Japanese protests in 2005 were orchestrated by the Chinese government, Zhu Jianrong argued that this was not the case. Rather, the protests were the result of China's progress in economic liberalization as well as the arrival of the Internet age.

Zhu, a professor at Japan's Toyo Gakuen University noted that Chinese youth were "not so gullible" to be swayed into anti-Japanese activities by the Communist Party's teachings. He argued that the Chinese government itself was alarmed by the intensity of the protests. Authorities placed a curfew on media coverage and shut down several websites espousing radical anti-Japanese views.

Zhu added that leaders in Beijing sensed that if they were seen as bowing their heads to Japan, the emotionally-charged masses could quickly turn on them. A US-based Chinese professor noted that if China's foreign minister had apologized to Japan, the public would have denounced him for selling out the nation, just as Qing dynasty statesman Li Hongzhang (李鸿章) was denounced for signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki to end the Sino-Japanese War more than a century ago.

Zhu also took to task the argument that China's anti-Japanese education was to be blamed for the anti-Japanese demonstrations. He noted that such an argument ignored what was really happening in Chinese society, or more specifically, the growth of the middle class. The argument also diverted attention away from problems on the Japanese side.

"China is the biggest victim of Japan's war of aggression. Some of the weapons abandoned by Japanese forces in China remain undisposed of, and lawsuits involving women forced into prostitution and workers uprooted from their homes are still ongoing. As far as China is concerned, therefore, this chapter of history is very much in the present tense, and in this sense it is only natural for these issues to be taken up in Chinese schools," Zhu wrote in Japan Echo (August 2005).

"That said, I would point out by comparison with my own school days in China some 30 years ago, textbooks over the past decade have come to devote less space to the events of this period. And while they have continued to focus on the heroic struggles of the Communist Party, they have also continued to stress the need to distinguish between the small group of militarists and the majority of the Japanese people."

One wartime episode that had been carried in history books for decades detail the fate of a Communist guerrilla band that fought valiantly against the Japanese until only five members were left, at which point they jumped to their deaths. In 2004, this tale was removed from a textbook used in Shanghai schools, and replaced by the gold-medal performance by Chinese hurdler Liu Xiang (刘翔) at the Athens Olympic Games. In explaining their decision, officials of the Shanghai Board of Education said that wartime exploits were too old to impress today's school children.

Explaining why Chinese police had not stopped protesters from hurling stones during the demonstrations, Zhu said that this was to avert bloody confrontations that could escalate into anti-government riots. President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) was said to have issued a directive in 2004 calling on police to restrain their use of force in dealing with public disturbances.

Zhu also explained why Yasukuni was such a sensitive issue for the Chinese.

When diplomatic relations between China and Japan were restored in 1972, Beijing waived its claims to war reparations. That was despite the fact that Japan had demanded high indemnities from China on previous occasions, such as during the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. At that time, many in China thus felt that it was Japan's turn to "pay up." Yet Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and Zhou Enlai (周恩来) ultimately decided against seeking reparations. Zhou was said to be an especially strong advocate of this approach. He had reportedly spent time in Germany as a student and had seen firsthand how the country seethed with vengeful anger over the huge sums demanded by World War I victors.

"Had China demanded reparations, the Japanese people would have been saddled with a huge financial burden, and so he instead sought a way to break the chain of hatred," Zhu wrote in Japan Echo (August 2005).

"The argument used to justify this decision to the Chinese people was that Japan's aggression against China was masterminded by a handful of militarists, who were convicted as class A war criminals after World War II, and that the majority of the Japanese people were themselves victims of these militarists' policies. For a Japanese prime minister to pay annual visits to Yasukuni, where these war criminals are enshrined along with other war dead, discredits the logic of the Chinese leadership."

Incidentally, the first foreign country to become a target of China's new nationalism was the United States following the Yinhe (银河) incident in 1993. The US Navy stopped a Chinese container carrying chemicals that could be used for mustard gas and nerve gas. The Chinese initially refused to allow inspectors onto the ship, but finally relented after a one-month standoff. No illegal chemicals were found, and Chinese anger toward Americans escalated.

Zhu concluded by saying that a lack of mutual understanding is the root cause of the problems between China and Japan. He noted that more efforts must be made by both sides. Beijing must inform the public of the official development assistance and other contributions that the government and people of Japan have made to China's modernization. And Japan should remind its people of how China had renunciated war reparations and the praise Chinese leaders had expressed for Tokyo's pacifist policy.

Japanese View of Chinese Nationalism

A University of Tokyo professor noted that it is debatable whether opinion within the highest echelons of the Chinese government is even united on a Japan strategy.

Even as Akihiko Tanaka noted that there are many in China who feel that friction with Japan should be avoided for the sake of economic development, such a thinking is "powerless in the face of the overwhelming anti-Japanese sentiment of China's youth. Criticism of Japan has its origins in public education, so it is difficult for the government so say anything."

Tanaka argued that the Chinese government is unable to come up with what he called a radical solution in stemming the on-and-off anti-Japanese protests. Rather, Beijing can only come up with ad hoc measures.

He added: "Chinese public at present is growing increasingly self-confident while at the same time holding on to a victim's mentality ... When you think about it, the very idea of achieving amazing economic growth under a massive communist, authoritarian system is a topsy-turvy kind of social experiment. And if it produces an explosion, it will pose a major crisis for neighboring countries. Ignoring the problem is not an option." (Japan Echo, August 2005)

The long term solution, according to Tanaka, laid in the "democratization of China." He noted that while the feelings of those who had received anti-Japanese education are likely to persist, a democratic society allows for the expression of diverse opinions, "and this creates a greater possibility of holding one-sided xenophobia in check."

Another Japanese observer - an advisor to former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi - noted that whenever anything goes wrong, there will probably be no fracture within the Chinese leadership at least on the matter of taking a hard line anti-Japanese stance.

Yukio Okamoto added that what Japan should really be worried about is what happens 10 to 20 years down the road when the present generation of youth raised with an anti-Japanese mindset moves into leadership positions throughout society.

Chinese and Soviet Involvement in the Korean War

There seems to be conflicting accounts of China's eagerness to get involved in the Korean War. Some analysts suggested that the Chinese were keen to provide military assistance to North Korea, but others indicated otherwise.

James G. Hershberg fell into the latter category when he suggested that China had to be prodded by the Soviets to assist North Korea.

In his article Russian Documents on the Korean War, 1950-53 (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004), Hershberg noted that Stalin sent a message to the Chinese leadership in October 1950 suggesting that China send at least five or six divisions of volunteers to Korea.

But "much to the surprise and consternation of the Soviets", Mao Zedong had demurred, saying that China had tentatively opted not to enter the conflict. Reasons cited included the American advantage in military equipment, China's weakened internal condition following decades of civil strife, and the danger that a clash with America could drag the Soviets into the fray, triggering World War III. While speaking of the need for caution, Mao also "left the door ajar" by noting that the Chinese leadership had not yet taken a final position on the matter.

As Hershberg wrote: "Mao's startling message set the stage for one of the most dramatic documents yet to emerge from the communist archives - Stalin's strongly-worded response arguing that China should enter the Korean War, and brushing aside concerns about the risks of igniting a world war with the confident assertion - "Should we fear this?" - that the Soviets and Chinese together were stronger than the Americans and British, and if war were inevitable, better it happen now, before a rearmed Germany and Japan could contribute to the western military alliance."

Hershberg noted that Mao was "pressured" to live up to Stalin's standards as a loyal ally, especially since both China and the Soviet Union signed a joint treaty in February 1950. Mao would later say that Stalin suspected him of being a second Tito and only trusted him after he intervened in Korea.

Mao eventually decided that China's involvement was necessary for the good of the Sino-Soviet alliance as well as other perceived advantages he could receive from rebuffing the Americans. These include helping to consolidate the revolution against potential domestic enemies, and to head off a long-term security threat from an ascendant U.S. military presence on the border with Manchuria.

As for the armistice that was eventually signed, Hershberg wrote that it was signed only after some final maneuvers by both sides, including Syngman Rhee's sudden release of more than 25,000 POWs without notifying Washington, a move that "threatened to torpedo a potential deal and exacerbated growing US irritation with Rhee."

North Korea and the Soviets 1953-1964

Balazs Szalontai suggested that the North Korean's peculiarities and roots of isolationism can be found in its early relations with the Soviet Union.

To begin with, the relative backwardness of the North Korean economy "necessitated an inordinate dependency on Soviet expertise." For instance, the limited financial resources of the North Korean state led it to establish unpaid security organs, whereby members were present in every village.

In his article "You Have No Political Line of Your Own" Kim Il Sung and the Soviets, 1953-1964 (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004), Szalontai noted that because of the deficiencies of the country's motion picture industry some 60 per cent of the films shown by 1957 were of Soviet origin.

And due to the lack of North Korean authors, translated Soviet works constituted the largest share of books published in 1955. In 1956, North Korean higher education still lacked adequate textbooks, a problem the authorities tried to solve by placing greater emphasis on teaching Russian so that students could use Soviet textbooks until Korean ones could be published.

During this period, Pyongyang took little interest in establishing contacts with communist countries not capable of rendering concrete assistance. In 1954 its relations with Bulgaria and Albania were still at the ministerial instead of ambassadorial level.

"To be sure, the disinterest often proved mutual, since the DPRK had little to offer the East European's "people's democracies." Moreover, many North Korean leaders knew little about Europe or "the ways of the world" which also inhibited the improvement of relations."

A great source of tension between North Korea and the Soviet Union laid in the former's economic policies. As early as November 1954, the Soviets questioned the advisability of rapid collectivization in North Korea which might not only alienate the South Korean peasantry but also the middle classes within North Korea.

The Soviets also criticized North Korean propaganda that depicted South Korea as "a living hell." At that time, informal relations existed between North and South Korea mainly through Japan. North Korea also carried on a contraband trade with the South across the DMZ in order to obtain goods for its economy.

"Under the circumstances, the Soviets thought, Pyongyang should not have ignored the negative effect its domestic policies might produce on South Korean public opinion. Actually Kim Il Sung's economic strategy did not overlook the question of reunification. However, he wanted to overtake the South instead of adjusting to it, which led to further disagreements with (North Korea's) patrons."

In addition, North Korea also failed to meet its foreign trade obligations to Moscow, and even asked the Soviets to cancel their debt. As the North Koreans put it, "your country is rich, you can afford that."

But what really stunned the North Korean leadership was the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. South Korean reaction to the Hungarian events also contributed to Pyongyang's anxiety. High-ranking officials in South Korea's Defence Ministry allegedly made preparations for a military intervention in case a similar revolt took place in North Korea.

Kim did not regard this potential threat lightly. Factory building came to an abrupt halt as the regime assigned workers to the construction of underground plants. Of the North Koreans studying in Hungary, at least one took the opportunity to emigrate to the West, whereupon the regime hurriedly summoned most of its students home.

On North Korean nationalism, Szalontai noted that Chinese leaders proved more tolerant as compared to their Soviet counterparts. For instance, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited North Korea in 1961 and criticized certain North Korean economic policies. After inspecting several factories, Kosygin told Kim that North Korea "should not have wasted time trying to invent everything themselves since in some cases the adoption of foreign patents would have been more economical."

In contrast, Deng Xiaoping explicitly appealed to Korean nationalism by proclaiming that "the Chinese leaders must learn from the Korean leaders" and calling Koreans "a mighty people of 30 million." Naturally, the North Koreans were so pleased that Deng's words were often quoted in intra-party propaganda.

North Korea in the Late 50s and Early 60s

According to Bernd Schafer, soon after returning from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1956, Kim Il Sung had to face an internal revolt within his Korean Worker's Party (KWP).

Kim's leadership was called into question because of the country's economic difficulties, differences over strategies for achieving national unification, and most importantly in the eyes of his party opponents, his personality cult which continued to increase despite the new policy coming out of the USSR after the CPSU's 20th Party Congress.

In his article Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict: The GDR and North Korea, 1979-1989 (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004), Schafer wrote that after a joint Soviet-Chinese intervention by a delegation sent to Pyongyang, some party functionaries ousted from the Central Committee were readmitted for "reeducation," only to be eventually purged in March 1958.

Kim also demoted his ambassador to Moscow Yi Sang-cho who had earlier criticized Kim's personality cult, and refused to distribute official North Korean propaganda in Moscow. Yi eventually decided to remain in exile in the Soviet Union, and Moscow refused Pyongyang's demand for his extradition.

In the article, Schafer noted that Kim accepted vital economic support provided by the USSR and Eastern Europe without acknowledgment. For instance, North Koreans boasted that they had created an entirely new type of tractor within one month.

"In fact, the tractor in question was an exact copy of a model from a factory in the Soviet city of Kharkov, a blueprint of which had been brought back by North Korean specialists who had been trained there."

Furthermore, Kim also adapted the Chinese version of "great leap forward" in the economy in 1958, calling the North Korean version Chollima, or thousand-mile horse. Later, Kim promised Moscow that Pyongyang would not follow the Chinese on their course against the Soviets after Khrushchev promised Kim more economic aid if North Korea gave up its Chollima concept. Still later on, Kim decided to become friendlier to China after the Soviet Union criticized him for his extreme personality cult. But even so, trade with the Soviet Union during this time (early 1960s) was greater than with China. This, according to Schafer, was the result of "economic desperation than of astuteness."

In late 1961, Pyongyang regretted its shift to China because North Korean leaders suspected that the Chinese aim was to make North Korea dependent on China. The Chinese had requested that a commission be set up to monitor the use of Chinese aid, and this led to an anti-Chinese backlash. In addition, the passive, anti-Moscow attitude of China in assisting North Vietnam demonstrated to the North Koreans that only the Soviet Union could deliver the desired military hardware and serve as a guarantor of North Korea's existence.

But when the Cultural Revolution took place in China in 1966, China was seen as a threat to the survival of the North Korean leadership, and China, according to Schafer, "forever lost its exclusive grip on North Korea."

Schafer's description of North Korea then was actually remarkably similar to the North Korea we know today.

"North Korea leadership was actually quite pragmatic with regard to matters of foreign economic assistance. Their policy was to attempt to reap the utmost benefits from any socialist or capitalist country while giving as little as possible in return."

1963 and 1964 also marked the lowest point in North Korea's relations with then East Germany. Especially notable were incidents such as "stone throwing, attempted burglaries and the "kidnapping" of the GDR embassy dog named Dina."

Kidnapping of the embassy dog? Boy, was North Korea that desperate? Relations must have sunk to an all-time low.

Even marriages between Koreans and citizens from Eastern Europe were unwelcome. Korean partners of such couples from Pyongyang were either demoted to the countryside or pressured to divorce their European spouses.

Chinese Perception of American Intentions

When it comes to US intentions towards China, Beijing usually harbors the worst-case scenario, and for good reasons too, according to David M. Finkelstein.

In his article National Missile Defence and China's Current Security Perception (2001), most incidents, mishaps and mistakes between Washington and Beijing "tend to take on the ominous strategic calculation on the part of the Americans" and that "conspiratorial explanations are never hard to find."

These include the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2001 EP-3 incident. Also included was the view held by many Chinese analysts that the US intelligence had forewarning of India's nuclear detonation in 1998 but chose not to share the information with China, hence "proving tacit US approval as part of a greater plan to contain via India."

"Small wonder that it is difficult to convince Beijing that NMD (National Missile Defence) is not "really" aimed primarily at China," Finkelstein wrote.

Admiral Yi Sun-sin and Kobukson

Admiral Yi Sun-sin is said to be Korea's most revered national hero for saving Chosun Korea from the brink of collapse during the Japanese invasion of 1592.

In Admiral Yi Sun-sin A Brief Overview of His Life and Achievements (Diamond Sutra Recitation Group) the unnamed author noted that Admiral Yi "achieved a battle record that no one in history has ever matched."

"Genghis Khan lost 2 battles out of the 20 that he fought, Napoleon Bonaparte lost 4 battles out of the 23, Emperor Frederick lost 4 out of 12, and Hannibal lost 1 out of 5. In all of his 23 battles, Admiral Yi was never once defeated. Overcoming formidable odds in terms of number of ships and troops, he led his navy to victory in every engagement he fought during 7 years of war with the Japanese, losing only2 ships of his own."

Japanese scholar Hujizka Akinao wrote that few of the world's greatest heroes were able to avoid criticism and censure, and most were labelled as oppressors. "Admiral Yi, in contrast, had been held as an object of admiration and reverence even among the Japanese, whose minds were swayed by his pure and absolute loyalty to his country and people, his brilliant use of strategy an tactics which led invariably to victory."

Of Admirai Yi's battles, the most crucial were the Battle of Hansan and the Battle of Myongnyang. He was also the inventor of the iron-clad warship known as the Turtle Ship (Kobukson).

The Kobukson was mounted with a dragon's head at the bow and a turtle's tail at the stern. It had two decks; a lower deck for oarsmen and the storage of supplies, and an upper deck for archers and gunners. It was specially designed so that its sailors could see their enemies outside while remaining invisible to their enemies. This effectively disallowed opponents from boarding the ship and engaging in hand-to-hand combat.

Not only was the ship roofed over, protecting both combat and non-combat personnel, the roof was also fitted with deadly iron spikes, which were often concealed beneath harmless-looking straw mats.

Unlike other warships, the Kobukson had guns stationed not only along its sides, but also in the bow and in the stern, allowing it unprecedented accuracy and flexibility of range in fire power. The dragon head was designed not only to exhale flaming arrows and cannon balls, but also sulfurous fumes and clouds of smoke. This provided the Korean Navy with cover for tactical maneuvers, as well as for, get this, "frightening their opponents."

Wooden nails were used in the construction of the Kobukson. Unlike metal which was quick to rust, wooden nails absorbed water and expanded, and thus overtime the joints become more secure.

North Korea and the Korean War

According to Beijing-based historian Shen Zhihua, China was quick to offer North Korea military support during the Korean War but Kim Il-Sung refused to accept Chinese assistance until forced to do so by the UN advances across the 38th parallel.

Shen attributes Kim's reluctance to 1) over-confidence in his military judgments and 2) the long history of Chinese interference in Korean affairs. These two reasons also explained why Kim preferred to depend on Soviet aid and avoid having China intervene in the war.

"The North Koreans were not prepared to invite the Chinese to send troops, if for no other reason than the severe disagreements between China and North Korea concerning the state of the war and strategic planning."

Despite Stalin's explicit warnings to Kim that he would not send Soviet troops to Korea if the Americans intervened, North Korean leaders nonetheless turned to Moscow. Before sending the letter to Stalin, Kim asked Soviet ambassador Shtykov how best to broach the subject of requesting Soviet troops.

"Shtykov avoided his question, and a confused, lost, hopeless and desperate Kim Il Sung and his Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong swallowed their pride and sent the letter to Moscow. Stalin replied on 1 October that the best plan was to send the Chinese Volunteers' Army (CVA), after first consulting with the Chinese."

With no other choice, Kim urgently summoned the Chinese ambassador late that night and requested that China send the 13th Army Corps, which had already been deployed along the Yalu River, to support the North Korean war effort.

Even after Chinese troops entered the war, Kim's concerns over national sovereignty also led him to resist Chinese efforts to create a joint Sino-Korean command. It was only under Soviet pressure that Kim eventually agreed to the militarily necessary joint command. But prior to that were severe lack of coordination between the Chinese and North Koreans over language, Chinese unfamiliarity with the terrain and many incidents in which the CVA was mistakenly attacked by North Korean troops.

Shtykov made it clear that the Chinese should exercise overall command as the Korean People's Army had been losing battles "despite using Soviet Union's best equipment." Shtykov also praised the Chinese for being able to neutralize large numbers of enemy troops despite having inferior equipment. In his opinion, there was no doubt that the Chinese should command.

Kim likewise resisted placing the management of North Korean railroads under Chinese military, and only agreed to do so after being pressured by the Soviets - a capitulation that, in Shen's estimate, "left a shadow on the heart of Kim Il-Sung."

Shen's article is titled Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution during the Korean War (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004).

Force Restructuring in the ROK-US Military Alliance

North Korea's military has evolved to the point where despite significant resource constraints it can still threaten the stability and security of South Korea with little or no warning. And to downplay this threat is both a poor conduct of military analysis and dangerous to the national security of South Korea.

That's according to Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. in his article Force Restructuring in the ROK-US Military Alliance: Challenges and Implications (September 2006).

Bechtol argued that while the flexibility and professionalism of both the South Korea and American military forces is beyond question, evolving from a combined fighting force as they are now to two separate military commands will be problematic.

Outlining the two very important challenges that the South Korea military faces, Bechtol pointed to the areas of finance and transformation.

To begin with, the Roh Moo-hyun government has announced that its goal is to achieve "self reliant defence." This, according to Bechtol, is "certainly a lofty and expensive goal when one notes that the enemy his nation faces has the fifth largest military in the world, a growing ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capability, and an ongoing foreign policy of belligerence with its neighbors."

The goal is an expensive one considering that the target date for the spending 3% of the national budget on the military is 2015. And since 2015 is still a long way off, it is doubtful if the Seoul government will be able to pay for the increase in military expenditure. After all, the budget is likely to change from year to year and president to president, depending on the foreign policy agenda of each administration.

As for military transformation, Bechtol argued that in order to truly transform, the South Korean military must now assume what he called extremely important missions. But more important, they must adapt their capabilities in order to reach the capability held by the US forces. And two of important capabilities that the US currently bring to the Korean Peninsula are airpower and C41 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence).

"It is important to note, that as things stand right now, South Korea is almost entirely dependent on the US for strategic level information, and there are currently no plans to significantly upgrade systems or sensors owned or scheduled to be acquired by the South Korean government that will meet or even come significantly close to the capability."

"There is another very important capability that is lacking even more so - the lift of South Korea's elite special forces and airborne brigades. This is yet another example of a capability that is vital but to date remains a void filled by US forces."

Furthermore, the South Korean navy is also lacking in its capability to provide its own Marine Corps the lift to conduct large-scale amphibious operations. And to be truly reliant, Bechtol argued that the military also needs a capable anti-missile defence capable of shooting down the more than 600 short-range ballistic missiles that North Korea currently has deployed and pointed at targets throughout South Korea.

North Korea and the Sino-American Opening

The Sino-US rappoache ment took the world by surprise, including North Korean leader Kim Il Sung who saw it as an opportunity to move closer to Beijing, so as to achieve his goal of Korean reunification and the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula.

According to Bernd Schaefer in his article North Korean "Adventurism" and China's Long Shadow, 1966-1972 (Working Paper #44, October 2004, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars), Kim hailed Richard Nixon's visit to China as "a great victory by the Chinese people and revolutionary peoples worldwide" and as the "march of the defeated to Beijing."

Portraying the development as an American attempt to back away from a deadend political strategy, Kim also interpreted Nixon's visit as evidence of the accelerating decline of imperialism and the failure of American hostility towards China.

In North Korean lingo, Kim reportedly said: "The US would stumble from defeat to defeat. The Americans attempted to isolate China, they occupied Taiwan and continuously threatened the PRC. But China developed into a mighty anti-imperialist revolutionary power in Asia, and the American blockage came to a shameful end. Nixon's visit to China would now prove the bankruptcy of America's anti-Chinese policy. Just as the United States came to Panmunjom with a white flag after its defeat in the Korean War, Nixon will head to Beijing. His visit will be that of a loser, not a victor. This will constitute a great triumph for the Chinese people and all revolutionary people worldwide. Now the USA will have to withdraw next from South Korea, Taiwan, Indochina and Japan."

Sino-North Korean Relations During the Cultural Revolution

As audacious and bold as the former North Korean leader sounded in public, Kim Il Sung felt deeply threatened by the Cultural Revolution unleashed by China in 1966.

So said Bernd Schaefer in his article North Korean "Adventurism" and China's Long Shadow, 1966-1972 (Working Paper #44, October 2004, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars).

Archival records of the DPRK's former ally, the German Democratic Republic, revealed that the challenges and opportunities Kim faced as a result of the Cultural Revolution, and the effect on Pyongyang's foreign policy, were greater than previously realized.

The Cultural Revolution was also said to be the most serious external threat to Kim's hold on power since the fallout from Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign in 1956. Schaefer argued that Kim managed to survive the years between 1966 and 1969 by treading cautiously, "avoiding provoking the Chinese by swallowing their slander and remaining passive in the face of their aggressive postures."

But despite that, the two neighbors were almost brought to the brink of armed conflict. On the part of China, Beijing had agitated against the "Korean revisionists" over loudspeakers set up along the entire Sino-Korean border. Beijing also derided Kim for having a "bourgeois" lifestyle and earning ten times as much as the average worker in his country.

North Korean officials, on the other hand, reportedly cracked jokes about China and even Mao, saying that Mao had become senile and that perhaps the only remedy was Korean ginseng root.

In the fall of 1966, the Korean People's Party (KWP) portrayed the Cultural Revolution as incomprehensible and the Red Guards as "just kids who know nothing about politics." Kim reportedly told Leonid Brezhnev in 1966 that the Cultural Revolution was "massive idiocy." Other North Korean officials described Mao's government as a "government dictatorship" that was pursuing "a policy that was much more disastrous for the worldwide communist movement than Khrushchev's had been."

As China began propagating the Cultural Revolution across Asia, the North Korean and Chinese brand of communism came into direct competition. The Chinese were eager to maintain the upper hand in every ideological struggle, which became obvious in their intervention in the various factional conflicts within the Japan Communist Party and among citizens of North Korean descent in Japan.

To make things worse, the anti-intellectualism displayed so prominently in China during the Cultural Revolution was especially problematic for Pyongyang as it hampered North Korean efforts in gaining support among intellectuals in South Korea and Japan.

Kim's first response to the Cultural Revolution was to seek rapprochement with Moscow. Officially, Pyongyang attributed the deterioration of relations with Moscow after 1961 exclusively to the wrong-headed policy of Khrushchev. The latter's overthrow in 1964 therefore allegedly paved the way for a smoother relationship, but actually it was Mao's decision to launch the Cultural Revolution that was said to be the decisive factor.

But as Schaefer pointed out: "Even under conditions of outright hostility, however, the PRC never lost its position as the most important foreign partner of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang's move toward closer ties to the Soviet Union was undertaken mainly for economic and military advantage. Moscow willingly misread the shift as an overture from an ally in the Sino/Soviet conflict."

Despite the ill-effects of the Cultural Revolution, Kim attempted to use the event as an opportunity to seek a larger role as leader of Asian communism. Following the Vietnamese model of fighting the Americans to achieve national reunification, Kim tried to unify the two Koreas by plotting unrests in the South in order to provide a pretext for reunification. By keeping tensions high at the Demilitarized Zone, Kim asserted that Pyongyang was supporting the Vietnamese people by tying down US forces in Korea and distracting them from Vietnam.

"The seizure of the USS Pueblo in January 1968 was one step along this path - a daring game of brinkmanship in which Korean adventurism was joined with militant anti-Americanism."

It was only when China's foreign policy became more moderate in late 1969 did North Korea embrace its giant neighbor as an old friend and alter its strategy towards unification. Part of this embrace was due to Pyongyang's need to counter US military threat.