Chinese and Soviet Involvement in the Korean War

There seems to be conflicting accounts of China's eagerness to get involved in the Korean War. Some analysts suggested that the Chinese were keen to provide military assistance to North Korea, but others indicated otherwise.

James G. Hershberg fell into the latter category when he suggested that China had to be prodded by the Soviets to assist North Korea.

In his article Russian Documents on the Korean War, 1950-53 (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004), Hershberg noted that Stalin sent a message to the Chinese leadership in October 1950 suggesting that China send at least five or six divisions of volunteers to Korea.

But "much to the surprise and consternation of the Soviets", Mao Zedong had demurred, saying that China had tentatively opted not to enter the conflict. Reasons cited included the American advantage in military equipment, China's weakened internal condition following decades of civil strife, and the danger that a clash with America could drag the Soviets into the fray, triggering World War III. While speaking of the need for caution, Mao also "left the door ajar" by noting that the Chinese leadership had not yet taken a final position on the matter.

As Hershberg wrote: "Mao's startling message set the stage for one of the most dramatic documents yet to emerge from the communist archives - Stalin's strongly-worded response arguing that China should enter the Korean War, and brushing aside concerns about the risks of igniting a world war with the confident assertion - "Should we fear this?" - that the Soviets and Chinese together were stronger than the Americans and British, and if war were inevitable, better it happen now, before a rearmed Germany and Japan could contribute to the western military alliance."

Hershberg noted that Mao was "pressured" to live up to Stalin's standards as a loyal ally, especially since both China and the Soviet Union signed a joint treaty in February 1950. Mao would later say that Stalin suspected him of being a second Tito and only trusted him after he intervened in Korea.

Mao eventually decided that China's involvement was necessary for the good of the Sino-Soviet alliance as well as other perceived advantages he could receive from rebuffing the Americans. These include helping to consolidate the revolution against potential domestic enemies, and to head off a long-term security threat from an ascendant U.S. military presence on the border with Manchuria.

As for the armistice that was eventually signed, Hershberg wrote that it was signed only after some final maneuvers by both sides, including Syngman Rhee's sudden release of more than 25,000 POWs without notifying Washington, a move that "threatened to torpedo a potential deal and exacerbated growing US irritation with Rhee."