Bo Yang's Ugly Chinaman

I have long outgrown Bo Yang’s (pictured) writing so it was somewhat surprising to myself that I still picked up his book 酱缸震荡 再论丑陋的中国人 (柏杨 星光出版社中华民国84年). Maybe I needed a dose of strident ranting from time to time.

On the decaying powers of Chinese culture, Bo Yang had this to say - “酱缸强大的腐蚀力，连美女都能变成丑八怪，连耶稣都会被扭曲，何况什么主义” ("The strong corrosive powers can even turn a beautiful woman into an ugly creature, and even Jesus will become twisted and contorted, let alone any kind of ideology.)

His disdain of Mao Zedong was unconcealed. “毛泽东真是伟大，他在短短的二十年左右，竟把中国变成一个以说谎为美德的社会，真不简单！” ("Mao Zedong is truly a great man. In a short time span of about 20 years, he had turned China into a society where deceit and lying is a form of virtue. Truly remarkable indeed!")

“诚如毛泽东所说的“中国有那么多人，不斗行吗？”把“人多”和“斗争”奇异的结合在一起，就是一种苍蝇飞翔式的思维逻辑。” ("Mao Zedong has said “China is so populated, can the lack of struggles be possible?” Linking “overpopulation” with “struggles” is a strange logic that is similar to the flying pattern of flies.")

Of course Bo Yang often made valid points, except they were expressed in strident language.

有光荣的历史，不证明有光荣的现在。一个生气勃勃，健康而有能力，大踏脚步前进的年轻人，不会炫耀他读幼稚园小班时，口齿是如何流利。一个老病夫，成天坐在养老院的摇椅上，或坐在街头的长凳上，偶尔和同年龄的人聚在一起，才总是喋喋不休的谈“想当年”英雄往事。中国人五千年不过是喃喃自语。于是乎，没有现在，也没有未来，只有过去五千年，用过去的五千年，当作自己现在的面子，心情的悲凉，使人落泪。(“Having a glorious history does not mean that the present is glorious. An energetic, healthy and capable young person marching confidently towards his future would not boast of how intelligent he was when he was in kindergarten. Only an ailing old man who sits all day on a rocking chair in a home for the aged, or sitting on a bench at the street corner, would talk incessantly about his glorious past. In the past 5000 years, the Chinese have been mumbling to themselves. There is no present, neither is there a future. There is only the past 5000 years, which is used as a form of pride and façade. The sadness of it all is enough to reduce one to tears.”)

一九六八年夏季的一天晚上，监狱中已经病入膏盲的刘少奇，突然发起高烧，毛泽东先生下令用所有的力量抢救他的生命，这跟史大林下令用所有的力量抢救艾古洛夫的生命一样，这不是慈悲仁爱，而是毛泽东要由他自己，而不是由上帝，来撕裂刘少奇的灵魂和肉体，他要刘少奇活着看到自己被开除共产党籍。对一个终生奉献给党，而又是党的副领袖而言，仅此一项打击，就够羞愤，痛苦，万箭钻心，那是一项最恶毒的摧残。(“One summer night in 1968, Liu Shaoqi who was at the verge of death in prison suddenly contracted fever. Mao Zedong instructed that no efforts should be spared in saving Liu. This is similar to the approach undertaken by Stalin. This was not compassion or humanity. Rather, it was because Mao Zedong wanted to make sure that it was himself, and not God, who could destroy Liu’s body and soul. He wanted Liu alive to see Liu expelled as a member of the Communist Party. For a man who devoted his entire life to the party, and for a deputy of the party no less, such a blow would be humiliating, tormenting and most vicious.”)

On his impressions of Lu Xun, Bo Yang wrote that he had a strong admiration for Lu Xun’s “righteousness and fearlessness” (正直和无畏) and described Lu Xun as “having a great impact on contemporary Chinese thought, but had yet to surpass Hu Shi.” (对近代中国思想有很大影响，但没有超过胡适)

他有强烈的战斗性，却缺少包容性，简直是拒绝任何批评，这不是民主人的气质。(“Lu Xun had a strong combative streak, but lacked tolerance, and almost rejected any form of criticism. This is not the demeanor of a democratic person.”)

鲁迅是一位“民族作家”，不是“民主作家”。1988年我去中国大陆，发现鲁迅已成为一位不可批评的人物，使人生忧。没有批评，如何进步？一代应比一代好，思想与文学也是，一个人不应成为思想的终结者，世界才有美景。(“Lu Xun is an “ethnic writer” and not a “democratic writer”. When I was in China in 1988, I discovered that Lu Xun had become someone who cannot be criticized. This is worrying. Without criticisms, how can there be any improvements? One generation should always surpass the previous. The same applies to ideology and literature. A person should not become the terminator of ideology. Only then can the world be a better one.”)

鲁迅在大陆的地位，是因获得毛泽东的支持，应是中国政治文化的一项特色，鲁迅的文学成就被政治化后已被当作一个政治工具。当哪一天鲁迅思想可被批评挑战时，鲁迅的价值才可以呈现。("Lu Xun’s exalted position in China is due to the support of Mao Zedong, and is a feature of Chinese political culture. Lu Xun’s literary accomplishments had been politicized and turned into a political tool. Lu Xun’s real value can only be brought to fruition on the day when his thinking can be criticized and challenged.”

China's Son - Growing Up in the Cultural Revolution

Da Chen’s autobiography China’s Son Growing Up in the Cultural Revolution (Delacorte Press. 2001) is an absolutely easy read.

It is an account of growing up in a small village in Fujian province, and the journey from a model student, to “counterrevolutionary” due to a landlord family background, to almost a drop-out, and eventually the first person from his village to study English in the prestigious Beijing First Foreign Language Institute.

The book is also an interesting account of the pressure faced by students during the college entrance examinations, where the pressure in the days after the Cultural Revolution seemed as intense as those faced by current students.

One area that was covered in the examination was “political studies” described by Chen as “the most boring of the five subjects required in the big exam” and “all about the twisted philosophy of the Communist party.”

“They sounded like sophistry at best, and that was what they were. It was like a carpet-cleaning salesman raving about this great revolution taking place in the carpet-cleaning industry, where actually none existed. And the machine he was trying to sell you wasn’t one bit as good as what he claimed. It was tedious self-promotion, mixed with a little bit of lying.”

“Many times I wanted to throw the book into the river. What was this? Marxism combined with Mao’s superior thoughts? It was simply some foreign garbage, stir-fried with local flavor until it became a dish called Communism, Chinese style. Moo goo gai pan with ketchup.”

“Some of the questions and explanations given were so far-fetched. I felt like spitting. Like why in the beginning of the revolution Mao had ordered his armies into the countryside instead of starting a revolt in the big city. The book said Mao was applying Marxism to China’s unique circumstances. That was bull. Mao was just running for his life.”

“He hadn’t even had time to wipe his ass. The Nationalists army was after his head and he’d had to flee into the woods. There had been no Marxism in his mind at that time. I almost puked as I read a whole chapter talking about the virtue of Mao’s one-liner “True knowledge comes from practice.” Yeah, right.”

“Well, he’d had plenty of practice, starting with dumping his ugly country-bumpkin first wife and crawling into bed with a chic Shanghai actress, while his army was chewing tree roots and getting their butts frozen in northern Shanghai ..”

How much of the above was what he thought then, and what he subsequently thought?

The Story of Some Mangoes

According to writer Xu Shanbin, during the Cultural, Mao Zedong received some mangoes from foreign guests, and passed on the fruits to members of Beijing’s Mao Zedong propaganda team (首都工农毛泽东思想宣传队).

“这本来是一件再平常不过的小事。这件小事后来变成了惊天动地的大事。” (“This is really an ordinarily small matter, but it later turned into an earth-shattering issue.”) (证照中国1966-1970，共和国特殊年代的纸上历史，许善斌，新华出版社，2009)

In the 7 August 1967 edition of the Beijing Daily, the headline read “最大关怀　最大信任　最大支持　最大鼓舞” (“Profound Concern, Profound Trust, Profound Support, Profound Encouragement”)

As if that was not enough, the mangoes were taken on a nationwide “tour”. And since it was hard to keep the fruits fresh, plastic replicas were produced.

“我们教师学生中谁都没有见过芒果，甚至连听都没有听说过，大家猜这种水果一定非同小可，是个稀世珍品，有人把它想象成了《西游记》里王母娘娘的蟠桃，吃了就可以长生不老.” (“Among us teachers and students, none had ever seen a mango. We had not even heard of it. Everyone guessed that the fruit must be truly exceptional, and was a rarity. Some even imagined it to be like the fruit in the epic “Journey to the West”, where ingesting it will ensure an everlasting life.”)

The stampede to catch a glimpse of the crudely produced replicas was described as 人山人海 (massively crowded). The replicas were placed in a glass box, carried by two Red Guards, and guarded by four PLA soldiers bearing arms. It was as if the fruits were 超级国宝 (exceptional national treasures).

On the Cultural Revolution, Xu had this to say:

文化大革命时“煮豆燃豆萁，豆在釜中泣”，我们用八年的时间打败了日本鬼子，却用了十年的时间来消灭“阶级敌人”。如果说抗日战争上的是“身体”的话，那么文化大革命伤的就是“灵魂”。(During the Cultural Revolution, it was like the poem where brothers were killing each other. We used eight years to defeat the Japanese demons, but took ten years to extinguish “class enemies.” If the anti-Japanese war had harmed the “body”, then the Cultural Revolution had damaged the “soul.”)

China and Legal Wars

An extremely interesting (though somewhat self-serving and contro-versial) article, I thought, from Chinese legal professor Guo Shuyong who argued that what he termed as "legal wars" (合法性战争)had and will contribute to China's growth as a major power.

These wars included the Sino-Russo border war in August 1929, the Sino-Japanese war from 1931 to 1941, the Korean War beginning in 1950 (pictured) and the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War.

Guo noted that the 1979 Vietnam War was an attempt by China to support the Cambodian people in their fight against aggression, and to oppose "regional hegemony" in Southeast Asia.

The self-serving part came in when Guo argued that "中国的战争行动增强了中国帮助弱者，反抗强权的良好国际形象." ("China's war efforts had strengthened China's positive international image of helping the weak and opposing hegemony.") Worse, Guo added that "我们有理由把中越战争作为国际社会意志的体现，是中国执行国际社会意志的战争行动." ("We have reasons to believe that the Sino-Vietnam War is a manifestation of the will of the international community, and that China is acting on the will of the international community.")(郭树勇，试论合法性战争与中国崛起，国际体系与中国的软力量，上海社会科学院世界经济与政治研究院，时事出版社，2006)

Yeah, right.

Guo was(slightly) more convincing when he noted that China's involvement in the Korean War had helped the East Asian region maintained five decades of stability, though I am not sure if it had necessarily 打击了美国霸权主义的气焰。("defeated the arrogance of American hegemony".)

Guo's central argument was that during the process of developing into a major power, it would be advantageous for China to engage in "one or two legal wars, so as to consolidate its development."

But what was most controversial was Guo's assertion that 一个有志向的崛起大国，必须时刻寻找战争的合法理由，必须深入研究国际社会的发展动向，必须成立专门的研究合法性战争与国际法的有效机构，必须对一些有可能演化成军事冲突的危机爆发点进行预防性的合法性战争准备。这种准备是一种政治准备，也是一种法律准备。一旦这种准备是相对充分的，就要抓住时机，高举国际人道主义与国际法原则的旗帜为中国的崛起而奋斗。

("A rising power with ambition should always be on the look out for legal reasons to enter a war, and deeply analyze the developmental trends of international society. It should also set up effective departments to research into both legal wars and international law, and be prepared to intervene into preventive legal wars in military hotspots. Such preparation must be both political and legal. Once these preparations are in place, it should seize the opportunity and raise high the banner of international humanitarianism and principles of international law and forge ahead to ensure China's rise.")

Chinese Students and China's Soft Power

Soft power in China, it is argued, should also include the behavior of Chinese students when they are overseas.

According to Chinese authors Han Bo and Jiang Qingyong, overseas Chinese students had given Chinese a bad name. They refuse to take part in class discussions, are reluctant to think, and have a tendency of copying their homework from other classmates.

Students in one New Zealand university was said to be so frustrated with their Chinese counterparts that its campus newspaper published an article in 2007 titled "We Do Not Want to Be in the Same Study Group as the Chinese." (不要和中国人一个小组！) Teachers in New Zealand also lamented that "中国人的作业全都一样" ("Assignments submitted by Chinese all look the same!")

As Han and Jiang noted, "相比之下，日本人和韩国人虽然也比较沉默，但却不会抄作业." ("In comparison, the Japanese and Koreans are also relatively quiet (in class), but they will certainly not copy homework from one another.")(韩勃 江庆勇 著 软实力：中国视角 人民出版社2009）

Certainly not copy homework from one another? Hmm. I am not so sure about that.

Another example cited include how Chinese students signed one-year cell phone contracts with British phone companies just so that they can get the free cell phone. But immediately after signing, they leave the country, and of course there will be no way to trace them thereafter.

Yet another example is how Chinese students apply for credit cards and spend to the card's maximum limit just before leaving the country. As later Chinese students lamented, this had given all Chinese students a bad name, and British banks have since decided only to grant minimum credit limits to Chinese students.

As Chinese students later lamented, this is known as "前人砍树，后人倒霉." ("Those who come earlier on cut the trees, while those who come later suffer the consequences." - A twist on a more popular expression 前人种树，后人乘凉，or "those who come earlier plant the trees, while those who come later can rest in the shade.")

North Korea's Hamgyong Province

During the Chosun dynasty, Korean officials who incurred the wrath of the emperor were exiled to Hamgyong, the country’s northern-most province.

“Perhaps as a result of all these malcontents in the gene pool, what is now North Hamgyong province is thought to breed the toughest, hardest-to-subdue Koreans anywhere.” (Barbara Demick, Nothing To Envy, Spiegel & Grau, 2010)

Until the 20th century, this province, which extends all the way to the Tumen River, its border with China and Russia, was sparsely populated and of little economic significance. Its human population was probably outnumbered by tigers, “the beasts that still terrify small children in Korean folktales.”

But all that changed when the Japanese began their empire-building, and Hamgyong was seen as laying right in the pathway of Japan’s eventual push toward Manchuria. Apart from coveting the then largely unexploited coal and iron-ore deposits around Musan, the Japanese also turned Chongjin (pictured), then a small fishing village, into a port that could handle three million tons of freight each year.

The Japanese built massive steelworks at Chongin’s port and developed Namsan into a city with a rectangular street grid and large modern buildings. The Imperial Japanese Army’s 19th infantry division, which assisted in the invasion of eastern China, was headquartered there. Further south in the city of Hamhung, the Japanese built virtually from scratch a headquarters of massive chemical factories producing everything from gunpowder to fertilizers.

But when the Communists came to power in the 1950s, factories that had been bombed in the successive wars were rebuilt and reclaimed as their own. Chongjin’s Nippon Steel became Kim Chaek Iron and Steel, the largest factory in North Korea. And the industrial might of the northeast served as a shining example of Kim Il-sung’s economic achievements.

“To this day, Chongjin residents know little of their city’s history – indeed, it seems to be a place without any past at all – because the North Korean regime does not credit the Japanese for anything.”

Chongjin, also known as the city of irons produced watches, television, synthetic fibers, pharmaceuticals, machine tools, tractors, plows, steel plates, and munitions. Crabs, squids and other marine products were fished for export.

Much like the South, it is understandable for the North not to “credit the Japanese for anything” even though the colonial masters had developed the Peninsula by putting in place a relatively good set of hardware and infrastructure, though admittedly not for altruistic reasons. Because of nationalistic reasons and the painful memories of Japanese colonialism, it is still hard for Koreans to objectively assess the positive aspects of the colonial period, as the negatives simply far outweigh the positives. But then a question to ask would be, how different would Korea’s trajectory be if the Japanese had not come barging in?

Revival of Confucianism

Remember the saying that China had thrown out the baby with the bath water in the early 20th century during a wave of internal self-criticisms and attempts to learn from the West?

One of the things that it was determined to throw out then was Confucianism which was seen as an outdated feudal doctrine that had deterred the modernization and development of China.

As writer Xu Jialu noted in an article on the revival of Confucianism in recent years, attempts to do so now are mainly to "carry the baby that had been thrown out with the dirty water home. We no longer want the dirty water. Moreover, water that had been thrown out cannot be taken back." (我们今天研究儒学，是把随着脏水泼出去的孩子再抱回家里，脏水并不收回，也收不回.) (许嘉璐 从中国文化与世界文化大视野看儒学复兴 高端讲坛 大国软实力 唐晋 主编 华文出版社 2009)

Though the question to ask here is - isn't the baby injured from having been thrown out together with the bath water earlier on? Perhaps by now it is crippled, if not suffering from damaged internal organs or even brain hemorrhage?

Xu does not think that there is a widespread revival of Confucianism, arguing that the revival is only within a handful of scholars and students, and negligible in a nation of 1.3 billion people.

"在中国内地上复兴儒学，任重道远。今天，弹奏古琴，古筝，吹吹箫,演奏民乐，如果在社会上卖票，那么，这样的乐团能很好的活下去吗？很难！但是，穿上露脐的衣服，来个脐钉，来个耳钉，拿着话筒，甩头发，跺脚，握手，最后来个飞吻，人们对此却是趋之若鹜。学术根植于社会。因此在今天这样一个社会环境下，要振兴儒学，道路太漫长了，需要一个文化的复兴，不是以年计，也不是以十年计，常常要以百年计."

("To revive Confucianism in China is a long and momentous task. Today, if a band were to perform on traditional musical instruments such as guzheng or the flute, can it possibly survive? With great difficulty! But if one were to dress up in belly-protruding clothes, carries a microphone, flips one's hair, stomps one's feet and then ends with a flying kiss, they will generate a lot more interest. With such a social environment, the path to reviving Confucianism is way too long. What is needed is a cultural renaissance that is calculated not in terms of years or decades, but in centuries.")

Yiwu Market

Some of us might be familiar with the Yiwu Small Commod-ities Market(义乌小商品城，pictured) in Zhejiang province.

But there is a story behind its origins, according to author Huang Jianguo (黄建国 主编 软实力 硬武器 改变世界的社会科学创新 党建读物出版社 2009).

In 1982, peasant Feng Aiqian (冯爱倩) walked into the Yiwu government office, and demanded to know from Party Secretary Xie Gaohua (谢高华) as to why she was arrested time and again for being a street peddler. Feng argued that she was jobless, and needed to be a street peddler to make ends meet. The argument reportedly lasted the whole afternoon.

Party Secretary Xie eventually tabled two resolutions at the next sitting of the local government - 1) Should trade markets be opened or not? (应不应开放集市贸易市场) and 2) Should peasants be allowed in cities for the purpose of conducting trade and commerce? (允不允许农民进城经商)

This subsequently led to an affirmative answer, and trade by peasants in cities were soon made permissible, even though the author did not indicate how long the process took.

But perhaps this is yet another example that individuals too can make a difference on policy discourse in China.

Wang Guangmei

Another fast and easy book to read while recuperating from surgery was one depicting the life of China’s former first lady Wang Guangmei (pictured). Easy to read as there were probably more photographs than text. (王光美私人相册, 罗海岩 编著, 新华出版社, 2010)

Wang was of course the wife of former Chinese President Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇). My interest in the Liu family began in graduate school while researching into the final decade of Liu’s life.

As the author rightly pointed out, Wang’s experience was almost unprecedented in China’s history. At the prime of her life as First Lady, she was thrown into jail on falsified charges and remained there for the next 12 years, not knowing what had become of her husband (who died in a prison cell in Henan province).

Yet after she was released, Wang “confronted history, and eagerly embraced life,” (正视历史, 真诚地拥抱生活), and “responded to the ugliness and depravities with truth, kindness and beauty.” (以人性的真善美来回应丑陋和低下)

One of China’s first graduate students in physics, Wang was Liu’s third wife, and the two were drawn together by their diametrically different backgrounds. Wang came from a well-off family, while Liu a revolutionary background. Liu was said to be mesmerized by how Wang sliced off the skin of a pear in an entire piece using a knife, while Wang was amazed at the simple daily meals of noodles with vegetables and a few “burnt mantou slices” eaten by Liu.

When Wang accompanied Liu on a state visit to Burma in 1963, a necklace she was wearing broke and scattered into the sea while she went swimming. The necklace was borrowed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Protocol Department for the occasion and Burmese authorities reportedly dispatched divers to search for the necklace but to no avail. The next day, President Ne Win presented Wang with a red ruby necklace, saying - “I know that you Communists do not accept gifts, but your necklace went missing in Burmese seas, so I need to compensate you. Red rubies are a Burmese specialty and the pride of the nation.” The necklace was later presented to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and now displayed in the Revolutionary Museum of China.

On another state visit to Cambodia, China reportedly uncovered intelligence that bombs had been planted along the route that Liu and Wang planned to take. This prompted some to call on Liu to cancel the visit. But Liu reportedly said that China could not afford to risk its credibility by not going. Moreover, China needed to have faith that the Cambodian authorities could handle security-related issues. So when Liu and Wang arrived in Phnom Penh, Prince Sihanouk hailed Liu as “the Chinese President who had delivered friendship using his life.” (用生命传送友谊的中国主席)

Wang was said to be a well-loved character. “在那个政治挂帅, 缺少美育的年代, 王光美典雅俊秀的形象, 给色彩单调的中国人带来了一缕充满人文情怀的温馨. 在国际社会上显示了泱泱大国红色夫人的优美风度, 让中国人深感骄傲和自豪. 许多中国人的心目中至今还记忆着光美当时的形象: 一袭白色旗袍, 映衬着高贵优雅的气质, 真诚的微笑挂在端庄的脸上 … 许多人当时反复看<新闻简报>, 是为了多看几眼王光美的形象.” (In an era where politics was overriding and aesthetics was sorely missing, Wang Guangmei’s classic elegance and beauty had brought about a heartwarming sensation to Chinese who lived mainly in a monochrome environment. Within the international community, Wang had displayed her beauty and elegance as the first lady of a large country, and this had instilled among the Chinese a sense of pride. Many Chinese still fondly remember Wang’s image as wearing a white cheongsam that brings out her elegance, and with a sincere smile on her face. Many Chinese read the newspapers repeatedly simply to look at Wang a few more times.”)

But it was Jiang Qing who was responsible for Wang’s incarceration in jail. Jealous of Wang’s favorable public image, Jiang reportedly hated Wang and during the madness of the Cultural Revolution, accused Wang for being a capitalist (by among other things, donning necklaces) and for being a US intelligence agent.

Wang was step-mother to five children from Liu’s two earlier marriages, He Baozhen’s (何葆贞) three children Liu Yunbin (刘允斌), Liu Aiqin (刘爱琴) and Liu Yunruo (刘允若), and Wang Qian’s (王前) two children Liu Tao (刘涛) and Liu Yunzhen (刘允真). She had 4 children of her own, Liu Pingping (刘平平), Liu Yuan (刘源), Liu Tingting (刘亭亭) and Liu Xiaoxiao (刘小小).

Incidentally the last thing that Liu said to Wang before he was taken away was “好在历史是人民写的.” (It is a good thing that history is written by the people). Is it really? So Wang and Liu had been vindicated, but in the course of Chinese history, how many had been or will be as fortunate?

Life Within the Hermit Kingdom

In Soon Ok Lee’s book, the author noted that the tiniest infractions will land a North Korean in one of the country’s much feared labor camps. (Eyes of the Tailless Animals, Prison Memoirs of a North Korean Woman , Living Sacrifice Book Company, 1999).

Such as the case of a high school principal who petitioned the authorities about excessive manual labor required of her students as she felt that the work was hindering their education. The government subsequently decided that she was rebelling against government policy, and she was convicted of abusing her position by giving her students “the impression that manual labor was worth less than studying.”

Or the case of a farmer in North Pyong’an province who was given a three-year prison sentence for selling seashells to the Chinese to pay for his son’s wedding. Selling of seashells was considered an “illegal export activity.”

Within prisons, punishments can be meted out for "misdemeanors" ranging from laughing and staring at one’s reflection in the mirror.

Then there were the self-criticisms that prisoners have to churn out, which invariably began with the words “with the care of Kim Il Sung, I had a life without worry. Instead of giving my utmost loyalty to his care, I ungratefully betrayed him by breaking prison policy.”

Other revelations included how products produced by prisoners were exported for foreign currency which was in turn used to import television sets and refrigerators for senior officials otherwise known as “presents from Kim Il Sung.”

And presumably in the 80s and 90s, many Central Party committee members withdrew foreign currency for exchange and pocketed the gain for their own use. As the practice became more widespread, many were inspected and arrested, including bank workers who were merely running errands requested by their bosses. They were charged for “collaborating” with their bosses, where they “suffered, were tortured, and died for no reason.”

And after Kim II Sung returned from a trip to Europe in 1984, he permitted his people to start small businesses with rice cakes, bean curds and motels. And within three years, these businesses reportedly became the livelihoods for many living in Gusung City.

But Kim’s son Kim Jong II subsequently thought that business owners were adopting capitalism and decided to clamp down on such businesses. Many housewives were arrested and thrown into labor camps for doing precisely what the elder Kim had allowed them to do in the first place.

Eyes of the Tailless Animals

Needed a fairly quick and easy book to read while recovering from surgery, so turned to Soon Ok Lee’s Eyes of the Tailless Animals, Prison Memoirs of a North Korean Woman (Living Sacrifice Book Company, 1999).

It turned out to be quick and light due to its length (154 pages), as well as clear and simple writing. Even though I am supposed to be moderately immune to horror stories from those who survived North Korean labor camps, having read so much from the genre, the book still contained rather disturbing elements.

Such as prison guards pouring boiling liquid iron at a temperature of 1,200 degrees on top of prisoners who refused to renounce Christianity.

“Suddenly, the smell of burning flesh assailed my nostrils. The bodies began to shrivel from the intense heat as the liquid metal burned right through their flesh.”

“I looked at their shrunken bodies and wondered in my heart, what do they believe? What do they see in the empty sky? What could be more important to them than their lives?”

“In the years I was in prison, I saw many believers die. Yet they never, never denied the God who is in heaven. All they had to do was say they don’t believe in religion and they would have been released.”

Then there were the sadistic prison guards who told prisoners that if they dashed towards the prison fence and leap over it, they would be set free. Many did so only to have their bodies scorched when they touched the high-voltage wire on the fence. The guards were said to have watched prisoners die “as if they were watching a funny show.”

A prisoner who did not want to see her son’s execution screamed and ripped out her own eyeballs. “Everything happened so quickly. Her eyeballs were hanging by tendons and they were swinging. It was sickening and tragic to watch.”

Pregnant female prisoners were forced to abort their babies as the regime believed that all anti-communists should be eliminated within three generations. Poison was injected into the women who suffered tremendous pain until the babies were stillborn 24 hours later. Medical officers walked around the pregnant women and kicked their swollen bellies if they screamed or moaned.

“The mother of these newborn babies just laid on the floor, and sobbed so helplessly, while a medical officer twisted the babies’ necks,” Lee wrote, adding that the dead babies were used “to make medicine.”

Then there was the case of how prison kitchens ran out of water to rinse cabbages covered with chemicals. But cooks went ahead to prepare cabbage soup anyway. Hundreds of prisoners subsequently came down with food poisoning, and many died as they were already malnourished. That was in May 1988, in summer, where the bodies “quickly began to rot and stink". Many who passed out “were carried out with the dead to an ever-growing pile of bodies.”

As for public executions, prisoners were tied to a post, mouths covered with a mask and eyes left wide open. 18 bullets were then shot into the upper part of the body leading to blood spurting all over. Surviving prisoners were then ordered to walk around the body within three feet and look straight into it. “Look at him and feel hatred for him. Swear to yourself that you won’t follow his example.”

For one of the executed prisoners, the officer reportedly said: “He was against the government and dissatisfied with the Party policy, so he sneaked into the kitchen and stole balls of rice. When he was being punished for his crime of stealing, he said, “I’d rather die than live in this pain.” His remark showed that he betrayed the great care of Kim II Sung.”

And when blood from public executions spurted on those who were in the front row, some female prisoners “lost their minds and became psychotic.” They cried, laughed and sang, or fainted, and these reactions were seen as “disagreements with the Party or a lack of a firm belief in communism.”

It is indeed a mad, crazy and demented world.

Lee proclaimed that “the barbarous crimes of the North Korean government will never escape the severest judgment of God and history.”

Somehow, I am less optimistic. Judgment from God aside, will any earthly judgment matters when it comes at a different time, a different regime, and where all the protagonists have come to pass? Some people will certainly have to be judged, but perhaps not in their life times. Little solace for their countless tormented victims.

Genghis Khan as a source of inspiration

Genghis Khan is still a source of inspiration in modern-day Mongolia as “these are turbulent times, and people need something to hang on to”, so said Mongolian scientist Oyun (full name not known).

“Before, people had little, but enough. And now? Look around: what do ordinary Mongolians see? The social fabric torn apart, street children, corruption. People do not see the real fruits of democratic change yet. Democracy is supposed to empower people, but we have seen an increase in poverty and unemployment, and an increasing gap between the rich and the poor, so a lot of people are less powerful, more threatened economically, than they were under communism. Half the population has to struggle to survive. They see the nation threatened by poverty, by weakness. So they look to Genghis and that part of their history as a symbol of strength.” (John Mann, Genghis Khan – Life, Death and Resurrection, Bantam Press 2004)

Genghis’ strength lay not just in conquest, but also in the idea of just administration rooted in a written legal system. And this is appealing given the lack of the rule of law after 70 years of one-party rule and the introduction of the multi-party system.

“With pluralism, disagreement is natural. But here there is no notion of a loyal opposition. They – especially the older people – can’t take this political infighting. They think Mongolians are fighting each other, dividing the country. My personal opinion is that if you asked Mongolians what they feel, many would say: Since we were once strong, why can’t we be again? Shouldn’t we have a strong presidential role, a sort of modern version of Genghis Khan? Not that there is any dream of empire, but at least the rule of law.”

Is this the mindset of a people who had once been strong? But it also attests to the notion that no nation or empire will remain strong, and there will always be fluctuations in the fortunes of a country or empire. Food for thought for a sunny island state in Southeast Asia. And doesn’t this harking to a better bygone days resemble a similar approach by Confucian adherents who reminisce about the golden days of Yao and Shun?

As Oyun added, industrialization would “court failure” as Mongolia’s countryside would be under threat, its towns polluted, and its industries owned by outsiders. So what needs to be done is to capitalize on Mongolia’s strength “which lies outside our towns, and under our feet.”

“I believe our competitive advantage lies in three things: our countryside, our nomadic ways and our resources. Genghis know the strength of the first two – the beauty and purity of our pastures and mountains and deserts, our freedom to wander and raise our animals. What we should be doing is looking back to the rural economy from which we came originally, looking back to look forward. And in this Genghis as a symbol is perfectly valid.”

But to the Chinese, Genghis is, according to Mann, not just a symbol of past strength but also of future assertiveness.

“In the eyes of those with a sense of history and of what China should be, there is a wrong to be righted; a “righting” which, if it ever comes to pass, will be done in the name, naturally, of Genghis Khan, because it was his heirs who reunited old China, and thus he, as the founder of a Chinese dynasty, who reasserted the roots of new China.”

Three Years in Beijing

Thanks to Dr Tay Eng Hseon and Dr Chiu Jen Wun for a surgery that “went very well”. At least those were the few gratifying words that I remember as I was wheeled out of the operating theatre last week in a semi-conscious mode. But who uttered those words? Dr Tay or Dr Chiu? Hmmm.

Thanks also to friends who had visited, showered concerns, brought food and reading materials, both during and after hospitalization.

Particularly enjoyed LL’s fried beehoon (vermicelli), dang gui (angelica root) chicken soup and her book Three Years in Beijing, a compilation of articles written and published in Singapore’s Chinese daily Lianhe Zaobao while she was based in the Chinese capital. (朱亮亮, 北京三年, 时报出版社, 2000)

Thanks LL for the common Beijing memories we shared, and for mentioning me in the article about China’s reaction to the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (pictured). Those were indeed the days. The article should also have mentioned how I was pushed, shoved, and sustained minor injuries while covering the student protests. :)

Two interesting snippets from LL’s book – the extreme actions taken by Chinese petitioners to get their grievances heard by the central authorities, and the changing perceptions towards soldiers in the country.

Some petitioners who wished to highlight their grievances apparently headed to CCTV (China Central Television), where one man was said to have dashed into the premises smeared in feces, and security guards who tried to stop him were also tainted with feces. Another man, an elderly farmer, whose brother was falsely accused and beaten to death showed up at the gates of CCTV where he knelt down while holding a bag with his brother’s head in it! Absolutely gruesome stuff, which reminds me of a television documentary I produced on petitioners in 2004 which was never aired due partly to its grisly details.

As for the changing perceptions of soldiers, there is the following ditty:

抗美援朝打美帝时是可爱的人
扑灭黑龙江大火时是可敬的人
拯救唐山大地震灾民时是最可靠的人
对付学生运动时是可恨的人

(When they resisted the American imperialists while assisting Korea during the Korean war they were the most lovable people.
When they put out the massive fires in Heilongjiang they were people to be admired and respected.
When they assisted those affected by the Tangshan earthquake, they were the most reliable people.
And when they cracked down on the student movement they were the most detestable people.)

Given China’s reform and opening up, soldiers had emerged as a less admired profession, and it was no longer a case of girls lining up to get married to men donned in army fatigues.

Hence, there is another saying about the kind of women that these soldiers can hope to marry – 搁在家里放心, 想起来伤心, 见了面恶心. (One’s heart can be at ease even if left at home, one’s heart will break whenever thoughts of them arise, and one’s heart will turn disgusted when comes face to face with them.) Hmm, not the best translation I guess.

Incidentally, this is the first national day I spent in Singapore in over a decade or more. I thought the national day parade was rather sleep-inducing. But nevertheless, happy 45th birthday Singapore.

The Fate of Chinese Intellectuals

As the late Liu Binyan (pictured) pointed out, the history of the Chinese Communist Party had largely been anti-intellectual.

The former dissident in exile noted that “almost none of the intellectuals among the first generation of Chinese communists (including the party’s founders) “has avoided coming to grief.”

In his book China’s crisis, China’s Hope, Essays from an Intellectual in Exile (Harvard University Press 1990) Liu noted that among Chinese intellectuals, renowned Chinese writer Shen Congwen (沈从文)“was the smart one.”

“Following two unsuccessful suicide attempts at the height of the campaign in 1951, he abandoned his writing career altogether and took up research on the history of Chinese attire, thereby avoiding considerable anguish and reaping a degree of scholarly rewards in the process.”

In contrast, philosopher Liang Shuming (梁漱溟) was indomitable and unyielding, “so typical of intellectuals in China’s tradition.” He had the courage to engage Mao Zedong in open debate, “holding back nothing in his criticism of Mao’s ultimate authority”, and he stood up to the public attacks that followed.

“All the others either kept silent or, like Guo Moruo (郭沫若), sang paeans even to the blatant mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party, shamelessly selling their souls for all to see.”

When compared to intellectuals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Chinese intellectuals were said to be more compliant.

In the twenty years following the 1917 revolution, some Soviet writers and literary theorists continued to contribute valuable work to the world, but nothing similar occurred in China.

Even as late as in the 1980s, Chinese writers could not match the courage of Hungarian writers of the 1950s or Czech writers of the 1960s.

So where did the problem lie? According to Liu., “the appeal of name, position, and material benefits is so strong among some intellectuals that it can overcome the desire for truth and lead to a willing sacrifice of individual talent.”

The lack of intellectual courage also had to do with what Liu called the loss of their political and economic independence as intellectuals became “employees of a highly centralized state.”

In the 35 years prior to 1990, intellectuals had lost their freedom to choose the nature of their work, as well as the location, organization, and the conditions under which the work was performed. Their salaries, position, housing, awards and honors, the opportunity to go abroad or perform domestic assignments were all determined by a higher authority. This could not help but undermine their independent thought, and made them subservient to party cadres who had the power to determine their fate. As Liu pit it, “the loss of a sense of equality saps the courage to struggle.”

But the true determination of the fate of intellectuals had been the anti-intellectualism campaigns launched by Mao Zedong. The theoretical framework of the campaign was that intellectuals must be dependent upon and obedient to the workers and peasants whom they were supposed to serve while cleansing themselves of “bourgeois individualism”.

“The effect … was to crush, once and for all, the intellectuals’ critical spirit and rebelliousness. This philosophy has enjoyed uninterrupted development since 1949, forcing intellectuals to move through society with their tails between their legs.”

China's Crisis, China's Hope

Picked up the book China’s crisis, China’s Hope, Essays from an Intellectual in Exile (Liu Binyan (刘宾雁), Harvard University Press 1990) after developing a sudden affinity with the late Chinese dissident in exile.

(Coz during my search for housing in Washington DC I chanced upon a Dupont Circle apartment that Liu used to live in for a year, at least according to the owner.)

Even as an exile, Liu was hardly bitter about the Chinese regime. His collection of essays were mainly reasoned and measured.

Liu noted that before 1988, officials used their authority for personal economic advantage but such acquisitions were considered illegal. The harm they inflicted on society by misappropriating funds and diverting public wealth was “more or less indirect.”

But since 1988, bureaucrats and their relatives were said to be diverting public funds “through the authority of party organizations to enter the realm of production and commodities by setting up state-funded companies; their speculation and profiteering caused untold damage to the national economy as they reaped staggering profits.”

Writing before 1990, Liu said the most serious problem was the “widespread spiritual malaise” among ordinary Chinese from all walks of life, “a growing mood of depression, even despair, a loss of hope for the future and of any sense of social responsibility, as if China were no longer their country and society owed them something.”

Remarking that such an attitude had not been seen in the four decades prior to 1990, Liu, a former Communist Party member and People’s Daily correspondent, argued that the malaise had led to disturbances such as labor strikes and work slowdowns.

Even so, Liu contended that the CCP had enjoyed a high degree of moral authority which is “unmatched by any other regime in the country’s history.”

“Even though people constantly witness the misdeeds of party members, they continue to view the party in a good light. Concepts, particularly traditional ones, have a powerful hold. So when people talk about forming another political party in China or setting up a multi-party system, I think the time is not yet ripe for that.”

Liu was sanguine that changes would occur in China, citing the role of the country’s trade unions which were then clamoring for reform and emphasizing on participation in government and their watchdog functions.

Liu noted that such clamoring were not official announcements, nor do they “originate from the powers that be”. Instead, these stemmed from changes within the unions themselves, many of which were no longer content to be “mere branches of the government” and were more interested in serving the interests of the workers.

These unions had formulated a series of demands, and they wanted to participate in legislation and be consulted on policies that involved the interests of workers.

“Government-run trade unions are in the process of becoming popular labor unions. Even though the appearance of a union like Poland’s Solidarity is not considered a strong possibility in China, there is a distinct possibility that government-run trade unions will in fact evolve into popular unions.”

Another example cited was the China Youth Daily which in 1988 published speeches of Ding Shisun (丁石孙), the president of Beijing University, and noted economist Qian Jiaju (千家驹). The move was said to have upset the authorities.

“I assumed that the paper would be chastened by this criticism, but they leaped right back into the fray after some perfunctory self-criticism. This is a case of a government-run newspaper evolving into a popular one.”

More on Genghis Khan

Genghis Khan is almost immortal and irreplaceable in the hearts and minds of Mongolians.

As early as in 1661, in a story told by historians, when the Manchu emperor Shunzhi died that year, the Mongols refused an official decree to mourn.

Summoned to Beijing to explain their “recalcitrance”, a group of Darkhats said they had been ordered to remain in mourning for one emperor only, Genghis Khan, all their lives. “If we were in double mourning we would make a serious mistake regarding the Sacred Lord’s brave soul … we would rather die obeying our late Emperor’s order than live violating it.”

“The Manchu officials knew when they were beaten, and granted the Mongols freedom to follow their own ways, pretty much unmolested, for the next 300 years.” (John Mann, Genghis Khan – Life, Death and Resurrection, Bantam Press 2004)

Even Genghis’ relics were contentious as recent as during the last century.

In the autumn of 1937, a representative of the Japanese Army based in Baotou in Inner Mongolia demanded that Genghis relics be handed over to the Japanese. The Japanese figured that whoever gained access to the relics “held the key to Mongolia” and that “whoever ruled Mongol lands had a fine base from which to secure the rest of China and Siberia.”

“Suddenly Genghis’ relics, Genghis’ very soul, had become the key to empire in Asia.”

However the Japanese were warned that if the relics were moved, there would be riots, and this reportedly compelled the Japanese to back off. But the incident also prompted the Mongols to approach the Chinese nationalist for help in moving the relics to a safe place. The KMT government agreed “to move everything by truck and camel to the mountains south of Lanzhou”. The area was chosen because it was safe, and not far from the Liupan mountains, where Genghis had reportedly spent his last summer.

So on 17 May 1939, 200 nationalist soldiers arrived unannounced at the Mausoleum, to the astonishment of the locals who blocked the way. A nationalist explained the need to protect the place against the “East Ocean devils.” Panic gave way to negotiations. The nationalists promised that all expenses would be paid and that some of the Darkhats could come along. But news spread and thousands spent the night in lantern-hit ceremonies, weeping and praying as the carts were loaded. At dawn, the train of vehicles moved off, with a brief pause when an old man prostrated himself in front of one of them.

One nationalist soldier reportedly muttered to another, “given such loyalty, no wonder Genghis Khan won wars.” Across “a sea of tears”, in the words of a journalist, the carts slowly pulled out.

“Because Genghis was, of course, a Chinese emperor and the whole Mausoleum a Chinese relic, both sides in what would soon be a vicious civil war united in competing to praise Genghis as a symbol of Chinese resistance to the invader, seeing him not as the founder of the Mongol nation and empire, but as the founder of the Yuan dynasty.”

“There was, therefore, a political subtext to this apparently altruistic gesture; the Mongols had better not forget that Genghis’ conquest were not conquests at all, but a little difficulty that led to the Chinese majority being ruled, for a short while, not by foreigners but by a Chinese minority; in brief, they had better remember that Mongolia was actually part of China.”

When Genghis’ relics arrived in Yenan, the Chinese Communists praised Genghis (Yuan Taizu) as “the world’s hero” and used him as a symbol calling on the Mongolian and the Chinese people “to unite and resist (Japanese aggression) to the end.”

As Mann mused, “this was how to deal with a barbarian conqueror: confer upon him a retrospective change of nationality and turn him into a symbol of Chinese culture, fortitude and unity.”

Mann added: “It was an astonishing display, given that this was the Chinese heartland, with few Mongols in evidence. Genghis had devastated the area. Yet ordinary people fell for his magic, because he had become a Chinese emperor, albeit posthumously; also, they were ancestor-worshippers, and Genghis was certainly a great ancestor, even if not theirs. So they knelt and kowtowed with joss sticks in their hands.”

Genghis Khan, Xi Xia Empire, and China

Mongolia has emerged as a new interest of mine. It does deserve a place in this China/Korea blog, given the influence that China/Korea have on Mongolia and vice-versa.

One of Mongolia’s most enduring legacies is most certainly Genghis Khan, an extraordinary character way ahead of his time. More than just a military conqueror and a war strategist, he was also the pioneer of modern management and globalization.

In his book, author John Mann noted that Genghis possessed the arrogance of someone who had been chosen to “unite, lead and conquer, who was justified in using every means to achieve Heaven’s purpose, and the humility of an ordinary man awed by the inexplicable nature of the assignment. It was this that lay at the heart of the paradoxical whirlwind of destructiveness and creativity, of ruthlessness and generosity, that constituted Genghis’ character.” (John Mann, Genghis Khan – Life, Death and Resurrection, Bantam Press 2004)

I was in China’s Ningxia province over a decade ago where I witnessed the ruins of the Xi Xia empire. As Mann noted, Xi Xia is hardly known to anyone beyond a few specialists because Genghis did his best “to wipe state, culture and people from the face of the earth. There is a case to be made that this was the first ever recorded example of attempted genocide.”

Xi Xia’s successor cultures, Mongol and Chinese, had no interest in saving its records, reading its script or preserving its relics. It took scholars of other countries, mainly Russia, to begin the work of decipherment and understanding.

It was only recently that the Chinese tried to gain leadership in this field, setting up a research institute, retrieving artifacts and restoring monuments.

“Only now is this ancient culture re-emerging into public gaze on the stage from which it was so violently ejected.”

The Chinese called the Xi Xia people Dangxiang (党项), while in Mongol they are known as Tangut.

As for Mongolian versus Chinese identity, let’s just say that history has made perfect delineation a somewhat difficult task.

As Mann noted, once upon a time, Mongolia and China were one, under the Mongols, who thereby became in effect Chinese. Since then, the Mongol empire has vanished and China “was also diminished in other ways.” Outer Mongolia – the Mongolian People’s Republic, as it became – “unfortunately slipped away from the family at a time of Chinese weakness in the early 20th century."

“But there are more Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, which is still part of China, than in Mongolia itself, which isn’t. So history’s underlying reality is best served by calling all Mongolians “Inner Mongolians” because to Chinese that’s where Mongolians come from. So therefore the troops that invaded Xi Xia in the 13th century were “Inner Mongolians”.

“There is one further dimension to this. The territory of Xi Xia overlaps present-day Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia, all very much part of China. If the Tanguts were with us today, they … would be Chinese – never mind that their language was related to Tibetan, that they established their own state by beating off the Chinese and that they were virtually extinguished or absorbed before the emergence of a united China. They were, after all, blotted out by a Chinese people, i.e. the Mongols. So their position is unequivocally part of the great family of China as it emerged after 1949. Thus, by the ruthless application of hindsight, it is possible to see an extended struggle for control of Inner Asia involving three separate nationalities as a minor spat among members of the same family.”

Perhaps the Chinese will not agree entirely, especially with Mann’s further assertion that it is “a strange distortion of history” for China to “impose Chinese-ness retrospectively on a unique non-Chinese people who were ruled by Tibetans ... before they carved out their own kingdom.”

Mann also asserted that if by being a successful conqueror, “Genghis become Chinese”, and if as a result all Mongols are seen as Chinese, then China has a claim on Mongolia, independent though it is at present.

China's Hui Minority

Currently reading a book purchased in China’s Ningxia province on the country’s Hui minority, who are invariably Muslims.

As author Wang Zhengwei noted, unlike the Hans, Miaos and Qiangs, ethnic Huis are not indigenous to China. Yet, unlike ethnic Koreans or Khazaks, they do not hail from foreign lands. Rather, the community was formed through “the great binding force of the Islamic culture” (伊斯兰文化的巨大凝聚力) where Muslims from different countries and speaking different languages were brought together in China’s ethnic melting pot.

Huis are hardly distinguishable from the Hans in terms of language and in their names. They have adopted Chinese last names and Chinese as their native language. But some last names are somewhat more unique to the Huis, such as Na, Su, La, Ha, Ma, Hai, Sai and Shan. (纳，速，拉，哈，马，海，赛，闪). The only outward distinguishable feature is the Muslim attire that some Huis still don.

Many Huis still observe several aspects of Muslim culture and tradition, such as burying the dead (as opposed to cremation) quickly (within 3 days), abstaining from wine, blood, animals that had died of unnatural causes, and “unclean” animals such as pigs, dogs, donkeys and other ferocious animals. They do not worship plants, animals, or idols, nor do they believe in demons and spirits. After 1949, male Huis have been prohibited from marrying more than one woman.

Given China’s vast changes, Wang noted that the Huis have also been swept up in the changes. Those who are religious are mainly those living in the countryside or in Hui-dominated areas, and among the old and illiterate. Rapid urbanization has meant that many Huis have not been able to pray 5 times a day, nor do they manage to find time to visit mosques or participate in religious activities. Some Huis also drink and smoke.

Wang argued that the Chinese Communist Party has shown “respect and sensitivity” toward Hui culture and tradition as early as in 1936 when the Red Army passed through Ningxia and Gansu provinces. A directive was reportedly issued making it clear that “no troops should be based in mosques, consumption of pork is prohibited, destroying of ethnic Hui scriptures is prohibited, cleanliness should be observed, Hui culture and customs must be respected, and using of Hui utensils is disallowed.” (禁止驻扎清真寺，禁止吃大荤，禁止毁坏回文经典，讲究清洁，尊重回民的风俗习惯，不准乱用回民的器具) (王正伟 回族民俗学 宁夏人民出版社 2008)

On Hui customs, Wang wrote that when a Hui woman is pregnant, she is not allowed to attend weddings or funerals, or consume rabbit as it is believed that doing so would lead to the birth of a child with cleft palate. When a child is born, the first person to step into the delivery room should be a male who is smart, honest and brave if it is a baby boy, and a female who is gentle, kind and hardworking if it is a baby girl. Usually, boys will be circumcised when they are between 5 to 9 years old.

Wang noted that historically the Huis had sometimes been “politically persecuted” during which their aversion to pork was ridiculed.

“为了区分回民与汉民, 以是否吃猪肉来检验, 以至引起更多回民的反抗与斗争.” (“To distinguish between Huis and Hans, the consumption of pork became a litmus test. This had resulted in even more struggles and battles among the Huis.”)

At different periods during the Ming to Qing dynasties, the Imperial Court attempted to stop Huis from intermarrying, using their family names, and from staying together as a united community. Huis were forced to marry Hans and settle down in Han-dominated areas.

The more the Huis were persecuted, the more they struggled to maintain their distinctive identity.

During Kuomintang’s rule over China, some newspapers reportedly published untruths such as saying that pictures of pigs were displayed in mosques, and that pigs are the forefathers of the Huis. These had naturally led to strong anger and consternation among the Huis on a nationwide basis.

One of the most famous Huis in Chinese history is most certainly admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) whose original name was Ma Sanbao. Wang wrote that Zheng’s family name was bestowed on him by the Emperor.

Chen Liangyu

A last entry from the book 中共政局全破译, 极目 编著, 新文化图书有限公司, 2007.

On disgraced former Shanghai leader Chen Liangyu (陈良宇, pictured center), the author described Chen as 作风霸道，生活糜烂, or “arrogant in manners, and decadent in lifestyle.”

During the period when Chen was detained for his misdemeanors, Chen imagined that he would only be given a light punishment by the Party. But when more evidence against him surfaced, he reportedly went on a hunger strike and cursed current Shanghai mayor Han Zheng (韩正) for having “sold out Shanghai”. But how Han had done so was not explained.

When Chen felt that his time was up (大势已去), he attempted three suicides. His son was reportedly deported to China and Chen tried to help his son obtain a lighter punishment, even though again, how his son was involved and how and whether a lighter punishment was obtained was not explained.

When Chen was handed over to the judiciary departments, he was said to have become “totally disillusioned” (彻底绝望), and loudly cursed Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong.

He claimed that if his son’s life cannot be protected (保不住), the lives of Jiang and Zeng’s sons will also be at stake. (休想保得了)

The author added that what Jiang and Zeng had done had made his supporters 泄气心寒 (demoralized and disappointed) and made them reconsider their loyalties to Jiang and Zeng.

On those who had stepped down after the 16th Communist Party Congress, the author had the following assessment.

Wu Guanzheng (吴官正) – “shown good performance during the five years and had emerged as an important pillar for Hu Jintao. The role he had played in the 16th Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) was secondary only to those played by Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong. The five years of success in tackling corruption is inextricably linked to him. He had accomplished a major act by attacking the “old nest” of the “Shanghai clique” and overturning Chen Liangyu and his cronies. As compared to Wei Jianxing (尉健行) under the 15th PSC, his performance was much more outstanding.”

Luo Gan (罗干) – “Even though he was Li Peng’s (李鹏) follower for over a decade, he was a person that all parties found acceptable. During the five years of the PSC, he firmly supported Hu Jintao and did massive work on political and legal reforms, especially in improving public order and reforming the judiciary.”

Zeng Peiyan (曾培炎) – “His position was obtained through Jiang. Before he was elected as vice-premier in 2003 he was involved in a car accident. During his 5 years as vice-premier, his performance was rather average” (似乎平淡). He is an expert in economics.

Huang Ju (黄菊) – “When he died before the 17th Party Congress, the following accolades were bestowed on him (优秀的党员, 杰出领导人, and 忠诚的共产主义战士 or “outstanding party member, outstanding leader, and a loyal warrior for communism”.). These accolades were inappropriate. In Shanghai, he assisted Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. And when he joined the State Council he seemed to be able to do only one thing – read from prepared text. Jiang pushed him (as well as Jia Qinglin) to the pinnacle of power. This was a major mistake (一大失误) which is against the Party and the people (有违党心民心). His wife, younger brother and secretary were all involved in corruption, and he could hardly escape the connections. The only thing is that he has passed away so there will be no further investigations.”

Zeng Qinghong

Chinese leader Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) is said to be able to assume full control of China due to the help of two leaders – Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红, pictured). The latter had often been portrayed as an extraordinarily astute character.

Even though Zeng was a protégé of former leader Jiang Zemin (江泽民), he made sure – after becoming a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSB) - that he worked with Hu, while avoiding any appearance of open assistance from Jiang, though he had reportedly secretly assisted the “Jiang clique”.

Soon after the new PSB line-up was announced after the 16th Party Congress, Zeng was pictured at the Xibaibo (西柏坡) Memorial with Hu. Xibaibo is a small village located in Pingshan County, Hebei province. From May 1948 to March 1949, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army set up their headquarters in the village. Since then, Xibaipo had been symbolically seen as one of the pivotal origins of New China. So when Zeng was pictured there with Hu, the rumor going round at that time was that “it is impossible for two tigers to live in the same mountain.”

But events have proven these rumors wrong as Zeng actively supported Hu. Through his leadership at the Central Party School, Zeng promoted and propagated Hu’s thinking. Zeng also reportedly made important contributions in the reform of the personnel system and inner-party democracy within the Party using his “superb intelligence.” (利用高智商为胡锦涛谋划)

“胡锦涛提拔那么多 ”团派”, 没有曾庆红的赞同是不可能的. 胡扳倒了那么多腐败高官, 直至拿下陈良宇, 都有曾庆红的支援. 海外媒体称, 扳倒陈良宇, 是胡曾连手干的.” (中共政局全破译, 极目 编著, 新文化图书有限公司, 2007.)

“Without Zeng’s approval, it is impossible for Hu to promote many within the “tuanpai” (literally “league faction”, which means cadres and government officials who originated from the Communist Youth League). Zeng’s support was also important in leading to the fall of several corrupted senior officials such as Chen Liangyu. The foreign media reported that the fall of Chen Liangyu was due to the joint effort of Hu and Zeng.”

Zeng was also described as “progressive” as he had visited Zhao Ziyang during the disgraced former Chinese Premier's final days.

“曾庆红在出席委内瑞拉期间赶上赵紫阳与世长辞, 他曾对记者发表看法, 肯定赵紫阳做过一些有益的贡献 (同时不得不说赵犯了”严重错误”). 二是参加纪念胡耀邦诞辰90周年座谈会, 会议由温家宝主持. 曾在会上发表热情洋溢的讲话,充分肯定胡耀邦, 表达了对胡耀邦的敬仰.”

“Zhao died when Zeng was in Venezuela. Zeng reportedly spoke to reporters and reaffirmed the useful contributions made by Zhao (even though he also added that Zhao had committed “serious errors”). He also attended the 90th anniversary seminar of Hu Yaobang’s birth which was chaired by Wen Jiabao. Zeng made a warm and exuberant speech and positively reaffirmed Hu Yaobang, and expressed his respect and admiration for Hu.”

曾庆红是靠江泽民上去的. 他为江泽民立下汗马功劳. 江泽民执掌中共的13年中, 经济, 社会和政治的稳定, 都有曾庆红的贡献. 曾庆红出生 “满门英烈” (毛泽东当年在井冈山对曾庆红的父亲曾山家庭的评语) 家庭, “根红苗壮”. 非常之人有非常之功. 曾庆红的劣势是身上罩着”上海帮” 的阴影 .“上海帮” 已经走向垂暮, 陈良宇的垮台更令它声名狼藉… 但”上海帮” 并非都是坏人 (“团派”也并非都是能人), 曾庆红是一个好人, 而且是一个开明的政治强人. 中共的颓势,令他心焦如焚. 但又苦无良策, 无力回天. 他看透了, 回家去了.

“Zhao owed his rise to power to Jiang, and had assisted Jiang tremendously. During the 13 years when Jiang was in power, Zeng made important contributions to economic, social and political stability. Zeng came from a revolutionary background (this accolade was bestowed by Mao Zedong in Jinggangshan on Zeng’s father Zeng Shan). Zeng is an extraordinary person with extraordinary deeds. Zeng’s disadvantage was his association with the “Shanghai clique” which was gasping for its last breath. The fall of Chen Liangyu made the clique even more disreputable. But not all within the “Shanghai clique” are bad guys (just as the “tuanpai” are not all competent men). Zeng is a good person and an open-minded political strongman. The decline of the CCP was extremely worrying to him but he could not think of a way to salvage the Party. He has seen through it and has decided to call it quits.”

曾庆红在中央干了18年, 铺佐两位总书记,够辛苦的. 凭他的智谋, 为党内外的协调出了大力. 支援胡锦涛的观点和工作有些建树. 激流勇退, 显示出落落大方. 因年龄退下, 对中共高层是个损失. 江泽民支援他退下, 令人费解.

“Zeng has worked in the Central government for 18 years and had assisted two secretary-generals. It was extremely hard work. With his intelligence and ability, he has made important contributions both within and outside the party, especially in supporting Hu. He has exemplified graciousness in stepping down citing his age, and this is a lost to the Party. It is puzzling as to why Jiang supported Zeng’s retirement.”

While the author gave high marks to Zeng, he also pointed to a “devious” side of Zeng during Hu's visit to Hong Kong in 2007 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China.

Over 1000 Falungong practitioners from Taiwan were barred from entering the territory and the author said this was instigated by Zeng to “apply pressure” on Hu. But how so? It was not explained in the book.

Another incident depicting the “devious” side of Zeng occurred the same year in August when Hu was in Russia to witness a military drill organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

During the visit, two Chinese scholars reportedly said that China wanted to dispose of its American bonds, a move which had supposedly angered Bush. Zeng had reportedly instructed the scholars to make the comments. Hmm.

Lee Myung-bak and Park Chung Hee

In a highly personalized book about the life of South Korean Lee Myung-bak (pictured), a group of Chinese authors (including possibly two ethnic Korean-Chinese) wrote that Lee’s real name was “Sang Gyong” (相京). But his mother convinced Lee’s father to change it to Myung-bak (明博), meaning “bright” and “broad” as she had a vivid dream about the moon when she was pregnant with Lee.

In tracing Lee’s life, the authors wrote somewhat extensively about Korea’s recent history and development, including how former President Park Chung Hee was mesmerized by the idea of expressways, seeing these super highways as a sign of a country’s progress. (韩国总统李明博，朴键一 焦艳 姬新龙 王晓玲 著，红旗出版社2008)

In 1964, a proposal by Park to build an expressway from Seoul to Busan was derided by everyone except Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung. Critics queried the need for having an expressway when the country “had hardly any cars.” Some even said that "the Taewongun (father of the last ruling Korean king) had already destroyed the country by building Gyongbokgung (palace), and Park was trying to perform a similar feat.”

It turned out that the expressway eventually played a contributory role in Korea’s development. Moreover, the good example and exemplary spirit and hard work set by Chung had “set a glorious example for the Korean business world, and even the ordinary people.” (郑周永在这个工程中表现出来的极大热情和坚韧精神也给整个韩国企业，甚至是普通民众树立了光辉榜样。)

Indeed, it was Park who had first mooted the idea in 1977 of relocating the country’s capital. Park’s concern then was to move the capital further away from the Demilitarized Zone, presumably away from any impending warfare between the two Koreas.

The authors also noted that over the past decade leading to the 2007 presidential election, Koreans, originally progressive, had turned conservative. Because even though progress had been made over the decade in eradicating corruption and improving welfare, economic development had become sluggish, unemployment had risen, and income gap had become more apparent.

Many accused the government of not providing a sound environment for the growth of Korean enterprises, adding that the aggressive trade unions pressing for higher pay had eroded the country’s competitiveness.

Lao She

The Lao She Memorial Museum in Beijing published a book about Lao She (老舍, pictured), a collection of the literary giant’s ruminations about his own life, some of which I found delightfully endearing. (老舍这一辈子,老舍纪念馆, 2006)

Lao She came from a poor family and was weak as a child; hence he did not enter school until he was nine. Prior to nine, he could not read a single word. He was reportedly taken to school, “much like an unrespectable puppy” (像一条不体面的小狗) by a wealthy relative.

Describing his time in England during his late 20s, Lao She mused that his English was so good that “I could speak it such that it doesn’t sound like English, neither does it sound like German” (我的英语就很好。我能把他说得不像英语，也不像德语。), adding that “I could artistically mix some English words into Chinese characters, like putting a chicken and rabbit in the same cage. The English made me bewildered with what they had said, but I can also speak to them such that they couldn’t stop blinking their eyes. They understood what they had said, and I understood what I had said. That’s more than adequate.” (我很艺术的把几个英国字均派在中国字里，如鸡兔之同笼。英国人把我说得一愣一愣的。我可也把他们说得直眨眼。他们说的他们明白。我说的我能明白，也就很过得去的。)

With the London subway, Lao She mused that “if I want to head to hell I will have no worries whatsoever.” (有了他，上地狱也不怕了) He noted that even “if the English hardly smiled and looked as if they were going to cry, deep down they are downright humorous.” (脸板得要哭似的，心中可是很幽默)

Lao She said he started writing at 7 in the morning but by 9 am “panting would become extremely exhausting.” (九点以后便连喘气也很费事了) “To be so engrossed in writing is a joy, even if what had been written is nothing to speak of. (能写入了迷是一种幸福，即使所写的一点也不高明。) Such self-deprecation. Love it.

The realities of working as a writer who had to support a family meant that materials intended for longer pieces of work had to be used for shorter pieces to generate an immediate income. This, according to Lao She was depressing as “what was intended for wholesale distribution had ended up as retail sale.” (由批发而改为零售是有点难过)

On fatherhood, Lao She was almost hilarious when he noted that “just when I thought I had come up with a line that would put Shakespeare to shame, the little one will pull at my elbow and whispered “shall we go to the park to look at the monkeys?”. This is why till this day I have not become Shakespeare.” (我刚想起一句好的，在脑中盘旋，自信足以愧死莎士比亚 。。小济拉拉我的肘，低声说“上公园看猴？”于是我至今还未成莎士比亚。)

“The worst was when the little fatty started teething. That was really unbeatable. Not only was he merciless in the day, he even worked the night shift … When he was teething, no one should think of getting any sleep. When his teeth were all out, everyone had turned into red-eyed tigers (through lack of sleep). (遇上小胖子出牙，那才真叫厉害，不但白天没有情理，夜里还得上夜班 。。他出牙，谁也不用打算睡。他的牙出利落了，大家全成了红眼虎。)

Lao She claimed that if he slept early, he slept like a log. “Even if someone carried me away I wouldn’t have known.” (有人把我搬了走我也不知道)

On the undeserved reputation of dogs in Chinese vocabulary, Lao She felt a sense of injustice, arguing that dogs are loyal, brave and faithful creatures, and wondered why traitors are called “running dogs” (走狗). He noted that cats are lazy and would leave their owners if no food were provided. So why shouldn’t traitors be called “running cats”(走猫)instead?

Mao Zedong's Daughters

A short account of why two of Mao Zedong’s (毛泽东) daughters Li Min (李敏, pictured left) and Li Ne (李讷) bore the family name “Li” instead of “Mao”.

There was even speculation that the two girls took Mao’s third wife Jiang Qing’s (江青) family name, whose maiden was Li Yunhe (李云鹤).

Incidentally, Li Ne is Jiang’s daughter, but Li Min’s mother was He Zhizhen (贺子珍), Mao’s second wife.

In a highly personalized book written by Wang Guiyi (王桂苡), a long-time friend of Li Min, part of the explanation was that in Li Min’s school records, her father’s name was listed as Li Desheng (李得胜). And Li Desheng was the name used by Mao during the war against the Kuomintang. Zhou Enlai on the other hand used the name Hu Bicheng. (胡必成) (毛泽东的女儿李敏，辽宁人民出版社, 1997)

During chaotic and turbulent periods, it is common for Chinese to adopt different names, partly to reflect their revolutionary zeal, and partly to avoid detection. But there was no explanation of why there was no desire on either side to restore their rightful names after the chaotic periods were over.

Malaysia and China Established Diplomatic Ties in 1974

Malaysia was the first ASEAN member to establish diplomatic ties with China in 1974.

The rapproche-ment between China and the United States was said to have made it possible for Malaysia to respond to China’s “diplomatic offensive.”

Malaysian leaders also believed that China would be committed to a policy of non-interference and co-existence if “it was allowed to play its legitimate role.” Malaysia sided with Albania in 1971 in admitting China to the United Nations, and this reportedly paved the way for establishing diplomatic ties between Malaysia and China.

Equally important was the personality factor.

“Unlike Tungku Abdul Rahman, the former prime minister who was considered rather pro-ethnic Chinese, Tun Razak had an image as the champion of the Malay interest. Therefore he could afford to move closer to the PRC without causing an uproar among the Malay population.” (Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

The visit of Tun Razak to China was also said to be timed to garner more Chinese votes during the 1974 Malaysian general election. Indeed, the National Front won a major victory that year, receiving not only the majority of the Malay vote but those of the ethnic Chinese as well.

Malaysian leaders were also concerned with the national status of the ethnic Chinese and viewed the establishment of diplomatic ties as a means to resolve the issue. At that time, China claimed that Chinese overseas were its nationals unless the country concerned had diplomatic ties and signed a dual nationality treaty.

China's Invasion of Vietnam

An account of why China invaded Vietnam in 1979 after the latter invaded Kampuchea.

According to Leo Suryadinata, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea partly because of Pol Pot’s refusal to have “special relationships” with Hanoi, and Kampuchea’s “continued hostility” towards Vietnam.

Vietnam calculated that China would not dare intervene as it had secured the backing of the Soviets. But this turned out to be a miscalculation as China saw the Vietnamese action as an open challenge. Many believed that Deng Xiaoping had secured the support, or at least the implicit endorsement, of the United States.

In a report to the Chinese Communist Party, Deng noted that the Soviet Union had been expanding, and Soviet-controlled Vietnam had not only controlled Laos but also invaded Kampuchea. The “hegemony” of Vietnam was seen as a threat to Southeast Asia and the southern borders of China.

Deng added that the “self-defence” war was also a “military exercise” for China’s army which had not been engaged in warfare for 30 years and had little combat experience. Deng said that the war would be “limited” and should be completed in a month “so that Vietnam could be taught a lesson and would no longer be arrogant.”

Deng argued that Vietnam would not be able to do much as the Soviets would not invade China as its troops, numbering 430,000 in the Sino-Mongolian border, “would be unable to penetrate China.”

“If the Soviets transferred their troops from the west, it would not serve their interests. Therefore the likelihood of the Soviets launching a large-scale attack on China was slim.” (Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

“The question of the overseas Chinese was never mentioned in the report. One can certainly argue that the expulsion of the ethnic Chinese by Hanoi was considered by Beijing as another arrogant and hostile act committed by Hanoi. But the overseas Chinese issue per se was not the major cause of the war.”

In invading Vietnam, China also intended to put across the message that Vietnam was “not undefeatable” and that the war would tie down some Vietnamese troops so that Pol Pot’s troops could survive.

Suryadinata noted that if the aim of the invasion was to remind Vietnam that China would not hesitate to use force to “punish” Vietnam, then Beijing had succeeded. But if it was to force Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea, then it had failed to achieve its objective.

However, it can be argued that because of China’s invasion, Vietnam would think twice before it moved beyond Kampuchea. The invasion was also a reminder to Beijing that it needed to modernize its army and equipment if it hoped to be more effective on the battlefield.

If the objective of Beijing was to tell Vietnam not to ill-treat the ethnic Chinese, it appeared to be unconvincing because the war only created racial antagonism between the ethnic Chinese and the Vietnamese. After the Sino-Vietnamese war, there was a large exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, and Vietnamese officials reportedly made money by sending “boat people” out to the seas.

From April to August 1979, China received more than 250,000 refugees from Vietnam. Beijing was unable to cope and had to appeal to the United Nations for help, “an unprecedented act in the history of New China.” In fact, before the start of the War, China stopped the flow of ethnic Chinese into China’s southern provinces as Beijing could not accommodate the refugees.

China, the Khmer Rouge and the Ethnic Chinese in Kampuchea

A 1970s example of how China’s overseas Chinese policy was dictated largely by political consi-derations.

Once in power in 1975, the Khmer Rouge tried to turn the country into a “primitive communist country” by forcing the population to move from urban to rural areas. Ethnic Chinese too were affected, many of whom were driven to the countryside to become farmers and their properties confiscated.

“Many were also assigned to exploit virgin lands. According to many reports, the working hours in the rural areas after the Khmer Rouge seized power were extraordinarily long. They started at four in the morning and ended at nine-thirty in the evening. There were breaks in between for meals. The cadres explained to the people that long working hours were intended to “build a socialist society in a shorter period of time.”(Leo Suryadinata, China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension, Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

To establish a socialist state, the Khmer Rouge decided to eliminate the “enemies of socialism” which included capitalists, intellectuals, professionals, school teachers and merchants. These “enemies” were ordered to dig their own holes and were buried alive. Among them were many ethnic Chinese.

The Khmer Rouge reportedly did not differentiate between the ethnic groups when they implemented the policy. But even so, Suryadinata noted that “Pol Pot’s policy was not without ethnic overtones.” The ethnic Chinese were prohibited from using their language and had to abandon their traditions. There were even reports of arranged marriages in which ethnic Chinese girls were forced to marry Khmer cadres and soldiers. Those who resisted were reportedly sent to labor camps.

The extreme hardship forced many ethnic Chinese to flee to either Thailand, Vietnam where they became “boat people”, and other countries.

The Pol Pot regime lasted three and a half years, and the population was alleged to have been reduced from 7 to 4 million.

The Kampuchean Chinese reportedly turned to the international community for help, including the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh. But the response from the embassy was that the matter had already been reported to Beijing and the reply was that “the problem should be solved slowly.”

“It appears that Beijing did not want to intervene in Kampuchean policy towards the ethnic Chinese because it feared that it would jeopardize Sino-Kampuchean relations – relations which Beijing was trying to cultivate,” Suryadinata noted.

Since Vietnam was moving closer to the Soviets at that time, China felt that it had to side with Kampuchea in the dispute between Phnom and Hanoi. Chinese experts were also sent in to help in the reconstruction of Kampuchea.

Even though the Committee on Rescuing Khmer’s Chinese which was established in December 1977 in Paris urged Beijing to intervene on behalf of the ethnic Chinese who were harassed and even persecuted, Beijing response to the Chinese was to be “patient.”

“One can maintain that Beijing was not able to do much because the Pol Pot regime applied a similar policy towards the whole population, therefore China could not protest. Nevertheless, a more plausible explanation was that Chinese needed the friendship of Kampuchea which had actively deterred Vietnam’s ambition in the region. It did not want to create friction with the Pol Pot regime over the issue.”

China’s concern with her security became even more apparent after Vietnam occupied Kampuchea. Beijing continued to support the Khmer Rouge in their resistance against the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime. Beijing even argued that Pol Pot had the support of the Kampuchean people, even as it admitted that the regime “committed mistakes.” But it refuted the argument that the Khmer Rouge had committed genocide.

China's National Security Prevailed Over Ideology

Am reading a rather dated book written by a former professor Leo Suryadinata (pictured) – China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension (Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985).

Suryadinata noted that when China’s national security and territorial integrity clashes with ideology, the former invariably prevailed.

One example was the Indo-Pakistan dispute where from the international communist standpoint “Beijing should have sided with India rather than Pakistan”. India at that time was not a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and tolerated the communist party, while Pakistan was a member of SEATO and banned communist activities.

But yet China sided with Pakistan because India has assisted Tibetan rebels who threatened China’s territorial integrity. Moreover, India had a border dispute with China and was on good terms with the Soviet Union – China’s then adversary.

“The Chinese leaders perceived the Russian threat to be real, and the cooperation between India and the Soviet Union persuaded the PRC to take the Pakistani side.”