North Korea in the Late 50s and Early 60s

According to Bernd Schafer, soon after returning from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1956, Kim Il Sung had to face an internal revolt within his Korean Worker's Party (KWP).

Kim's leadership was called into question because of the country's economic difficulties, differences over strategies for achieving national unification, and most importantly in the eyes of his party opponents, his personality cult which continued to increase despite the new policy coming out of the USSR after the CPSU's 20th Party Congress.

In his article Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict: The GDR and North Korea, 1979-1989 (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003-Spring 2004), Schafer wrote that after a joint Soviet-Chinese intervention by a delegation sent to Pyongyang, some party functionaries ousted from the Central Committee were readmitted for "reeducation," only to be eventually purged in March 1958.

Kim also demoted his ambassador to Moscow Yi Sang-cho who had earlier criticized Kim's personality cult, and refused to distribute official North Korean propaganda in Moscow. Yi eventually decided to remain in exile in the Soviet Union, and Moscow refused Pyongyang's demand for his extradition.

In the article, Schafer noted that Kim accepted vital economic support provided by the USSR and Eastern Europe without acknowledgment. For instance, North Koreans boasted that they had created an entirely new type of tractor within one month.

"In fact, the tractor in question was an exact copy of a model from a factory in the Soviet city of Kharkov, a blueprint of which had been brought back by North Korean specialists who had been trained there."

Furthermore, Kim also adapted the Chinese version of "great leap forward" in the economy in 1958, calling the North Korean version Chollima, or thousand-mile horse. Later, Kim promised Moscow that Pyongyang would not follow the Chinese on their course against the Soviets after Khrushchev promised Kim more economic aid if North Korea gave up its Chollima concept. Still later on, Kim decided to become friendlier to China after the Soviet Union criticized him for his extreme personality cult. But even so, trade with the Soviet Union during this time (early 1960s) was greater than with China. This, according to Schafer, was the result of "economic desperation than of astuteness."

In late 1961, Pyongyang regretted its shift to China because North Korean leaders suspected that the Chinese aim was to make North Korea dependent on China. The Chinese had requested that a commission be set up to monitor the use of Chinese aid, and this led to an anti-Chinese backlash. In addition, the passive, anti-Moscow attitude of China in assisting North Vietnam demonstrated to the North Koreans that only the Soviet Union could deliver the desired military hardware and serve as a guarantor of North Korea's existence.

But when the Cultural Revolution took place in China in 1966, China was seen as a threat to the survival of the North Korean leadership, and China, according to Schafer, "forever lost its exclusive grip on North Korea."

Schafer's description of North Korea then was actually remarkably similar to the North Korea we know today.

"North Korea leadership was actually quite pragmatic with regard to matters of foreign economic assistance. Their policy was to attempt to reap the utmost benefits from any socialist or capitalist country while giving as little as possible in return."

1963 and 1964 also marked the lowest point in North Korea's relations with then East Germany. Especially notable were incidents such as "stone throwing, attempted burglaries and the "kidnapping" of the GDR embassy dog named Dina."

Kidnapping of the embassy dog? Boy, was North Korea that desperate? Relations must have sunk to an all-time low.

Even marriages between Koreans and citizens from Eastern Europe were unwelcome. Korean partners of such couples from Pyongyang were either demoted to the countryside or pressured to divorce their European spouses.