China's Xuzhou

I was in Xuzhou (徐州) in 2000, and remember the city mainly for the rain, the fact that it looked like any other bustling second or third-tier city in China, and its Han terracotta warriors (pictured, which are less famous than their Xi'an (西安) counterpart).

According to a 2003 article, few outsiders were aware of Xuzhou's appeal, as it rarely promoted itself, unlike Suzhou (苏州) and many other southern Chinese cities.

"Xuzhou has not needed to advertise itself to the outside world ever since the city was crowned the state capital of the Han dynasty 2,200 years ago," Michael Jen-Siu wrote.

Rural inhabitants and people living in smaller towns and scattered across five provinces - Jiangsu (江苏), Anhui (安徽), Henan (河南), Shandong (山东) and Hebei (河北) - have naturally travelled to the city, because of its status as a crossroads. This persisted till today, where vehicle licence plates from four provinces could be found on the roads of Xuzhou.

Apart from the two railway lines - the Beijing-Shanghai and Gansu-Shanghai -, the city is also equipped with four expressways and 20 provincial highways. A canal from Huangzhou to Beijing leads to four Xuzhou ports, and flights from Xuzhou's domestic airport fly to 10 cities.

The city also boasts of more shopping centers than most cities with a comparable population of about 1.5 million people. Like most east-coast cities, Xuzhou has an economic development zone with 500 companies, including Haier and Caterpillar.

But with many east coast Chinese cities prospering and growing at a rapid pace, many businesses in Xuzhou reportedly wanted officials to promote the city as a tourist town and a key business center.

As an economics researcher pointed out, in order to reach the level of a first-tier coastal city, Xuzhou must first overcome its shrinking coal resources. He also suggested that the city's distance of more than 100 km from the ocean could make it difficult for Xuzhou to compete for investment.

Liu Hong's Startling Moon

Liu Hong was described as a rare Chinese writer for whom life during the Cultural Revolution was not pure misery. Rather, her works testify to the moments of happiness she experienced growing up on the mainland despite political and economic hardship.

Unsurprisingly, her first book Startling Moon (2001) was compared to other more successful memoirs such as Nien Cheng's Life and Death in Shanghai (1986) and June Chang's Wild Swans (1991).

Liu grew up near the Korean border in Manchuria, and for a long time she never understood the lengths her mother went to keep the family safe. It was not until she was in her 30s - when a stranger in England asked her about her childhood - that she discovered the truth.

"I'd told people it wasn't hard, but suddenly realized my parents had protected me from the suffering of my elders," Liu recalled.

Her maternal grandparents had been labelled "rightists" and exiled to the countryside for 10 years. But to a naive Liu, their peasant life sounded idyllic in their letters. Her mother kept her parents' identity a secret to ensure that she and her brother would grow up as ordinary children.

"I had always thought I had a normal childhood. Because I was so well-protected, I had some good times. I even enjoyed being a Red Guard."

But once the full realization hit, Liu was saddened to think that neither her parents nor grandparents had a voice. Startling Moon was her effort to recover one for them.

Incidentally, Startling Moon was named after a piece of poetry by Tang poet Wang Wei (王维).

On her English writing skills, Liu noted that "Chinese language and culture are like the soil that gave me nutrients, but English is the language that has made me free."

North Korea, A Land of Surprises

In a 2003 article North Korea A Land of Surprises by United Nations official John Williams, some interesting glimpses of the hermit kingdom were offered.

One was Williams' observation that North Korean society "gives pride of place to children." Travelling coast to coast from Nampo to Wonson, the children Williams and his colleagues saw were mostly sturdy, warmly dressed and "with energy enough for snowball fights in the freezing winter."

But having said that, Williams also noted that the situation for children was complex. Even though polio had been eradicated, a recent survey showed that immunization levels need to be improved.

"Acute child malnutrition has dropped from 16 to 9 per cent. So those photographs of thin sick children tell an important part, but only a part of the story."

The country itself was said to contain wide variations. Levels of children with pneumonia and diarrhoea were described as worse in the northeast, with its closed factories and poor roads, than in Pyongyang or Nampo, the major port.

"In the centers we visited, North Korean caregivers, usually not highly trained, provided children with that primary ingredient, affection. I saw more human warmth here than on visits to far better equipped clinics in Eastern Europe. As we left a Kangwon provincial clinic, a young caregiver and a small child cuddled as they waved goodbye, their cheeks cradled together."

But with the bitter winter stretching into March that year, Williams noted that the energy crisis was evident everywhere.

"At dusk in small towns, whole families return home, each member carrying a backload of chopped branches. Trees have been stripped of bark as a food supplement."

Random Notes About the 16th Party Congress

Now that the dust has settled on the 17th Party Congress, I find myself reading about the 16th Party Congress. Call it 温故知新, or "gain new insights by studying old material."

At the National People's Congress held after the 16th Party Congress, Huang Ju (黄菊) - who had since died - and an ally of Jiang Zemin (江泽民) - was confirmed as Executive Vice-Premier. Huang received 91.75 per cent of delegates' vote, said to be a "poor showing" by Chinese Communist Party standards. In contrast, Ethnic Affairs Minister Li Dezhu (李德柱) received a stellar 99.76 per cent.

At his appointment, Huang was described by analysts as having little experience managing state affairs, given that he had always been a party organization man. Analysts also lamented the sidelining of Xu Kuangdi (徐匡迪), the popular former mayor of Shanghai, to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The talk then was that Xu had to go to make way for Huang. In the words of one observer, "Xu should have been appointed one of the vice-premiers. That would have raised the image of the Cabinet. He's clearly a world-class manager."

The other three vice-premiers at that time were former state councillor Wu Yi (吴仪), former planning chief Zeng Peiyan (曾培炎), and former Jiangsu party chief Hui Liangyu (回良玉). With the possible exception of Zeng, the other two vice-premiers reportedly owed their allegiance to Jiang.

Among the five state councillors, former education minister Chen Zhili (陈致立) - also a member of the Jiang clique - received the lowest approval rating of 87.8 per cent. Another who had a poor showing was Hua Jianmin (华建敏), secretary-general of the State Council. Former foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇), who replaced Qian Qichen (钱其琛) as state councillor in charge of foreign policy, received a "mixed vote."

Two state councillors who "bucked the trend" with good approval ratings were defence minister Cao Gangchuan (曹刚川) and Zhou Yongkang (周永康), who took over the public security ministry, and who was appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee since the 17th Party Congress.

At the end of the 16th Party Congress, observers noted that whether the soft-spoken Premier can handle a cabinet packed with many Jiang loyalists "rests heavily on many people's mind." A party source added that while Wen Jiabao (温家宝) may be dedicated and hardworking, "he lacks the charisma of his mentor Zhu Rongji (朱镕基) and may find it hard to assert his authority."

Lower down the hierarchy, Li Zhaoxing (李肇星) was appointed China's new foreign minister. Nicknamed by some as the "Red Guard ambassador" for his frankness, Li was also known as the "poetic diplomat." He reportedly wrote poems during his leisure, and had even published a collection of his works. His diplomatic style was said to reflect those two dimensions of his personality - "frank and firm, but not without subtlety and imagination."

On a totally different note, Hong Kong analyst Frank Ching observed in 2003 that Deng Xiaoping Theory was only incorporated into the Constitution in 1997, the year Deng died. But in 2003, that theory was already superseded by Jiang's "Theory of the Three Represents". Ching noted that Jiang was the first Chinese leader since Mao to have his thought incorporated into the Constitution when he was still alive.

Such audacity by Jiang!!

Ching also noted that instead of a hammer and sickle, the emblem of the Chinese Communist Party should be changed to a more "appropriate" one - such as one consisting of "a laptop and a dollar sign." Haha.

Thou Shalt Not Fear China

Southeast Asia should not fear China's low-cost labor and its attraction to foreign investors, so said a 2003 China Economic Quarterly article titled How Korean Firms Found a Gold Mine on the Mainland.

While competitive pressure from China had undoubtedly hurt low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing in many countries, this pressure had been described as "not necessarily negative on balance."

As the article pointed out, "what rarely gets reported are the benefits that neighboring countries can extract from a fast-growing China."

Using South Korea as an example, the article noted that five years ago, the country's economy was in disarray, given the Asian Financial Crisis. But recovery came far faster than anyone had anticipated, thanks in part to China.

China gave Korea's struggling companies, big and small, two things: a source of cheap manufacturing labor, and a ready-made export market.

Chaebols - Korea's giant industrial conglomerates - also realized that their future lied with China. Their first tack, in the mid-1990s, was to sell Chinese consumers second-rate goods at low prices. That strategy failed, since copycat Chinese companies could always win on price.

So in the late 1990s, Samsung, LG and other companies switched their focus to pricey, stylish, and hard-to-copy goods (pictured). Such a strategy was a success, partly because of the companies' success at marketing, and partly because of timing - which coincided with the rapid increase in the numbers of wealthier and middle-class Chinese.

The article added that as China's manufacturing economy booms, so will its appetite for Korean goods. Right now, China's northeast is dotted with tiny Korean food-processing and cold-storage firms that export products back to Korean supermarkets.

As the article concluded: "South Korea's situation is unique, because of its proximity to China and its specialization in industrial supplies that China desperately needs. But then, every country's situation is unique. The key is to make the best of what you have rather than complain about what you do not. And in this, Korea has a lot to teach the rest of Asia."

Long Yongtu and WTO

Long Yongtu (龙永图) was the top Chinese trade negotiator who led China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) after a 15-year quest.

According to a 2003 article by Rebecca Lee published in The Straits Times, he was also the man who had opened China's eyes to the world of "win-win."

Long noted that his biggest achievement has been introducing concepts such as a "win-win" outcome to a nation that had previously been closed to such ideas.

Long reportedly said: "(Win-win) is not the language of the Chinese ... but in this world, because of globalization, we all have to strive for a win-win output to attain a good relationship with other countries. If you want to only take advantage of others and benefit at others' loss, then you are bound to reach no agreement. This is a new concept we are trying to introduce, not just to external relationships, but also among the Chinese, so that relationships can be more harmonious."

Turning to the WTO deal that was sealed in 2001, Long said that the most difficult part of the negotiations were those surrounding the opening up of China's telecommunications and insurance industries.

Although the outcome - China will allow up to 50 per cent of foreign investment in these key industries - was far from the totally barrier-free set-up one would expect of a free trade agreement, Long pointed out that this was an example of how both sides had met midway.

Born in Hunan province (湖南省) to working class parents, Long was the eldest and attended school in neighboring Guizhou province (贵州省), one of the poorest provinces in the country.

In 1965, Long graduated with a BA in British and American literature at the top of his class in Guizhou University (贵州大学). In 1973 - during the Cultural Revolution - Long and a few others were sent to study at the London School of Economics as part of a pioneer batch of Chinese students sent by the government to study in a foreign country.

Then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (周恩来) thought it was important to send students abroad to learn the workings of the international economy, as Chinese delegates at the UN then were "totally lost and unable to grasp the free-market terms used during discussions."

Long admitted that his two years spent in London kept him away from the revolution in China and enabled him to concentrate on his studies. But he still had to work in the countryside from 1969 to 1970, though he concurred that the experience had been a beneficial one for him.

"I know how poor the farmers are. That's why during my trade negotiations, when it comes to issues, especially about agricultural subsidies, I have a greater understanding of how the farmers feel and work ... and we have to take care of them."

After overcoming all obstacles in getting China into the WTO, Long noted that the biggest challenge the country faces was in understanding and integrating the rules into its system.

"Committing to international rules and practices is one thing, but actually implementing them is another."

South Korea's Outlawed Student Group

The Hanchongryon (Korea Federation of University Student Councils) was once described as South Korea's most popular but "now most vilified student group."

In a 2003 Associated Press article, the leftist organization was said to be outlawed in 1997 for being "enemy benefiting" by virtue of its promotion of reconciliation with North Korea.

"Now, with many of its members on the run and a new government in Seoul seeking better ties with the North, a battle is brewing on whether to lift that ban," the article noted, adding that since 1997, 735 members had been arrested.

Supporters view the group as a scrappy band of college idealists, while critics saw its members as "unrepentant emissaries of a communist threat."

Critics argued that due to tensions over North Korea's nuclear programs, it was not time yet to revise Hanchongryon's status. They also point out that the group should first renounce its often violent past before any leniency can be granted.

Others noted that since Hanchongryon still sympathizes with the North, any move to lift its ban without a national consensus "would be a dangerous idea."

An interesting slice of information, given how the South had been trying to work its sunshine magic when it comes to its dealings with its Northern neighbor. While government-to- government contacts are still largely portrayed as oozing with good will, students who sympathize with the North are still deemed to be subversive. A bit of an irony there.

China's Position on Korean Reunification

South Korean ambassador to China Kim Ha-joong had a brief chapter in his book 腾飞的龙 (The Soaring Dragon, World Knowledge Publishing Press, 2002) on China's view of Korean reunification.

He noted that those who argue that China is not keen to see the two Koreas reunite reasoned that if reunification occurs, a stronger Korea might threaten or even weaken China's overall influence. Worse, a reunited Korea might even demand from China the return of "lost" territories.

Citing Chinese sources, Kim noted that firstly, it is not true that China does not wish to see a reunited Korea. After all, Beijing had often made it clear that the reunification of the two Koreas should be undertaken in a peaceful and autonomous manner, and in line with the wishes of the Korean people. What this argument implies is that even if China inherently opposes reunification, it would not take active steps to alter or reverse the trend or process.

Secondly, Kim pointed out that given China's "anti-hegemonistic" inclination, it would be difficult for Beijing to "meddle" into the question of Korean reunification. Besides, "if reunification occurred in light of Beijing's disapproval, one can well imagine how a reunified Korea would view and treat China."

Thirdly, Kim noted that a reunited Korea can play an important role in global politics and commerice, and such a role would be beneficial for China. Hence, it would not be in China's interest to oppose reunification.

Lastly, Kim concluded that a reunification of the two Koreas will be seen as a setback for Taiwan separatist forces. Reunification will also reduce the interference by other countries into what China sees as an internal issue, i.e. the Taiwan issue.

The chapter consisted only of two pages with hardly any elaboration, which is a pity. But given his official capacity then (when the book was written) and even now, there is probably a lot more that he can say, but which he found inconvenient to do so.

How Chinese and South Koreans View One Another

Interactions between South Koreans and Chinese increased tremendously after the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992.

According to South Korean ambassador to China Kim Ha-joong in his book 腾飞的龙 (The Soaring Dragon, World Knowledge Publishing Press, 2002), these interactions led to an initial sense of South Korean "superiority."

After visiting parts of China, especially the northeastern provinces and having discovered the standards of living and average salaries there, many Koreans were said to "unabashedly look down on and despise the Chinese, especially those of ethnic Korean origin."

As Kim wrote: "After merely a few days of observation, Koreans in China began to denigrate China for being poor and dirty. When they were in restaurants, they spoke loudly in Korean to waiters and waitresses, used disrespectful language, and behaved in an ill-mannered way."

Which was the reason why Kim made it a point to tell his staff that "during the 2,000 years of relations between China and Korea, Korea had often lagged behind China. But this is the first time in history that Korea is wealthier than China. Seen in that light, this is perhaps the best of times in Sino-Korean relations. But it should be remembered that China will continue its economic development, and in two to three decades, it will become an economic force to be reckoned with."

"By then, even though Korea's income levels might still exceed China's, China's GDP will certainly exceed ours. And when that day comes, we will revert to the old days of Sino-Korean relations. So right now, if we do not adopt a more humble and friendly approach, we would adversely affect our future generations."

Turning to how the Chinese viewed Koreans, Kim noted that the first feelings were always "a sense of warmth" (亲切感) and the "feeling of family" (都是一家人).

Kim noted that most Koreans, including their surnames, originated from China. For instance, a former Korean President (guess which?!) originated from Shantong province (山东省), while a former foreign minister was said to be a descendant of Confucius.

Chinese, Kim noted, were also amazed that many Koreans understood complex Chinese characters, since many younger Chinese had already become accustomed to the simplified version and could not understand the complex version.

Chinese were also "impressed" at how the Koreans had not only preserved the Chinese influence in Korean culture, but had also "elevated" such influence. For instance, given how Confucius temples - even the one in the Confucius hometown of Qufu (曲阜) - were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese were "embarrassed" that in comparison, the Koreans had preserved their Confucian shrines and temples. The Chinese were also said to be "amazed" that Koreans had preserved many aspects of the Confucian tradition.

Other aspects which impressed the Chinese - Korea's rapid economic development, Koreans' illustriousness, professionalism, and strong nationalistic spirit (especially in light of how strongly the Korean government and its people had criticised and protested about Japan's "intransigence", and how similar reactions by the Chinese government and its people paled in comparison).

The Chinese were also said to be "extremely amazed" that during the 1997 financial crisis, many Koreans donated their possessions to help their country tide over the crisis. This, according to Kim, "was something totally incomprehensible according to the Chinese mindset."

But on the flip side of the coin, the Chinese viewed Koreans as being impatient, emotional and opinionated. As compared to the subtle Chinese way of talking, the Korean way was seen as too direct and militant. Chinese also felt that Koreans were prone to exaggeration and boasting, had inflated egos, and were inclined to measure everything in monetary terms.

The Chinese were also said to be "amazed" by the drinking culture in Korea, as Chinese usually had dinner at 6.30 pm, and were usually in bed by 9 or 10 pm. But the Koreans would visit bars and karaokes after dinner, and usually drank till they were barely conscious or "uttering nonsense."

Lastly, Kim claimed that Chinese women were generally put off by the MCP nature of Korean men, as the latter never helped out with housework, and do not seem to respect the fairer sex.

"Hence, in recent years in China, if daughters do not obey their parents, their parents would frighten them by saying "when you grow up, I'd marry you off to a Korean man!""

Kim Ha-joong and The Soaring Dragon

South Korean ambassador to China Kim Ha-joong (pictured) once wrote a book titled 腾飞的龙 (The Soaring Dragon, World Knowledge Publishing Press, 2002).

Much of it were descriptions about China, and anyone who has some basic knowledge of China will find nothing new or insightful in those descriptions. The more interesting aspects, rather, were Kim's personal experiences and diplomatic dealings with China.

For instance, Kim wrote that when he was young, he had three wishes. First, to be a diplomat. Second, to participate in the building of official diplomatic ties with China. And third, to become his country's ambassador to China.

Kim said he first thought of working in China after he read in October 1964 that China had successfully tested a nuclear weapon. The following year, he enrolled in Seoul National University's Chinese Literature Department - a choice which was little understood at that time.

When queried by friends, Kim said that "in three decades, we will establish diplomatic ties with China, and my China knowledge will be useful then." Incredulous friends laughed and mocked at his choice, as they felt that official ties were impossible.

Anyway, the long and short of it all was that South Korea did establish diplomatic ties with China, three years ahead of Kim's estimate - in 1992.

And besides, all Kim's three wishes in life came true. What more can anyone ask for?

On the changing roles of the sexes in China, Kim noted a new catchy (at least in Chinese!) version of 三从四德 (or "Three Adherences and Four Virtues" - used in the old days to stipulate the adherences women must observe and virtues that they must possess).

三从：
女人的话，男人要听从；
女人逛街，男人要跟从；
女人说谎话，男人要盲从。

Three Adherences:
What women say, men must listen and obey,
When women go shopping, men must accompany,
When women lie, men must blindly follow.

四德：
女朋友化妆要等得，
女朋友生气要忍得，
女朋友花钱要舍得，
女朋友生日要记得。

Four Virtues (1)
When your girlfriend puts on make-up, you must be willing to wait,
When your girlfriend is angry, you must be willing to tolerate,
When you girlfriend goes on a spending spree, you must be willing to part with your money,
And you must always remember your girlfriend's birthday.

四德：
女人的教诲，男人要记得，
女人购物，男人要舍得，
女人撒野，男人要忍得，
女人胖了，男人此话说不得。

Four Virtues: (2)
Women's teachings, men must remember,
Women's shopping, men must foot the bill,
Women's tantrums, men must tolerate,
And if women put on weight, men must never ever mention, or else!

三全丈夫：
有活全干，
挣钱全交，
剩饭全吃。

The Three "All" Husband
When there is work to be done, he should do it all,
When he brings home the pay packet, all the money should be surrendered,
When there are leftovers, he should finish all up.

Zhu Rongji's Legacy

Former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) was semi controversial during the time when he was premier.

According to a 2003 article titled Beijing autocrat leaves behind debt and doubt, Jasper Becker suggested that "Zhu's worst legacy may be the high esteem that many younger Chinese now have for his brand of strong authoritarian leadership and for the merits of heavy-handed state intervention and big government spending."

Arguing that the state debt that accumulated under Zhu was enormous and hard to determine, Becker noted that the former premier used state banks to finance what should be government spending. Zhu also left his successor Wen Jiabao (温家宝) to cope with some $450 billion in non-performing loans, while unsecured state pensions and other liabilities were said to have raised the government's total bill by two or three times that amount.

By the time he stepped down, Zhu was said to have failed in his efforts to build a social welfare infrastructure for city dwellers, and farmers were still not given legal title to the land they farm.

During his tenure, Zhu kept the state sector going by aggressively injecting money raised on domestic and overseas stock markets. And when the Asian Financial Crisis hit in 1997 and Chinese jobs were lost, Zhu responded by launching "wave after wave of huge infrastructure projects" to stimulate the economy. He also spurred housing privatization, and unleashed a construction boom.

As Becker noted: "To help raise China's prestige and encourage an economic recovery in East Asia, Zhu resisted pressure from domestic groups to follow neighboring countries in devaluing the currency. The cost has been high, especially in rural China, where neither wages nor incomes have risen for more than seven years."

"Zhu got away with a lot through bluster and bluffing. For example, he manipulated statistics so that they showed the economy was growing at around 8 per cent in 1998, although it was barely growing at all."

Likewise, Zhu's claims that the state sector had been restored to profitability in just three years and that the size of the bureaucracy had been halved were said to be doubtful. "More likely is that the officials are still on the state payroll, just doing different jobs," according to Becker.

As Becker concluded: "Zhu boasted in 2002 that he had saved the Chinese economy from collapse. While he did stave off fresh political upheavals, the day of reckoning may only have been postponed."

Oh well.

Interestingly, the austerity measures spearheaded by Zhu in the mid-1990s were said to be so severe that there were "believable rumors" that he and his family members had narrowly escaped assassination attacks.

At least now Zhu can live in peace, serenity, and with no fear of assassinations.

(Official) End of the Jiang Era?

Hopefully these are the last tidbits about the ongoing Communist Party Congress, most of which should still be taken with a pinch of salt.

According to a report, after Party General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) delivered his keynote address at the opening of the Congress this week, he walked back to his seat, and along the way, shook hands with Jiang Zemin (江泽民).

"But the two did not exchange any words. After the session was drawn to a close by NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), Hu engaged in small talk with officials who crowded around him, but Jiang walked away on his own. And even when he was near the exit, no one went up to say hello to him."

The report added: "即使曾领风骚, 江泽民时代真的过去了. 昨天, 他看上去精神不佳, 除步履缓慢, 站立时身体还略为倾斜. 北京政坛盛传, 在中共17大人事换届布局上, 江, 胡间意见不合, 有些不欢."

("Even though he was once calling the shots, the Jiang Zemin era is really a thing of the past. Yesterday, Jiang looked as if he was in poor spirits. Apart from his slow footsteps, his body seemed to be tilting slightly when he stood up. According to discussions emanating from Beijing's political arena, Hu and Jiang had opposing views about personnel changes prior to the 17th Party Congress, and there was unhappiness between the two.")

According to another report, there was a "collective verbal agreement" reached at the end of the last Congress in 2003. The agreement stipulated that in matters of grave importance, the leadership would turn to Jiang for advice. But an analyst was quoted as saying that "judging from the present political climate, such a verbal agreement will not re-appear again in this 17th Party Congress."

Turning to Politburo Standing Committee (PSB) member Jia Qinglin (贾庆林), many reports wondered if he would stay on as PSC member. Others were certain that even if he did, given his current 67 years of age, and given his purported links with the largest smuggling case in Fujian, Jia would not be able to complete his second five-year term.

Oh, come on, the smuggling case had dogged Jia for several years now, and he seemed to have weathered it fairly well. Even if he did not get to finish his second five-year term, it would have been due to age. And even so, that is after he had enjoyed so many years of prestige and being in power!

Another report noted that it is clear that Hu Jintao and future Chinese leaders had no intention of appointing a "successor." Rather, the choice of the next successor will be entrusted to the "central leadership." This, the analyst noted, is an indication that Hu wants to move from a leadership based on the "core", to a leadership based on the "collective."

"Mistress-Gate" in China

More tidbits to add on to the ongoing Chinese Communist Party Congress. But take these with a huge pinch of salt!

According to a lengthy analysis in an American Chinese newspaper, the "resignation"of former Finance Minister Jin Renqing (金人庆) prior to the congress was part of a wider "plot." While many senior officials were reportedly involved in the "plot", another group of pivotal players were the mistresses of these senior officials.

Having mistresses is nothing new among senior Chinese officials. In the case of Jin Renqing, his wife was said to be suffering from mental illness, and he reportedly had an "unhappy family life." Since officials above the rank of vice-governor must seek the permission of the central authorities before they can divorce, Jin was said to be grossly unhappy as his approval for divorce was approved only in 2005.

But more than just the age-old trend of powerful men having mistresses, writer Chai Zhengren (柴铮仁) cited sources who argued that these mistresses "do not just have pretty faces and attractive figures."

In the case of an unnamed senior official in Chongqing (重庆) who failed to deliver "concrete benefits" to his mistress who had connections to the property market, the mistress was said to have reported him to the Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee for corruption.

Furthermore, mistresses are also getting more resilient and resourceful. After their "backers" had fallen from grace, again mainly due to corruption, some had even found new "backers."

One example cited was the former mistress of former Yunnan (云南) governor Li Jiating (李嘉廷) who was sentenced to death for corruption. Also bearing the surname Li (李), the mistress later found not just one, but several "backers" - besides Jin Renqing, there were also Du Shicheng (杜世成), Chen Tonghai (陈同海) and Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声).

Another example cited was Zhao Lihong (赵丽红), former mistress of former Beijing vice-mayor Wang Baosen (王宝森), who reportedly zipped around in a Porsche before Wang was arrested. After Wang was sentenced, Zhao was reportedly imprisoned for an unidentified period of time. But after her release, she found another "backer" - China Bank vice-president Zhao Ange (赵安歌). Even though Zhao Ange knew about Zhao's past, he was happy to ply her with loads of money. Indeed, Chai revealed that it was under Zhao's "influence" that Zhao Ange's corruption had "escalated." Zhao Ange was eventually arrested and sentenced, while Zhao escaped to the United States with loads of cash.

Turning to the impact of "mistress-gate" on the 17th party congress, Chai cited sources who argued that the scandals were deliberately investigated and unveiled by Politburo Standing Committee member Wu Guanzheng (吴官正, pictured right), because Wu knew he was going to step down from power anyway. Hence, he wished to "leave behind an image of being upright and for being an anti-corruption fighter."

This was especially in light of earlier speculations that either Jin Renqing or Yu Zhengsheng might be appointed to the post of vice-president. So it might be a case of "someone out there" wanting to smear the names of both Jin and Yu.

As Chai concluded: "以上这些事实说明, 高官情妇问题, 不是某个官员的生活作风, 道德品质问题, 甚至也不是一般的以权谋色, 性腐败问题, 而散发出很浓厚的阴谋气味, "公共情妇", "高官职业情人", 都是权利者与利益集团互相勾结, 又互相控制, 然后去影响中国政治, 经济, 文化等重大决策的鬼蜮手段之一."

("The facts above had clearly stated that the issue of senior officials having mistresses is not just a lifestyle problem, a moral issue, nor an issue involving the usual trading of power for sex. Rather, there is a strong whiff of conspiracy in the air. "Public mistresses" and "professional lovers of senior officials" are products of the mutual collaborations and control between those in power and the various interest groups. These sinister collaborations would in turn influence important decisions in Chinese politics, economics, and culture.")

China's Role in Myanmar

According to Chinese writer Lin Baohua (林保华), Myanmar is China's "new Vietnam."

Lin noted that during the Korean war, China had openly declared that Vietnam is China's "hinterland" and that Beijing will do whatever was necessary to prop up the regime. Hence, China supplied Vietnam with material, financial, and military assistance.

But now, China views Myanmar as the "new Vietnam." China has helped its impoverished neighbor built new roads, power stations, paper mills, shipbuilding facilities etc, and has also supplied the military junta with arms and military hardware.

China also reportedly plans to build a harbor in Myanmar that would allow Chinese ships direct access to the Indian Ocean, and an oil pipe connecting China to the Middle East.

Lin added: "人民币居然可以在缅甸流通, 更活像是中国的殖民地. 不过想想缅甸以前是中国的 "藩属", 因此也可以说, "缅甸自古以来是中国领土", 因此这次缅甸发生由僧侣带头的争取自由, 民主, 改善民生群众运动, 中国政府协助甚至命令缅甸政府去"处理"或镇压, 自是"责无旁贷"."

("Even the Chinese currency - the Renminbi - is circulated in Myanmar, which made the country look like a Chinese colony. But if you think about it, Myanmar was a Chinese "vessel state" in the past. Hence it can be said that "Myanmar has been a part of China since ancient times." So when you have this movement spearheaded by monks in fighting for freedom, democracy and the improvement of people's livelihoods, it is the "unshirkable duty" of the Chinese government to order the government of Myanmar to "settle" or quash the movement.")

Lin noted that while Beijing had publicly offered the military junta support, it had also kept in close contact with anti-government forces in the country.

"These two sentiments can be understood. Supporting the military junta is an indication that Beijing is worried that the Chinese might emulate their Burmese counterparts, and thus pose a threat to the control of the CCP. But keeping in close contact with anti-government forces reflects the opportunistic tendencies of the CCP," Lin explained.

Lin added that foreigners had only seen how China had opposed sanctions on Myanmar, but had not understood the "core thinking" of Chinese leaders. And this core thinking is to ensure the stability of Myanmar.

"To understand what Beijing meant by "stability", you have to go back 18 years to June 4th, and you will understand what "stability" means in the CCP's lexicon," Lin added.

Lin's conclusion - apart from condemning the Myanmar government, it is also necessary to highlight the role of the Chinese government. Western countries should not miss the woods for the trees, and that the problem must be tackled both at root and at the source.

Should Hu Appoint An "Emperor-In-Waiting"?

More speculative trivial about the Chinese Communist Party congress which is in session this week.

Chinese writer Hu Shaojiang (胡少江) noted that when Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) was appointed by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) to be "emperor-in-waiting", the late leader had deliberately placed a considerable "distance" between Hu and Hu's contemporaries.

When Hu was appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo (吴邦国) was "merely" a regional leader, Wen Jiabao (温家宝) was an alternative Politburo Committee member, while Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红) was only a ministerial cadre.

But according to the writer, whoever that will be designated "emperor-in-waiting" by Hu Jintao will not have the "good fortune" of the current President. Firstly, Hu does not have strong military and political credentials, as compared to Deng, and therefore his ability to appoint is weakened. Secondly, even disregarding the issue of CCP's legitimacy in China, many obviously do not think that Hu has the right to legally appoint a "leader-in-waiting."

Quoted by Radio Free Asia, the writer added: "新王储的这种先天性合法性危机, 不仅会使他在王储的位置上如坐针毯, 即使他有可能真的继承了大位, 也未必能够逃脱华国锋的命运."

("With such a congenital legitimacy crisis, the new emperor-in-waiting will not only feel as if he's sitting on a carpet lined with needles. Even if he has the chance of eventually succeeding the grand throne, he might not be able to escape Hua Guofeng's fate.")

Another thing to be borne in mind, according to the writer, is that current successors to Hu Jintao do not have impressive political credentials, and none of them has a significant edge over the other. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any one of them will gladly allow another to lord over them, so to speak - whether Li Keqiang (李克强), Xi Jinping (习近平), Wang Yang (汪洋), Li Yuanchao (李源潮), Bo Xilai (薄熙来), or Wang Qishan (王岐山).

As the writer concluded, if Hu Jintao is "rational", he might abandon the system of appointing an "emperor-in-waiting." If he persists in doing so, not only will the fate of the "emperor-in-waiting" be uncertain, the internal competitive politics of the CCP will also be thrown into jeopardy.

Such competitive politics, the writer noted, will not be allow players to display their leadership abilities. Rather, it will further erode CCP's legitimate rule on power.

OhmyNews

Part of the reason why Korean president Roh Moo-hyun was elected was supposedly due to the power of online media. More specifically, the power of OhmyNews, a free online new service.

At the peak of the 2002 elections, the site was said to have registered 20 million page views a day.

According to Howard French's 2003 article Online News Service Flourishes in Korea, the online newspaper began with only four employees. It was started by Oh Yeon Ho, described as a "lifelong journalistic rabble rouser who wrote for underground progressive magazines during the long years of dictatorship here."

Its name OhmyNews is a play on the expression "Oh my God!" which entered the Korean language by way of a comedian who popularized it around the time the online service was founded in 2000.

The electronic newspaper's concept was to rely mostly on contributions from readers all over the country who sent dispatches about everything from local happenings and personal musings to national politics. Only 20 per cent of the paper each day is written by staff journalists. A computer check in 2003 showed that there were over 10,000 other bylines.

The newspaper dealt with questions of objectivity and accuracy by grading articles according to their content. Those that were presented as straight news were fact-checked by editors. Writers were paid small amounts, which varied according to how the stories were ranked, using forestry terminology, from "kindling" to "rare species."

Oh who insisted that his name had nothing to do with the newspaper said that his goal was "to say farewell to 20th century Korean journalism, with the concept that every citizen is a reporter."

"The professional news culture has eroded our journalism, and I have always wanted to revitalize it. Since I had no money, I decided to use the internet, which has made this guerrilla strategy possible," Oh added.

As French observed: "The kind of immediacy this brand of journalism can bring to a story was shown in late January (2003) by the dispatches of a firefighter from the central city of Taegu, who sent gripping accounts of the subway arson disaster there, which killed nearly 200 people."

But one of the greatest impact OhmyNews had was when it reported the deaths of two schoolgirls who were ran over by a U.S. Army armored vehicle. The reports were widely seen as forcing the hand of the mainstream media to pay attention to a story that "conservative traditional here suggests they might have been inclined to ignore."

"The rest is, as they say, history: A series of demonstrations against the army's presence here snowballed ... becoming a huge national movement that many see as having propelled the candidacy of Roh," French wrote.

The new president was, until then, a relative unknown, and third in a field of three major candidates. Little surprise that after Roh was elected, he granted OhmyNews his first media interview.

Incidentally, Oh was also the first to break the story on the No Gun Ri incident in 1994 when he was a "little known freelance journalist." Occurring in 1950 during the Korean War, the incident was a massacre of South Korean refugees by U.S. military forces.

After Oh reported the story, the South Korean media did not pick up the story. But five years later, The Associated Press wrote about the incident, and later even won a Pulitzer prize for its subsequent investigations with U.S. army veterans.

Oh reportedly said: "Once the American media picked up the story, our mainstream newspapers wrote about No Gun Ri as if it was a fresh incident. This made me realize that we have a real imbalance in our media, 80 per cent conservative and 20 per cent liberal, and it needed to be corrected. My goal is 50-50."

So is Oh anywhere near his goal now?

Women's Rights in China

Even though China has enacted equitable laws prohibiting discrimination against women, the difference between equality in law and in real life lies with the implementation of those laws.

For instance, domestic violence is now included as grounds for divorce. But in practice, it is difficult to seek civil compensation for domestic violence in the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes such violence. Domestic violence is not broadly defined to cover threats of violence to the woman and/or her family, psychological damage, sexual abuse and rape within marriage.

As Rangita de Silva-de Alwis noted in her 2003 article Why the Rule of Law will Aid Women's Rights, a related question is whether a claim for compensation can be made while the couple is still married.

Women also generally find it difficult to meet the high standards of proof required under criminal law to hold wife-beaters criminally responsible.

"To invoke the relevant laws, a woman have to prove the crime was particularly "evil" and the abuse was "continued and consistent." On the other hand, the crime of "intentional injury" requires forensic authentication."

And even though the law made it clear that during marriage, neither side can transfer property without the consent of the other, many women find it difficult to trace any illegal transfers. - particularly in cases when property is transferred to a third party to stop it from being equally divided.

As Silva de-Alwis observed, Chinese married women are frequently unaware of the full extent of their husband's income or property. "The challenge of proving the ownership or concealment of property is an enormous burden to women in China," she noted.

In conclusion, the author noted that advocacy of women's rights has matured rapidly over the past five years, and the work of some women's legal-aid organizations had been a catalyst for change. But even so, a lot more remains to be done.

"Women's empowerment foreshadows the transformation of a society and is a benchmark of a functioning rule of law. Supporting the work of women's rights groups remains critical to the further strengthening of the rule of law in China."

Comfort Women

Nora Okja Keller's Comfort Women (Penguin Books, 1997) is the story of Akiko, a World War II Korean refugee, and Beccah, her daughter by an American missionary.

The two women were living on the edge of society in Honolulu, haunted by Akiko's periodic encounters with the spirits of the dead, and by Beccah's struggles to reclaim her mother - a former comfort woman - from her past.

Akiko remembered a former comfort women whom everyone thought was crazy because she did not shut up.

"One night she talked loud and non-stop. In Korean and in Japanese, she denounced the soldiers, yelling at them to stop the invasion of her country and her body. Even as they mounted her, she shouted: I am Korean, I am a woman, I am alive. I am seventeen, I had a family just like you do. I am a daughter, I am a sister."

"Men left her stall quickly, some crying, most angrily joining the line for the woman next door. All through the night she talked, reclaiming her Korean name, reciting her family genealogy, even chanting the recipes her mother had passed on to her. Just before daybreak, they took her out of her stall and into the woods, where we couldn't hear her anymore. They brought her back skewered from her vagina to her mouth, like a pig ready for roasting. A lesson, they told the rest of us, warning us into silence."

Years later, Akiko continued to hear noises.

Noises of men laughing and betting on "how many men one comfort woman could service before she splits open." Noises of a woman being kicked because she had used an old shirt as a sanitary pad. Noises of a man sighing loudly as he "urinated on the body where he had just pumped his seeds."

Noises of trucks delivering more men, military supplies, and new women "to replace the ones that had died, their bodies erupting in pus." Noises of women's naked buttocks being slapped as they were paraded in front of a new arrival of troops. Noises of bullets ricocheting at the feet of women the soldiers were momentarily bored with.

Noises of a defiant comfort woman who bellowed the Korean national anthem "even after the soldiers had knocked her teeth out." Noises of men who "took their turns with us, until they could no longer create an erection." Noises of men who "plucked curling wires of my pubic hair, which they would carry to the front with them, talismans against danger and fear."

Akiko recalled: "If they had asked, I would have pulled them myself, and woven them into an amulet. Not to keep them safe from but to attract harm, each one of my hair a wish for death, and a call for justice."

Despite the trauma of soldiers banging in and out of the comfort cubicles and "in and out of our women's bodies", Akiko remembered that "what was left of our minds we guarded, kept private and separate."

On the division of Korea into two, Akiko had this to say:

"It still seems strange for me to think of Korea in terms of north and south, to realize a line we couldn't see or feel, a line we crossed with two steps, cut the body of my country in two. In dreams I will always see the thousands of people, the living and the dead, forming long queues that spiral out from the head and feet of Korea, not knowing that when they reach the navel they will have to turn back. Not knowing that they will never be able to return home. Not knowing they are forever lost."

Ab ECP Flintstone

You say I am the wordsmith who comes up with words like "himbo" and "bastardized." But most times I cannot figure out the right words to say.

But nevertheless, I want to thank you for all that you've done for me. Thanks for being such a great friend. And also, thanks for spending my birthday with me.

If life is about snippets of Kodak moments, 13 October 2007 will forever be etched in my memory as one of those deeply memorable and indelible moments.

May love, joy, peace, happiness and inner contentment be with you, now and forever.

Medical Touts in China

Another occurrence that can only happen in China - touts. Or to be more specific, hospital touts.

First appearing in the late 80s, these touts could be found loitering outside outpatient clinics in large government hospitals. Their initial targets were Chinese "compatriots" from Hong Kong and Macau who often visited the mainland for cheaper health care services. These "compatriots" would be encouraged and persuaded by the touts to go to nearby private clinics which supposedly offer better medical care and more efficient services.

By referring patients to private clinics, touts obtained from the clinics a commensurate commission - more if the medical care involved operations, and less for minor ailments. Even though most types of common ailments can be treated, some clinics have found a "niche" by offering abortion services and dental treatment.

According to Chinese writer Tu Qiao (涂俏) in 生存体验, 当代中国边缘阶层生存状态实录 (Experiencing Survival - A True Record of Survival Among The Marginal Class in Contemporary China, Xinhua Publishing Press, 1999), costs of treatment at these clinics were naturally more expensive - from a few times to several times more as compared to government hospitals.

To convince customers that abortions done at such clinics are quick, fast and painless, some clinics even hire "actors" and "actresses" to sit in their waiting rooms. For instance, one clinic hired a girl who claimed that she often had abortions done at the clinic, and assured bona fide patients waiting nearby that the process was invariably quick, fast and painless.

Pitfalls of Chinese Matchmaking Agencies

If you have a hunch that matchmaking agencies in China are dubious and unscrupulous, you are right.

In ads placed across the country, these agencies would place enticing advertisements to grab your attention, but a sub-standard alternative would be offered. The main aim of these agencies is of course to make money, with successful matchmaking far from their minds.

According to Chinese writer Tu Qiao (涂俏) in 生存体验, 当代中国边缘阶层生存状态实录 (Experiencing Survival - A True Record of Survival Among The Marginal Class in Contemporary China, Xinhua Publishing Press, 1999), a typical ploy consisted of placing an ad of an attractive-looking, rich and successful individual looking for a spouse. Once you call or visit the agency, staff would find ways to induce you to sign up as a member.

They would invariably tell you that the advertised person had already been "snapped up", but other equally well-qualified candidates were available for viewing once the membership fee is paid up. And when the first matchmaking session is arranged, it is usually with someone who is a friend/relative/contact/associate of the agency - in other words, paid actors who are neither rich nor successful.

Seizing on the many lonely hearts in big cities, agencies would promise prospective customers that "someone suitable and with outstanding qualities" would be introduced to them. But once the membership of at least 400 RMB is paid up, the chances of being called up for a second meeting is low. The only exception is when you are being used as a "bait" to induce someone else to sign up as a member. In which case, you will be called up, and the person who is interested in meeting you will have to pay up the membership fee before he or she can meet you. This usually isn't so bad, since both parties in this case are genuinely keen to meet someone new.

As for the paid actors, they were told not to spend too much time talking to customers, so that they can "have more time to meet other customers" - meaning that the less time he/she spends talking to one person, the more people the agency can hoodwink.

Even though many customers felt either cheated or shortchanged, there is usually nothing much they can do. For instance, an agency once promised to introduce a "Korean businessman working in China" to a female customer. But when the meeting took place, the customer knew that something was not quite right, as the purported "Korean businessman working in China" did not look, speak, or had the mannerisms of a "Korean businessman." And after 5 minutes of "meeting", the "Korean businessman" would invariably come up with an excuse, for example he had to rush to the airport to catch a flight. By then, all the agency can tell you is that "if the Korean businessman is interested in you, he'd call you" (but of course, he'd never call), or something to the effect that "perhaps there is no chemistry between the Korean businessman and you."

Agencies owners were invariably unashamed of their brazen dishonesty. One such owner even had the audacity to say: "这些男人都是心术不正的, 想找富姐, 富姐那么容易找的吗? 也不撒泡尿照照, 我们这样做, 是为社会除暴安良."

("These men have crooked minds and hearts. They want to find rich women. Is it that easy to find rich women? They should piss and look at themselves in the urine's reflection. What we are doing is to rid society of evil.")

Another agency owner said: "说我们骗人, 那些被骗的征婚者也活该. 自己的条件不怎么样, 反过来都希望找富哥富姐, 成功人士, 他们也不想想, 成功人士怎么还会找不着对象呢? 所以, 我们赚他们的钱, 也赚得心安理得!"

("If you say we are cheating people, why don't you say that those who come to us deserve it? They do not have outstanding qualities, yet they wanted to look for rich men or rich women. Why don't they think for themselves, if a person is successful, why can't he or she find a spouse? Therefore, we feel there is nothing wrong in making money from them!")

God help the lonely souls in China!

Getting Paid For Taking A Taxi

Riding a taxi and getting paid for it? Well, it happened in China, or at least in the southern city of Shenzhen (深圳), according to Chinese writer Tu Qiao (涂俏) in her book 生存体验, 当代中国边缘阶层生存状态实录 (Experiencing Survival - A True Record of Survival Among The Marginal Class in Contemporary China, Xinhua Publishing Press, 1999)

Apparently, at the Luohu checkpoint (罗湖口岸), in order to ensure "orderly control of traffic" at one time, no empty taxis were allowed to enter the railway station. But given the huge demand for taxis from mainly Hong Kong visitors and tourists, taxi drivers discovered a way to beat the system.

They picked up "passengers" at a location about 200 - 300 meters from the station, and "pay" their "passengers" 1-2 RMB each for their "efforts." The "passengers" would then be let off at the railway station, and the taxi driver could then pick up bona fide passengers, especially Hong Kong visitors. Certainly a mutually beneficial "deal."

According to Tu, this fake passenger phenomenon started in 1992, and reached its peak in 1995 - a time where Hong Kongers were eager to purchase property in Shenzhen. It was also a time where many rural dwellers with few employable skills had swarmed into the city hoping to look for jobs. Unable to find jobs, many of them turned to living on what Tu described as the "fringes of society", and resorted to various legal and illegal ways to make a living.

I suppose the arrangement in this case is neither legal or illegal. Just an ingenious and mutually beneficial way of finding loopholes in, and beating the system.

As Tu pointed out, even though the "passengers" were hauled up and questioned by railway police from time to time for "disturbing social order", these "passengers" had to be let off after a warning, since there were no related laws to either charge or indict them.

US-Korea FTA

In a report by the US-Korea Business Council titled The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Economic Opportunity, Strategic Imperative, the Council argued that the FTA will spur America's economic growth, competitiveness and prosperity.

By removing obstacles to trade and investment with Korea - one of America's most important trading partner - the FTA will also generate new growth and jobs all across the United States. Once the FTA is ratified, nearly 95 per cent of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products will become duty free within three years, while tariffs on almost all goods will be eliminated within 10 years.

Apart from the economic imperative, the Council also pointed to the importance of security considerations. Korea is said to be a close and long-standing US ally and one of America's strongest partners "in advancing regional and global security." Besides, the FTA is also a powerful display of unity between the US and Korea "as our two countries work together to address regional security challenges and promote shared strategic goals."

Once the FTA is ratified, Korea will expand market access in financial services, telecommunications, broadcasting, express delivery, legal, and other major sectors. It will implement clear, consistent, and predictable regulatory and rule-making procedures across all sectors of its economy.

Korea will also strengthen its protection and enforcement of copyrights, trademarks and intellectual property rights, as well as simplify and expedite customs procedures. Korea must also fully reopen its market to all US beef imports before the FTA will be submitted to Congress for approval.

If the FTA is ratified, Korea will, among other things, immediately eliminate its 8 per cent tariffs on US vehicles, eliminate discriminatory aspects of Korean auto taxes on the basis of engine size that disproportionately affect US autos, and ensures that it will not impose any new engine displacement taxes.

Turning the to what it calls "the cost of inaction", the report had this to say.

- US businesses and farmers would not only lose new access to the Korean market but also could lose market share as Korea concludes other bilateral trade agreements with global competitors.

- There would be an adverse effect on the overall US-Korea strategic partnership at a critical moment in our countries' efforts to increase challenges to security and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia.

- It would undermine US leadership and credibility in promoting open markets and fair competition not only in Korea but globally, set back vital US geo-strategic goals, and undercut US global economic competitiveness.

Roh Moo-hyun and the Korean Media

For most major South Korean newspapers, the election of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2002 was said to be a "tragedy". Roh had long been known for his unfriendly relations with Seoul's papers, especially the three largest dailies which account for two-thirds of the nation's total market.

According to B.J. Lee in 2003, all three papers were conservative, whereas Roh was a lifelong liberal and reformist.

In particular, Chosun, the largest and most conservative daily, had been at odds with Roh for years. Roh once even sued its sister magazine for libel, and refused to be interviewed by the paper prior to his election.

Roh was said to be a big fan of online newspapers and to a lesser degree, television news. Internet papers were major supporters of Roh's campaign. Their readers were mainly young progressive Koreans who sympathized with Roh's idealistic platforms.

Hence, at one time, Ohmynews - an online paper run by a former dissident journalist - was the only domestic news outlet that had been able to interview Roh since his election. And when Roh was being ignored by mainstream newspapers during the presidential primary, the internet paper devoted much space to his campaign and broadcast his speeches live on the internet.

As Lee added: "An eloquent speaker, Mr. Roh also likes to be on television discussing or debating with others. As television-friendly former US president John Kennedy defeated newspaper-oriented Richard Nixon in the 1960 US presidential election, television star Roh beat opposition leader Lee Hoi-chang - who was mainly backed by older newspaper readers ..."

"But the president runs the risk of turning into a simple populist by virtue of favoring the Internet and television media. Already, critics accuse him of bypassing media scrutiny to reach audiences directly. As president, maybe it is time for him to embrace critical print media as well."

The New Insiders in Korea

In most countries, a jail term is something best avoided if you plan to become a public servant. But in South Korea, that might actually be an asset in government.

That's according to Korean writer B.J. Lee in 2003.

Referring to President Roh Moo-hyun's government, Lee noted that the presidential Blue House seemed to be hosting a "reunion of former prison inmates." Of the 30 or so presidential secretaries, 10 were former prisoners who were imprisoned for fighting the military regimes in the 1970s or 1980s.

As students, these former prisoners led anti-government street protests that eventually toppled the military regime in 1987. But before that, they spent their youthful years in dark cells under constant torture and harassment.

As Lee noted, the ascendancy of Mr. Roh and other former social outsiders signalled "a major power shift in Korea's rigid society." But what this meant for the country's future was yet to be seen.

"With democracy pretty much in, and bad old dictatorship out, the new Korean leaders might feel lost with no passion in their lives. Their inexperience might put the country at risk, particularly when North Korea's nuclear weapons program is heightening military tensions on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The young leaders liberal and often radical ideas and policies could destabilize society, hurting the economy's long-term competitiveness."

"Many Koreans look at Mr. Roh and his generation as selfless patriots willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of the people. They have done that when they were young and on the outside. Now older and wiser, they have to do it again - this time as insiders.

Bo Yang

I first read Bo Yang's (柏扬) Ugly Chinaman (丑陋的中国人) in 1987 and found the book refreshing. That was the first time I encountered stark criticisms of the Chinese psyche, as well as blunt portrayals of the Chinese civilization. But the novelty soon wore off. Over the years, Bo Yang struck me as an extreme critic who refused to see anything good in the Chinese. He also struck me as someone who had an axe to grind, since he was imprisoned for close to a decade for "political subversion" by former Taiwan leader Chiang Kai-shek (蒋介石).

But my impressions changed after I read his more recent works this week. In the book 我们要活得有尊严 (or We Must Live With Dignity, Chunfeng Wenyi Publishing Press, 2003), I discovered a more moderated, mellowed, if not progressive Bo Yang.

For instance, Bo Yang turned the traditional concept of filial piety on its head when he suggested that parents should have moderated expectations of their children.

As he wrote:

"上帝不允许孩子永远记住父母入骨的爱, 那将使他们无法成长; 也不允许父母永远记住自己对儿女所作的牺牲, 那将使老人陷入期待回报的自怜. 而且, 事实上, 孩子早已经用儿语, 用拥抱, 用一声 "妈妈, 我好爱你啊!", 一声 "爸爸, 我要嫁一个像爸爸这样的好丈夫! 完全回报了! 是的, 完全回报了."

("Heaven Almighty does not allow children to forever remember their parents' deepest love, as this will not allow them to grow. Parents are also not allowed to forever remember the sacrifices they made for their children, as this will plunge them into self-pity and expecting gratitude. And besides, in reality, children had already fully paid back their parents' love by their childish talk, their hugs, and their claims of "Mommy, I really love you" and "Daddy, when I grow up, I want to marry a good husband like Daddy.")

But Bo Yang's former critical nature could still be found in smaller doses throughout the book, even though he was already 83 when he wrote the collection of short articles found in the book.

For instance, in accusing the Chinese of not having any respect for the individual, Bo Yang pointed to various incidents at various periods of Chinese history.

Such as an ancient local leader who enjoyed sucking on dried blood. Hence, the "task" of hundreds of lowly officials was to be whipped till they bled. The dried blood were then wiped off and poured into the leader's wine.

Then there was the case of an attendant to the son of a senior aristocrat. Every time the teenage boy needed to clear his throat, the attendant would open his mouth wide, so that the boy could spit directly into the attendant's mouth.

Then there were the more brutal cases. Such as the case of a warlord who used his subordinates to test out how good his swords were. Every time he acquired a new sword, he would try it out on the heads of his subordinates. If the heads fell off with a clean swoop, the sword is deemed a good sword. If not, the sword would be discarded, and new ones acquired (and new heads rolled).

Liang Xiaosheng on the Cultural Revolution

Like many who were swept up in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese writer Liang Xiaosheng (梁晓声) often recalled those heady days with a dose of nostalgia tinged with sadness. (自白, or Self Confession, Jingji Ribao Publishing Press, 1997)

He noted that the tragedy of his generation was that their fervor in pursuing revolution far exceeded their fervor in pursuing knowledge and education. He added that without knowledge and education as the foundation, revolutionary ideology would be no different from blind religious fervor.

He also added:

"我们这一代人, 都是唱这首歌长大的. 红领巾是我们的骄傲. 少先队队礼表达着我们对美好事物的崇高敬意. 少先队队鼓使人们的童心激动无比. 我们这一代中的大多数幼年, 童年, 乃至青少年时期不知巧克力为何物. 五十个人的玩具加在一起也没有儿子的玩具多. 一件新衣服会使我们欢欣雀跃. 新衣服是爸爸或者妈妈买的, 可是我们都普遍地认为最应该感激的是毛主席和共产党. 没有毛主席, 就没有共产党. 没有共产党, 就没有新衣服. 我们的父辈虔诚地在我们的心头脑中打上这种 "胎记". 全社会惟恐我们忘却了我们来到这个世界上并且生存下来的意义只有一个 - 知恩图报."

(Our generation grew up singing this song. The red scarf is our pride. The salute of the youth league represents our utmost respect for the beautiful things in life. The drum beats of the youth league had stirred up the passions within our innocent hearts. Most of us - from early childhood, childhood to even our teens - had not heard about chocolates. If 50 of us were to combine our toys, the toys would be nowhere as numerous as my son's. When we obtained a new piece of clothing, we would leap for joy. The new clothes were purchased by either father or mother. But we generally felt that we should be most grateful to Chairman Mao and the Communist Party. Without Chairman Mao, there would be no Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, there would be no new clothes. Our father's generation religiously indoctrinated this "birthmark" in our hearts and our minds. The entire society seemed to be worried that we would forget the one sole reason why we were brought into this earth and the reason for our survival - and that is, to know who our benefactors were and to repay their kindness.")

"这是整整一代人的狂热, 整整一代人的迷乱. 而整整一代青年的迷乱与狂热, 是飓风, 是火, 是大潮, 是一泻千里的狂瀾, 是冲决一切的能量! 当这一切都过去之后我们累了. 当我们感到累了的时候, 我们才开始严峻的思考. 当我们思考的时候, 我们才开始真正长大成人. 当我们真正长大成人了, 我们才感到失落. 当我们失落了, 我们才感到愤怒了, 我们才感到失望. 当我们感到失望了, 我们才觉醒. 当我们觉醒了, 我们才认为有权谴责!"

(This is the zeal of an entire generation of people, the chaotic loss of a whole generation of people. And this zeal and chaotic loss of a whole generation of people is a typhoon, is fire, is a forceful and ferocious wave, and is the strength that will sweep everything away! When everything was over, we were tired. And when we began to feel tired, we began to think critically. When we began to think, we began to fully grow up. And when we were fully grown up, we began to feel a sense of loss. And when we felt a sense of loss, we became furious and disappointed. When were disappointed, we began to wake up. And it is only when we have woken up, that we have the right to castigate!")

"试问, 有谁比这一代人精神上所造成的失落更空洞? 有谁比这一代人所感到的失望更巨大? 有谁比这一代人的谴责更激烈?"

("Just ask yourself, who else feels more emotionally lost and hollow as compared to this generation of people? Who else harbors even greater disappointments as compared to this generation of people? And whose castigations are stronger than this generation of people?")

"然而今天, 当中国的历史又翻到崭新一页的时候, 我与我的同龄人谈到毛主席的时候, 几乎所有的人都说过这样的话: "毛主席毕竟是一个伟大的人物."

("But today, when China's history is flipped to a brand new page, and when my contemporaries and I talk about Chairman Mao, almost every one said this same thing: "No matter what, Chairman Mao was indeed a great man.")

Liang Xiaosheng on Dang'an

Chinese writer Liang Xiaosheng's (梁晓声) castigation of dang'an (personal dossiers in China privy only to one's superiors) depicted both the helplessness and indignation of countless Chinese, particularly before the country's reform and opening up process. (自白, or Self Confession, Jingji Ribao Publishing Press, 1997)

"为什么不允许一个人知道自己的档案里装着一些有关自己, 有关自己父母和亲属的什么材料呢? 它象个影子似的, 跟随着你一辈子, 你觉得自己是个好人, 你努力象个好人那么生活, 但它却很可能向许多人证明你是个坏人. 许多人相信它远胜过相信你在生活中在工作中在实际行为和表现. "不得委以重任", "有政治野心", "思想意识不良", "品行不端", 等等, 等等. 这样的一些评语曾写在多少人的各种鉴定上啊! 而写鉴定的人又不见得是个正人君子. 你死了, 火化了, 装进了骨灰盒. 你的档案, 又成了你儿子或你女儿档案的一部分. 这样一想都够令人七窍生烟的!"

(Why is one not allowed to know the information about oneself, parents, and relatives that are contained in the dossier? It is like a shadow that follows you all your life. You may feel that you are a good person, and you do your best to live like a good person. But the dossier may prove to many people that you are a bad person. Many people believe in the dossier more than your actual behavior and performance in your real life and work.

"This person should not be entrusted with important responsibilities," "this person has political ambitions," "this person has unhealthy thinking and thoughts," "this person has poor conduct," etc etc. These comments had been written on the dossiers of countless people! And those who had written those comments were not necessarily upright people. Even after you die and are cremated and your ashes stored in urns, your dossier will become part of your son's or daughter's dossier. Even thinking about it is enough to make one fume with anger.")

An Excerpt From Liang Xiaosheng's Book

This excerpt from Chinese writer Liang Xiaosheng's (梁晓声) book 自白 (Self Confession, Jingji Ribao Publishing Press, 1997) somehow echoes what I am feeling right now.

"我感到自己仿佛是坐在一辆疾驶着的车上. 目标是确定了的, 车速也是绝不会因人的意志而改变的. 每一辆从车旁闪过的树, 都是我的一个日子. 每一个从车旁闪过的水泥电线杆, 都是我一个月份. 每一块从车旁闪过的里程碑, 都是我的一个年头. 我的日子我的月份我的年头, 不停地朝后闪, 闪了便永远不再属我拥有. 我以任何方式在任何一地都绝无可能再从新找回它们! 哪怕是它们的某些碎片, 某些残骸, 或某些浮光掠影!"

(I feel as if I am riding in a car that is in rapid motion. The direction has been decided upon, and the car speed will not be changed on anyone's whim. Every tree that I passed by in the car represents every day of my life. Every electrical pole I passed by represents every month of my life. Every milestone that I passed by represents every year of my life. My days, months and years are rapidly disappearing behind me. Once they disappear. they no longer belong to me. No matter how and where, I can never retrieve them again! Not even some broken pieces, not even some fragments, and not even some flickering light or shadowy images."

How the Financial Crisis Transformed East Asia

According to Eric Teo in a 2003 article How the financial crisis transformed East Asia, apart from the various economic and financial changes that had taken place in East Asia after the financial crisis, the region had also embarked on a fundamental transition of the nation state itself.

There are four aspects to the transition.

First, Asian countries have to come to an understanding of national sovereignty in the new globalised context. Because of globalisation, the nation-state needs to be redefined in terms of its prerogatives and power. Many Asian leaders understand their control over many policies and decisions has been reduced significantly.

Second, there is the concept of national security versus subversion, separatism and terrorism. Asian states are now faced with increasing security issues that have sprung up either from their colonial heritage or their failure to build national entities and identities. Many Asian nation states are fragile because of their diversity of population, religion and ethnicity. This fragility is a cause for concern, as the potential for intra-state conflicts is high across Asia. But because national institutions have not been adequately built and consolidated since independence, subversive groups or separatists pose a direct challenge to authorities.

Third, Asian nation-states will have to contend with the increasing influence of "soft power" (culture, diplomacy, economic power and influence), as much as "hard power," (military and political) in the new global context. They must learn that to increase their role and place in the world they must not focus on "hard power" alone. China has built its "soft power" considerably as it realizes it cannot match US "hard power."

Finally, Asian nations will probably need to redefine inter-state relations within the region. Asian regionalism has been noticeably absent as countries have tended to look to the West for trade, investments, ideas, and expertise. Asian regionalism would be a new form of transition as countries seek to overcome national sovereignty issues and cross-border problems. Asian nations need to "think regional". This is not a case of chauvinism or Asian arrogance, but an East Asian regionalism in the making within the present "Asean plus three" framework. It should be perceived as one of greater prosperity and stability for the whole Asia-Pacific region.

Teo concluded that the fundamental transition for East Asia will come only when East Asia implement the ultimate change towards a larger nation-state beyond the present borders, as in the case of an increasingly integrated Europe. Indeed, Teo argued that Europe could be the inspiration for an ultimate transition of East Asia in the next 20 years.