North Korea and the Soviets 1953-1964

Balazs Szalontai suggested that the North Korean's peculiarities and roots of isolationism can be found in its early relations with the Soviet Union.

To begin with, the relative backwardness of the North Korean economy "necessitated an inordinate dependency on Soviet expertise." For instance, the limited financial resources of the North Korean state led it to establish unpaid security organs, whereby members were present in every village.

In his article "You Have No Political Line of Your Own" Kim Il Sung and the Soviets, 1953-1964 (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004), Szalontai noted that because of the deficiencies of the country's motion picture industry some 60 per cent of the films shown by 1957 were of Soviet origin.

And due to the lack of North Korean authors, translated Soviet works constituted the largest share of books published in 1955. In 1956, North Korean higher education still lacked adequate textbooks, a problem the authorities tried to solve by placing greater emphasis on teaching Russian so that students could use Soviet textbooks until Korean ones could be published.

During this period, Pyongyang took little interest in establishing contacts with communist countries not capable of rendering concrete assistance. In 1954 its relations with Bulgaria and Albania were still at the ministerial instead of ambassadorial level.

"To be sure, the disinterest often proved mutual, since the DPRK had little to offer the East European's "people's democracies." Moreover, many North Korean leaders knew little about Europe or "the ways of the world" which also inhibited the improvement of relations."

A great source of tension between North Korea and the Soviet Union laid in the former's economic policies. As early as November 1954, the Soviets questioned the advisability of rapid collectivization in North Korea which might not only alienate the South Korean peasantry but also the middle classes within North Korea.

The Soviets also criticized North Korean propaganda that depicted South Korea as "a living hell." At that time, informal relations existed between North and South Korea mainly through Japan. North Korea also carried on a contraband trade with the South across the DMZ in order to obtain goods for its economy.

"Under the circumstances, the Soviets thought, Pyongyang should not have ignored the negative effect its domestic policies might produce on South Korean public opinion. Actually Kim Il Sung's economic strategy did not overlook the question of reunification. However, he wanted to overtake the South instead of adjusting to it, which led to further disagreements with (North Korea's) patrons."

In addition, North Korea also failed to meet its foreign trade obligations to Moscow, and even asked the Soviets to cancel their debt. As the North Koreans put it, "your country is rich, you can afford that."

But what really stunned the North Korean leadership was the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. South Korean reaction to the Hungarian events also contributed to Pyongyang's anxiety. High-ranking officials in South Korea's Defence Ministry allegedly made preparations for a military intervention in case a similar revolt took place in North Korea.

Kim did not regard this potential threat lightly. Factory building came to an abrupt halt as the regime assigned workers to the construction of underground plants. Of the North Koreans studying in Hungary, at least one took the opportunity to emigrate to the West, whereupon the regime hurriedly summoned most of its students home.

On North Korean nationalism, Szalontai noted that Chinese leaders proved more tolerant as compared to their Soviet counterparts. For instance, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited North Korea in 1961 and criticized certain North Korean economic policies. After inspecting several factories, Kosygin told Kim that North Korea "should not have wasted time trying to invent everything themselves since in some cases the adoption of foreign patents would have been more economical."

In contrast, Deng Xiaoping explicitly appealed to Korean nationalism by proclaiming that "the Chinese leaders must learn from the Korean leaders" and calling Koreans "a mighty people of 30 million." Naturally, the North Koreans were so pleased that Deng's words were often quoted in intra-party propaganda.