Another Japanese View on Chinese Nationalism

Terumasa Nakanishi noted that "history" is simply a Chinese foreign policy tool, and that anti-Japanese sentiments in China were mainly driven by the agenda of Beijing's "authoritarian leaders." He also argued that what China calls history is often based on a self-serving - and highly suspect - interpretation of the past.

The Kyoto University professor said even though Chinese appeared to be boycotting Japanese products and protesting about the content of Japanese history textbooks and visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni war shrine, the main target of the anger was actually Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Arguing that Chinese leaders have used the past as a "cudgel to browbeat Japan", Nakanishi claimed that the Chinese had often overstated their case. He also took Beijing to task for its "selective memory", and accused the Chinese authorities for treating history in an arbitrary manner.

For example, the 1932 Lytton Commission report on Manchuria had reportedly rejected Japanese "defensive" activities there. Nakanishi wrote that the League of Nations team that visited Manchuria was "the target of skilled operations by the Chinese intelligence agency, using spies, agents, and even the sexual allure of Chinese women." The Chinese also staged a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations, and "used just about every means imaginable to paint Japan in a bad light."

"The result was a report that offered the one-sided judgment that Japan was an aggressor ... in 1933, when the League's General Assembly voted 42-1 to accept the report and demand that Japan withdraw its forces from Manchuria, it felt that it had been "crucified" by the international body and simply quit in a huff. In doing so, our country ended up playing right into China's hand," Nakanishi wrote in Japan Echo (August 2005).

"In order to advance China's national interests and their own political objectives, the rulers in Beijing have no compunctions about playing games on the international stage, mobilizing the people through various maneuvers and appealing to international opinion with consummate skill."

While stating that the relationship between China and Japan is "politically cold but economically hot", Nakanishi berated the Japanese foreign ministry for what he called a "spineless diplomacy."

He complained that the Japanese tend to put all their cards on the table from the beginning, and do not know the importance of bluffing. The Japanese also find it hard to start out with a "tenacious and overstated position and working from there to a negotiated settlement. So the Japanese are always like open books to their Chinese counterparts, and they find themselves unable to make their case effectively, whether in business or in diplomacy."

"In response to the latest rounds of demonstrations, the Japanese government is talking about "dealing with the situation calmly and demanding an apology and compensation." Starting out by presenting this sort of minimal demand is precisely what the Chinese want us to do. The proper approach would be to make a great racket complaining about the Chinese violence and appealing to the rest of the world to recognize the wrong we suffer. This is the only way to get through to China ... the fact that the Japanese have yet to equip themselves with the ability to display strategic anger, an indispensable tool of diplomacy, show that they have failed to learn the lesson of their 20th century failure."

And in an assertion that had certainly riled many Chinese, Nakanishi insisted that Japanese military intervention in China was not the cause of anti-Japanese activities in China, but the result of it. He argued that with or without Japanese aggression, "China is always moved by an anti-Japanese spirit; this is a constant risk of which today's Japanese need to be aware."