North Korea and the Korean War

According to Beijing-based historian Shen Zhihua, China was quick to offer North Korea military support during the Korean War but Kim Il-Sung refused to accept Chinese assistance until forced to do so by the UN advances across the 38th parallel.

Shen attributes Kim's reluctance to 1) over-confidence in his military judgments and 2) the long history of Chinese interference in Korean affairs. These two reasons also explained why Kim preferred to depend on Soviet aid and avoid having China intervene in the war.

"The North Koreans were not prepared to invite the Chinese to send troops, if for no other reason than the severe disagreements between China and North Korea concerning the state of the war and strategic planning."

Despite Stalin's explicit warnings to Kim that he would not send Soviet troops to Korea if the Americans intervened, North Korean leaders nonetheless turned to Moscow. Before sending the letter to Stalin, Kim asked Soviet ambassador Shtykov how best to broach the subject of requesting Soviet troops.

"Shtykov avoided his question, and a confused, lost, hopeless and desperate Kim Il Sung and his Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong swallowed their pride and sent the letter to Moscow. Stalin replied on 1 October that the best plan was to send the Chinese Volunteers' Army (CVA), after first consulting with the Chinese."

With no other choice, Kim urgently summoned the Chinese ambassador late that night and requested that China send the 13th Army Corps, which had already been deployed along the Yalu River, to support the North Korean war effort.

Even after Chinese troops entered the war, Kim's concerns over national sovereignty also led him to resist Chinese efforts to create a joint Sino-Korean command. It was only under Soviet pressure that Kim eventually agreed to the militarily necessary joint command. But prior to that were severe lack of coordination between the Chinese and North Koreans over language, Chinese unfamiliarity with the terrain and many incidents in which the CVA was mistakenly attacked by North Korean troops.

Shtykov made it clear that the Chinese should exercise overall command as the Korean People's Army had been losing battles "despite using Soviet Union's best equipment." Shtykov also praised the Chinese for being able to neutralize large numbers of enemy troops despite having inferior equipment. In his opinion, there was no doubt that the Chinese should command.

Kim likewise resisted placing the management of North Korean railroads under Chinese military, and only agreed to do so after being pressured by the Soviets - a capitulation that, in Shen's estimate, "left a shadow on the heart of Kim Il-Sung."

Shen's article is titled Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution during the Korean War (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004).