To Swim Across the World

Frances and Ginger Park's book To Swim Across the World (Talk Miramax, 2001) might be fictitious, but accounts of Japanese atrocities toward Koreans were real and palpable.

As Aunt Sunja lamented: "They ransack homes; beat the men and rape the women, shoot babies to stop them from crying, then feed their tiny hearts to the vultures. I speak the truth! If you don't believe me, you are no better than a dirty Jap dancing on Korean graves."

Changi too, had this to say: "Everyone listen to me! I do not respond to the Jap name they brand me with - Mifune Okawa!"

After spitting with whole-hearted disgust, he added: "Call me that name and I'd warm your sake with my piss! Because I am afraid of no one. No one tells me how to think or breathe. No Jap tells me who I am."

Detailing how a Korean grandfather was beaten and sliced with a knife, the authors described the knife as one "whose bejeweled jade handle was surely worth more than any Korean life."

As for the name of the novel, it was derived from the name of the novel's protagonist Sei Young (世泳) which literally means "to swim across the world."

As Sei Young noted, not without a tinge of sadness: "We all suffered during the Japanese Occupation. Many of us lost loved ones during the war effort. The pain is greater than the sum of our soul."

Since the book is supposed to be fictitious, the following descriptions of Korea's first president should be taken with a pinch of salt:

"Syngman Rhee would fight to the end; that I believed. It wasn't only the Japanese he had fought in his lifetime. As a young independent revolutionary in turn-of-the-century Korea, his way of thinking - to give more power to the people - jeopardized the Korean royals, who had ordered Rhee captured, imprisoned and tortured. Even when bamboo sticks were driven under his fingernails and lit with matches, he would not relent. Only as his flesh began to singe were the burning sticks extinguished. For the rest of his life, whenever he became infuriated, he would blow on his fingertips as though they were on fire. The habit of a lifelong crusader."

"Our first President had had the immortal task of rebuilding a nation in the midst of war, and I believed he was the best person for the job at that time. However historians would view this era, they were not there at Korea's moment of crisis."

Why the Hong Kong Dollar is Pegged to the US Dollar

In September 1982, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited Beijing to pave the way for formal negotiations on Hong Kong's future.

Diplomatic talks began in July 1983, but they did not get off to a good start. Britain maintained that the people of Hong Kong wanted British administration to continue after 1997, whereas China held that Hong Kong must be returned to China.

According to C.K. Lau in his book Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy - A Hong Kong Chinese's View of the British Heritage (The Chinese University Press, 1997), as the stalemate dragged on, China's official media launched an attack against the British stance.

Lau wrote: "The lack of progress caused a collapse of confidence in the territory, and sparked off a currency crisis in which the Hong Kong dollar lost more than 20 per cent of its value between 16 and 24 September 1983."

The crisis was averted only after the Hong Kong government announced that the Hong Kong dollar would be pegged to the US dollar (US$1 = HK$7.80).

A Comfort Woman Remembers

In Hildi Kang's Under the Black Umbrella Voices from Colonial Korea 1910 - 1945, former Korean comfort women Kim Pongsuk from Kyonggi province recalled the day she was summoned to serve "a higher cause."

"The Japanese told us that we would serve the Emperor and the great cause of the Japanese empire by becoming nurses and taking care of the Imperial Japanese soldiers. They told us that the pay would be very good and we would be well taken care of. Some girls were really very excited about doing this."

But the brutal reality set in when the girls were used as sex slaves by Japanese soldiers.

"The men lined up outside the barrack doors where the women were, and took their turn. The girl just lay there inside. Each man had a given amount of time, about seven minutes. If he wasn't out in time, the next man went right in and yanked him out. Each door had a long line of men waiting their turns."

Koreans Remembering the Colonial Period

Koreans who lived through the Japanese colonization of Korea remembered different aspects of life during that time. Some of these accounts were contained in Hildi Kang's Under the Black Umbrella Voices from Colonial Korea 1910 - 1945.

Kang Byung Ju from North Pyong'an province remembered that the Japanese ordered men to go round villages in order to round up children and force them to attend Japanese-run schools.

Kang recalled: "So you can imagine, while we studied Chinese characters in the schoolroom of our house, we kept one eye looking out for the child-catchers. Our room opened up to a clear view of Sodang Hill where the officials were likely to appear. Whenever a person with black clothes came down the hill, we all scattered and fled."

When Kang grew older, he remembered how the Koreans were made to do menial jobs so as to free the Japanese to become soldiers. Ching yong (labor draft) was non-combative work, and Korean men were drafted into this service to do assembly-line work making parts for airplanes, tanks, and military supplies, and also to work in the mines.

But towards the end of the war, ching byong (military draft) turned compulsory, as the Japanese were running out of their own men, and had to make soldiers out of Koreans.

Yang Songdok from South Chungchong province remembered the lights flickering at night across the Yalu River in Manchuria. "Rumor said that those lights came from bands of roving Korean guerrilla fighters."

Yang also recalled that when he was in the fourth or fifth grade (1929 - 30) the Japanese forbade Koreans to wear their traditional white clothing. But since the Japanese could not enforce the ban, they "set up huge tubs of water - dirty, dark water - at street corners everywhere. Whenever they saw people in white clothes passing by, they sprayed them with this dirty water."

Recalling a visit to China shortly after the 1937 Nanking massacre, Yang noted: "With my own eyes I saw corpses pile high on the streets, corpses blocking sewers, and absolutely brutal bayonet practices."

The Japanese Communist Party and Korea

Hong Eulsoo, a Korean who lived through the Japanese colonization of Korea, recalled that one of the slogans of the Communist Party of Japan was "Independence for Korea."

Hong who had studied in Japan remembered that most of the Korean students in Japan were "infatuated" with Communism. Apart from being the new force at that time, Communism was thought to be well-organized, systematic and logically reasoned out.

Hong who later became a teacher turned businessman noted that the Communist Party of Japan's support for Korean independence was far from altruistic. Rather, the Party's main objective was to overthrow the Japanese Imperial government.

"They reasoned that by helping Korea become independent, Japan would lose a tremendous source of income, the government would fall, and the Communists could step in," recalled Hong in the book Under the Black Umbrella Voices from Colonial Korea 1910 - 1945.

Korea as a Japanese Colony

Japanese rule of Korea is generally divided into three periods.

First came the age of subjugation (1910 - 1919), when the military ruled by threat and violence. After the Korean independence movement in March 1919, the Japanese eased into a time of cultural accommodation (1920 - 1931), allowing some freedoms in schools, newspapers and businesses. Then came the years of assimilation (1931 - 1945), with a renewed tightening of controls and forced participation in the Japanese war effort.

As Hildi Kang noted in her book Under the Black Umbrella Voices from Colonial Korea 1910 - 1945 (Cornell University, 2001), even though Japanese occupation ended in 1945, the debate raged then, and continues to this day, "over whether that occupation was beneficial or harmful for Korea."

When elder Yi Sangdo recalled the Japanese-built dams and bridges that brought flood control to his village, he admitted, "I must say, their organization impressed me. I think probably it was good, in the long run." But Yang Songdok just as strongly insisted, "They had sinister plans ... to eliminate any vestige of Korean consciousness."

Scholar Carter Eckert looked at both sides of the picture: "If one finds [in the colonial period] enlightenment and progress, one also finds national subjugation, shame and betrayal, political authoritarianism and violence, and profound human suffering."

Bruce Cumings also stressed this dichotomy when he said that politically Koreans could barely breathe, but economically there was significant, if unevenly distributed growth.

Indeed, this complexity can be found throughout Kang's book. The complexity led to the crumbling of the old order, and coincided with a time where the "modern world knocked, pounded, and battered its way into [Korea's] consciousness."

Perhaps, just perhaps, hermits and recluses* cannot be left alone for long, or forever.

* Ab FS being one of them.

Kazuo Ishiguro's When We Were Orphans

Another book which will be donated - with a huge dose of regret - to the used book section of the public library is Kazuo Ishiguro's When We Were Orphans.

The book is a story of memory, intrigue, and the need to return. Moving between London and Shanghai during the inter-war years, it is also a story of a childhood vision of the world surviving deep into adulthood, indelibly shaping and distorting a person's life. Like almost all of Ishiguro's work, it is filled with exquisite insights of human emotions.

But what will leave an indelible imprint in my mind is the following excerpt:

"For the truth is, over this past year, I have become increasingly preoccupied with my memories, a preoccupation encouraged by the discovery that these memories - of my childhood, of my parents - have lately begun to blur. A number of times recently I have found myself struggling to recall something that only two to three years ago I believed was ingrained in my mind for ever. I have been obliged to accept, in other words, that with each passing year, my life in Shanghai will grow less distinct, until one day all that will remain will be a few muddled images. Even tonight, when I sat down here and tried to gather in some sort of order these things I still remember, I have been struck anew by how hazy so much has grown."

I don't know why, but the words induced in me fear, anxiety, and sadness. Fear that one day my memories will fail me. Anxious that what had been ingrained in me for so long are no longer what I think they are, but rather my attempts to varnish or prettify the truth. Sadness that I will one day end up like protagonist Christopher Banks, where places and people whom I love would become hazy and eventually fade from my memory. Will my life in Hong Kong, Beijing, Seoul, and even the U.S. be one day reduced to "a few muddled images?" Will people whom I love and care about, such as Ab FS, also be reduced to "a few muddled images"?

Green Terror in Taiwan

Writer Chen Sen (陈岑) suggested that even though Taiwan had lifted martial law two decades ago, the reign of terror had not been eradicated. Rather, it had taken on a new form.

In his article titled 台湾戒严20年:从"白色恐怖"到"绿色恐怖" (Two Decades After Taiwan Lifts Its Martial Law: From "White Terror" to "Green Terror") dated July 2007, Chen argued that since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民进党) came into power, it had launched and waged an "ideological struggle." On the pretext of "national security", the DPP had been on the constant look-out for "spies."

As Chen wrote: "(The DPP) often labels those who are pro-unification as "joining forces with the Communists to sell out Taiwan." This had placed Taiwan society in a frightened and precarious political environment. Little wonder that many had described the unscrupulous methods undertaken by the DPP to attack its political opponents as "green terror." (Green being the color of DPP)

Chen also argued that with a leader like Chen Shui-bian (陈水扁) who incessantly preaches an anti-communist doctrine, his deputies are similarly, albeit deliberately, paranoid. Former defense minister Lin Chung-pin (林中斌) claimed he once rode in a taxi driven by a "commie spy" in Taipei. Ditto for vice-president Annette Lu (吕秀莲).

When former DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh (施明德, pictured) launched a massive anti-Chen demonstration in 2006, DPP claimed that the demonstrations were orchestrated by the Communists.

When calls were made to oust Chen in a referendum, again in 2006, Green forces in south Taiwan reportedly called on their supporters to form kamikaze squads. The aim? To shed blood and lay down their lives by killing Kuomintang (国民党) leader Ma Ying-jeou (马英九) and other "China spokespersons" in Taiwan.

In conclusion, writer Chen had this to say:

"台湾, 断然不能回到一个思想和声音重新沦丧的年代. 问题在于, 当下台湾的现状正在重新浮现意识形态束缚的背影. 当解除约束的受益者重新又拾起约束的武器时, 他们已经忘了一个时代的伤痛. 今天的台湾政治, 又在通过另一种"枪弹"和"刺刀"指向台湾民众的心灵深处. 甚至连"戒严"这个词, 也成了政党互相攻击的武器, 而不是共同纪念的关键词."

"台湾戒严20年, 不但解除了国民党的专制, 也解除了人们思想的枷锁. 但是历史证明, 这种解除之后, 社会必然要用新的阵痛, 来实现次序与合理. 在填补空白的过程中, 如果台湾的民众不能以一种清醒和理智的态度来面对今天的台湾政治, 那么新的"思想戒严"又会通过"台独"分子从新侵占人们的公共空间. 所谓政治乱象的恐怖程度, 或许不亚与"白色恐怖"下的暗哑."

"Certainly Taiwan cannot return to an ideologically decayed era. But the problem is, a new and binding ideology is once again making its presence felt in today's Taiwan. Those who had benefited from the eradication of restraints are once again picking up the weapons of restraint. They have already forgotten a generation of pain. They are using different types of ammunition to point deep into the hearts of the Taiwanese people. Even the expression "lifting of martial law" has become a weapon used by political parties in attacking each other, and not an expression that is worthy of joint commemoration."

"Two decades of the lifting of martial law had not only eradicated Kuomintang authoritarianism, it had also eradicated the locks on people's minds. But history had shown that after these things had been eradicated, society will have to undergo new pangs of pain in order to reach a new and reasonable balance. During this process, the Taiwanese people must view today's Taiwan politics in a clear and rational light. Otherwise, a new "ideological martial law" - in the form of "Taiwan separatist forces" - will once again occupy the public domain. And such a reign of terror will be no less terrifying than the mute darkness we've witnessed under the period of "white terror."

White Terror in Taiwan

In an article dated 20 July 2007 by Chen Sen (陈岑), two incidents were said to have characterized Taiwan under martial law.

1. In 1965, Wang Zhipeng (王志鹏), an illiterate fisherman from Matsu (马祖) was inspired by the wonderfully gorgeous weather and remarked aloud: "Today's weather is excellent. The direction of the wind, as well as the flow of the tide, is also good. And it is near enough to peddle to the mainland." Wang's remarks were overheard by the boat owner, who immediately alerted the police. Wang was sentenced to five years in jail for being a "counterrevolutionary."

2. Ke Qihua (柯旗化), an English teacher, was sentenced to 17 years in prison for being a "leftist." One key evidence of his "crime" was that he possessed a book titled The Adventures of Tom Sawyer by Mark Twain. Prosecutors claimed or assumed that Twain was related to Karl Marx. Why? Because Twain's name, when translated into Chinese is 马克吐温, which is remarkably similar to Marx's 马克思. Two similar Chinese characters in their names! How audacious!

Chen's article was titled 台湾戒严20年:从"白色恐怖"到"绿色恐怖" (Two Decades After Taiwan Lifts Its Martial Law: From "White Terror" to "Green Terror").

The Lost Daughters of China

I read Karin Evans' The Lost Daughters of China years ago, and I must confess that the book has constantly been at the back of my mind. Especially when:

1. I was in Guangzhou many years ago and witnessed the countless baby girls carried by or pushed around in prams by western adoptive parents.

2. I tried to do a television documentary a few years ago on the issue of adoption in China. Adeline, a Singaporean, once invited me to a temporary shelter for orphans located in the outskirts of Beijing. I was overwhelmed by emotions when I witnessed the countless healthy beautiful babies (mainly girls) abandoned by their birth parents. I almost choked when one of the Chinese helpers cooed to one baby and asked in a sing-song lyrical manner:"你到底是谁的孩子? 哎呀呀,你不就是上帝的孩子吗?" (Or "whose child are you? Hey, hey, aren't you a child of God?") Much like Evans when she wrote: "Oh lord, sweet baby, where on earth did you come from?"

I had lots of footage, but in the end decided not to pursue the story. The reason was complex enough, but the long and short of it was that after talking to people, mainly foreign NGOs involved in helping Chinese orphans, doing a feature on the issue would be more of a disservice than a service to their noble and charitable cause.

In the book, Evans wrote that "each daughter adopted from China is a gift beyond measure, and each comes with her own little mystery," adding that "if China was full of lost daughters, it was also full of lost mothers."

"Babies have persuasive powers to make us love them ... How unspeakably hard it must have been to walk away. And yet someone had. While I was at home in San Francisco, fretting about bureaucratic logjam, someone in south China was bundling up that beautiful three-month old for a last trip to the marketplace."

Apart from the vast numbers of unwanted baby girls available, there are several reasons why Chinese adoptions are popular. The application and approval process was faster than elsewhere. China was more forgiving of older parents as compared to some South and Central American countries. The Chinese adoption program was not tainted by rumors of stolen children, babies for sale, or black-market profiteers. The health of the children was generally good. The babies could be adopted at a younger age - most at a year old or younger - lessening the chances of attachment disorder. And the care in the orphanages that dealt with foreign adoption was apparently good.

No less significant is the fact that the parents of these abandoned children would rarely surface to re-claim the child at a later date. This is mainly due to the 1992 Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests, which makes it illegal to abandon baby girls. Though there had not been a substantial pattern of prosecution, many parents understood that abandoning their baby girls was a crime. Hence, they'd forever remain elusive. Moreover, many were also too ashamed to come forward and be identified.

But nevertheless, there were also charges that some Chinese institutions deliberately offered better care to those infants who were "marketable" for foreign adoption, while condemning the less attractive and appealing children to sub-standard care.

Evans wrote that a baby in Anhui province (安徽省) was found with a yam tucked under her arm. "The parents wanted to show some love for the baby and they were very poor, and they left it with the poorest food of China, a dry yam." Another baby was found with a bunch of used bus tickets as "the parents didn't even have a penny to leave."

An American adoptive parent was quoted as saying: "One thing I know in defense of these women who abandon their babies is that they must have some special kind of love for these unborn souls because it is very easy (and encouraged) to have an abortion (in China)."

As for Evan's own adopted Chinese daughter Kelly, Evans had this to say:

"This baby was found; she was meant to be found - that is the important point here. The story that Kelly's mother had to offer, I realized, was closer than we thought. The best evidence was Kelly herself. Her sweetness and courage, her humor and grace. Her mother left the biggest clue of all in this baby's ready smile. Her mother loved her. If I know nothing else about this woman who gave me the gift of this beautiful child, I know this: When she cared for this baby, she cared wholeheartedly. When she set her down, she set her down gently."

Here Comes the Chinese Tourists

Mainland Chinese guests are heading your way. You are a hotel general manager, so what do you do? No, don't lay out the red carpet. Re-stock the items in the minibars instead.

Get rid of the green bottles of Perrier, and replace them with distilled water. Cut down on the cans of Coca-Cola, and replace them with cans of Chinese tea. And forget about Planters peanuts. Think instant cup noodles and dried fish snacks.

As Scott Neuman noted in a 2003 article titled Asian Hotels Adapt as Mainland Chinese Check In, changes have to be made to make mainland Chinese guests feel at home.

These include supplying hot water boilers so that Chinese guests can make their own tea using their own tea leaves.

While Chinese tourists certainly boost hotel occupancy rates, the problem, according to a Hong Kong hotel manager, is that they do not eat in the hotel as much. This had resulted in empty tables at hotel cafes. And since breakfast would normally account for 20% of hotels' non-room revenues, the no-show had also eaten into hotels' bottom line.

Furthermore, since Chinese tourists mainly joined tour groups where stays were often shorter, they often make little use laundry services. Those who need to wash their clothes often do it themselves and hang the clothes to dry overnight in the bathroom.

Vice-chairman of the Hong Kong Hotels Association Dan Lee was quoted as saying: "A lot of people had the attitude that big mainland tour groups, their behavior, the way they dressed, the language they used, would really disturb some of the other guests."

But Lee also hoped that Chinese guests will eventually graduate from budget-traveler status. After all, as incomes rise in China, Lee reckoned that "those people will have more to spend."

It has been four years since the article was written. Surely improvements have been made in the behaviors of Chinese tourists. Or have they not?

Chinese Social Scientist Li Shenzhi

The conditions for further reforms in China are not only ripe, they are "overripe". And if democracy is not implemented soon, the corruption that the people find so repugnant will only worsen.

So said former deputy head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Li Shengzhi (李慎之, pictured).

Li noted that former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) disregarded the very principles he had formulated by saying in 1992 that "if capitalism can have a market economy, so can socialism."

In a 2003 article titled Peaceful Times Call for Bold Reforms, Li asked: "So why can't our leaders say, "if capitalism can have parliamentary democracy, so can socialism," and open new prospects for Chinese politics?"

Li, who died the same year the article was published, added that only if Chinese leaders are bold enough to pursue reform "will they be able to save themselves and protect the legacies of Deng, Mao and the Communist Party."

Li also warned that if there is no peaceful evolution, "there will be violent evolution, or else revolution."

For many years, Li was a trusted spokesman for the Chinese Communist Party, but was later dismissed due to his blunt criticisms of the party. He emerged in the 1990s as a powerful critic of authoritarianism and a prominent exponent of Chinese liberalism.

Behind the Hyundai Payoff Scandal

Remember the payoff scandal surrounding former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il?

Two years after the landmark meeting, Hyundai admitted that it made a $500 million payout to Kim Jong-il days before the meeting.

According to Korean journalist Shim Jae-hoon, Pyongyang exploited the rivalry in Seoul to host the summit in exchange for a large payoff from Hyundai.

Apparently, the South's Ministry of Unification - supposedly the main administrative channel set up to authorize North-South business deals, including legitimate trade - had consistently been sidestepped.

In the 2003 article, Shim noted that it did not help that Kim Dae-jung had "an imperial style of management."

"(Kim) hogged the entire North Korean agenda, leaving little say to experts outside the Blue House. For the past five years, policy deliberation has been mainly in the hands of chief security adviser Lim Dong-won and chief of staff Park Jie-won. Mr. Park even bypassed the National Intelligence Service in secretly contacting Kim Jong-il's aides."

Zeng Qinghong and Mount Jinggang

In anticipation of the 17th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) congress coming up soon, here are further tit-bits from the last congress in 2002.

In November 2001, Jiang Zemin (江泽民) reportedly wanted to revive the post of Central Military Commission (CMC) General Secretary for his protege Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红).

But the idea had to be abandoned because of great resistance within the party against "this overt display of favoritism", according to a February 2003 article by ex-journalist Chin Cheong. Incidentally, it is with extreme regret that Chin is still languishing in Chinese jail, and is reportedly in poor health right now.

Speaking of Zeng, apart from his strong paternal pedigree, his maternal pedigree is no less impressive. His mother used to head an informal kindergarten attended by children of high-ranking officials and officers.

While Zeng was largely seen as a Jiang protege, there were indications even in 2003 that he made it a point to tread a fine line between being the loyal protege and not alienating himself from, if not getting into the good books of Hu Jintao (胡锦涛).

But as Chin noted, Zeng's surprise visit to Mount Jinggang (井纲山) after he was elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee that year bewildered many.

Mount Jinggang has long been regarded as the cradle of the communist movement. It was the first stronghold seized by the CCP after it established the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1927.

Since then, it has become a monument of sorts for the CCP. Because of its historical significance, only the No 1 man in the Party, as an unwritten rule, would make a pilgrimage there. Other senior leaders would avoid such a gesture lest it caused suspicion.

Hence, when Zeng visited Mount Jinggang, it immediately sparked off gossips that Zeng's move betrayed his ambition.

Changchun = Everlasting Spring = Oxymoron

Chinese television journalist Zhu Bo's (朱波) lamentation of Changchun (长春) in Jilin province (吉林省), made me laughed.

Recalling his trip to the north-eastern Chinese city on an assignment in the depths of winter, Zhu said that while quivering and trembling in the cold, he stared in fury at the words "长春" (Changchun) and hissed:

"多么无耻啊! 这种天气，也敢自诩“长春”。”

"How shameless! With weather like this, how dare it calls itself "changchun" (or "everlasting spring"?)

Even though the cold was indeed oppressive when I visited Changchun in winter, I have never looked at the meaning of "Changchun" quite so literally - until Zhu's observation, that is.

Media Freedom in China - The Case of Caijing

The answer as to whether China has a free press is, according to Hu Shuli (胡舒立), both yes and no.

In a 2003 article, Hu noted that while the government's attitude towards the press is not one of constant suspicion, the line between the permissible and the prohibited is constantly shifting.

The editor of Caijing (财经) should know, as the business publication was one of the pioneers in pushing the unclear limits of what was "permissible and prohibited."

In its first issue in April 1998, Caijing published a cover story on a little-known real estate company whose share prices rocketed by 400 per cent. The company's stock was suspended from trading in 1997, after it was charged with over-stating profits. A few insiders had been tipped off and unloaded their shares, while 50,000 individual investors lost millions of dollars.

Even though everyone knew what happened, no one dared to publish details of the inflated profits, or the tip-off - until Caijing broke the silence.

As Hu recounted: "Our article offered no investigative scoop or new information. By simply reporting the story and pointing out that the system had failed to protect small investors, we caused a stir."

In October 2000, Caijing published an inside story of fund management, which disclosed a previously suppressed Shanghai Stock Exchange analysis. In the analysis, China's investment-fund management companies were said to have traded illegally and irregularly on the securities market. As it turned out, Caijing was the first serious publication to report criticism of the fund-management sector and the stock market.

After the article was published, the 10 government-affiliated companies mentioned in the article threatened to sue. But Caijing's readers defended the publication. Even prominent Chinese economist Wu Jinglian (吴敬琏) threw his weight behind Caijing.

Hu recounted that the story was a watershed for Caijing and the Chinese media, as the government left the publication alone, "not even criticising our report." In a speech around that time, China Securities Regulatory Commission chairman Zhou Xiaochuan (周小川) even announced that the securities market welcomed "media criticism and supervision."

Since then, China's financial media had become bolder, and Caijing had exposed further price manipulations and other financial irregularities.

In 2002, the publication reported that Yinguang Xia Holdings, then China's second largest listed company in China's A share market, posted a falsified online claim of 700 million yuan in profits. Within hours of publication, the company was suspended for trading, and within a week, security regulators were investigating.

But despite these successes, Hu noted that official pressure remained high, information that should have been made public is often not available, and key officials often refused to be interviewed. Some listed companies even tried to stop Caijing from publishing what they thought were negative stories about their companies by appealing to government agencies and officials.

Hu added: "There are no laws protecting the media or freedom of speech, and companies which don't like our reports can sue us for damaging their reputations. They usually win."

But despite the various obstacles, Hu remained optimistic that the media will eventually become a "viable monitor of Chinese industry, if for no other reason than that most people recognize by now that economic development will falter without it."

As Hu concluded: "After the public becomes familiar with Caijing's brand of journalism, it is sure to raise demands for more tough-minded and scrupulous reporting - not only on markets, but also on developments within people's communities and governments. Thousands of important stories remained to be told in China. Caijing is but one voice struggling to tell them."

We can only hope that Hu's predictions will be proven right sooner than we think.

Hai'er CEO on Korean Conglomerates

Hai'er's (海尔) CEO Zhang Ruimin (张瑞敏, pictured) once remarked that the "Hangang Miracle" created by South Korean conglomerates was something that Chinese firms can and should learn from.

That comment came in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) that had badly affected South Korea's economy, and led to questions about the country's model of economic development.

Despite the AFC, Zhang was quoted as saying: "So what if we had just witnessed the fall of a giant? Does that mean that we can simply refuse to grow and develop?" (21世纪,21大话题, or 21st Century, 21 Major Topics, Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Publishing Press, 2000)

According to Zhang, the temporary failure of Korean conglomerates was not due to their high debt equity. Neither was it due to their rapid expansion. Rather, it was due to what he called the inability to set aside "the face problem of Orientals" (放不下"东方人的面子问题").

Zhang noted that because of the overwhelming presence of "face", some Korea conglomerates were forced to absorb and take in unprofitable enterprises.

Based in Qingdao (青岛) in Shandong province (山东省), Hai'er is a top Chinese producer of household appliances. It reported sales of over $12 billion in 2005.

Rural China's Lack of Legal Awareness

Chinese writer Song Shuli's (宋树理) book 私了 - 法庭外的荒唐闹剧 (or Private Settlement - The Ridiculous Farce Outside Court Rooms, Dazhong Wenyi Publishing House, 1999) is a collection of real-life stories about how people chose to settle criminal cases and civil disputes among themselves, instead of turning to the legal system.

Most of these cases involved local disputes where money, power, influence and illicit sex (but of course) were involved.

In the case of women who were raped, these mainly rural women and their families would usually remained silent after the crime. Most were afraid that their families would be "shamed", while those who were single did not want the incident to affect their marriage prospects. Then there were also those who had no choice but to keep quiet because the rapist is someone prominent within the community.

One case involved a man who discovered that his wife was having an illicit affair with the latter's married factory supervisor. When the two were caught in the act, the male philanderer pleaded for mercy, and begged his lover's husband to "name a price."

But apparently, the husband did not want any money. Instead, he asked the philanderer how many times the latter had slept with his wife. When he was told "four", the husband said, "well, in that case, go and tell your wife that I will sleep with her four times." The philanderer had no choice but to oblige.

But when the husband found out that the philanderer's wife was a couple of years older than his own wife, he felt "cheated." And as luck would have it, the philanderer had an 18-year old daughter.

So the deal was - to make up for his "loss", the husband will sleep thrice with the philanderer's wife, and once with the daughter.

Anyway, the central theme of the book was to take these ignorant Chinese to task for not turning to the police and the legal system, and for taking the law into their own hands.

But with a Chinese legal system that has yet to instill, let alone inspire confidence, and with the concentration of power in the hands of powerful people who controlled both the police and the courts, how can Chinese, especially those living in rural areas, be expected to have confidence in the ability of the legal system in delivering a fair and just verdict?

Separation of Party and Government in China

At the height of China's political reform in 1987, Chinese Communist Party secretary general Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳, pictured right) proposed the "separation of party and government" and the "separation of party and enterprise."

With Zhao's fall from power in 1989, those ideas were abandoned.

Yet, according to Andrew Nathan, "in the intervening 14 years, much of what he proposed has happened by evolution."

In his 2003 article titled The China Paradox: A Stable, Single-Party System, Nathan noted that provincial-level governors and party secretaries have an increasingly wider scope in setting local policy in areas such as health, education, welfare, the environment, foreign investment and economic development.

Many large state enterprises have also been removed from state ownership, or placed under joint state-private ownership. Enterprise management decisions are predominantly economic rather than political. State Council members, provincial-level officials and enterprise managers are also increasingly selected for their relevant policy expertise.

The National People's Congress too has become more autonomous in initiating legislation and actively reviewing and altering proposals. Even though the police and courts are still highly politicised, a norm of judicial independence had at least been instituted. Judges now have more leeway in applying the law to economic and criminal cases that have little or no political repercussions.

And even though all Chinese media is still owned by the Party and other state agencies, the media has, over the years, become more commercialized and less politicised.

"In the political domain, they often push the regime's off-limits markers by investigating stories about local corruption and abuse of power," Nathan wrote.

Anyway, Nathan's main point in the article was that China's experience during the past two decades had shown that democracy "is not inevitable, as many once thought."

"Under conditions that elsewhere have led to democratic transition, China has made a transition instead from totalitarianism to a classic authoritarian regime, and one that appears increasingly stable."

Iraq and Sunshine Policy

I don't really like to admit this. But sometimes I do derive a perverse yet ironic sense of pleasure while reading history. Only problem is: can 2003 be considered "history"?

In February that year, James E. Goodby had this to say about America's handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis in his article titled Playing The Long Game Is Risky.

"What is the national security team of President George W. Bush up to? One answer is that after an anticipated rapid victory over Iraq, the negotiating hand of the United States will be strengthened and Pyongyang will agree to a settlement on better terms than could be got now."

An anticipated rapid victory over Iraq? Remind me to check in again in 2010 to see if American forces are still tangled in Iraq. And ditto about the better "settlement" with North Korea.

Also in 2003, Brad Glosserman took former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung to task for the latter's sunshine policy. Glosserman might as well be castigating current President Roh Moo Hyun. Just change the name from Kim to Roh and notice how smooth everything sounded.

Arguing that the sunshine policy had become an end in itself, Glosserman noted that the "perpetuation and justification of the policy have become more important than its actual achievements."

Citing a study that year undertaken by the Rand Corporation, Glosserman wrote that Kim Dae Jung had "used his sunshine policy overtly and intentionally to improve both his personal political position and his party's electoral prospects. He polarized what had generally been considered a non-partisan issue and increased the perceived stakes in domestic political terms."

Japanese Militarism

According to writer Iris Chang, the molding of young men to serve in the Japanese military began early in life. And by the 1930s, military influence seeped into virtually every aspect of Japanese boyhood.

In her book The Rape of Nanking, Chang noted that "toy shops became virtual shrines to war, selling arsenals of toy soldiers, tanks, helmets, uniforms, rifles, anti-aircraft guns, bugles, and howitzers."

Memoirs of that time also described pre-adolescent boys waging mock battles in the streets using bamboo poles and imaginary rifles. Some even tied logs of wood on their backs and fantasized about dying as "human bomb" heroes in suicide mission.

Historians also cited the story of a squeamish Japanese schoolboy in the 1930s who burst into tears when told to dissect a frog.

His teacher reportedly slammed his knuckles against the boy's head and yelled, "Why are you crying about one lousy frog? When you grow up you'll have to kill one hundred, two hundred chinks!"

Beware of North Korea's Economic Liberalizations

In his book Nuclear North Korea (2003), Victor Cha argued that earlier attempts by North Korea to move towards greater economic liberalization does not necessarily mean that the country is becoming less threatening.

Cha noted that those sympathetic to the North cite the baby economic steps taken by Pyongyang prior to the escalation of the nuclear crisis in 2003. These include sending a delegation to the U.S. to study international contract law, and not cracking down on the black markets that have sprouted up on the Chinese-North Korean border.

Those sympathetic to the North also argued that economic engagement with the North is the answer, and that economic carrots will "pacify" the regime by giving them what they want.

Cha noted: "The problem with this argument is ... the distinction between tactics and intentions."

Cha argued that North Korean sympathizers are assuming that "tactical actions represent true change in the North's intentions."

Cha asked: "Upon what basis is this assumption that economic carrots should be associated with reduced DPRK belligerence? Contrary to what engagers posit, if one looks at the history of North-South Korean interaction, Pyongyang has been the most belligerent in its security behavior when it has been economically strong."

"In the 1960s and 1970s, for example. DPRK provocations against the South were at their highest (both in number and severity), and this was when the North was equal to or superior to the South on economic terms (measures in terms of per capital GNP)."

In a way, I too am a North Korean sympathizer. But Cha's point was convincing. And much as I tried, I could not erase it too easily from my mind.

Chinese Intellectuals As Oxens

China was better off in some aspects under the Nationalists than under the Communists. One such area was in the proliferation of the mass media.

According to Jasper Becker in his book The Chinese, before the establishment of the Republic in 1911, China had only 7 newspapers. But by 1935, there were 910 newspapers, and over 900 periodicals, as well as independent publishing houses, film studios and radio stations.

It was also during this period that the greatest works by China's most famous 20th century writers - Ba Jin (巴金, pictured), Shen Congwen (沈从文), Lao She (老舍), Lu Xun (鲁迅), Qian Zhongshu (钱钟书) - were written.

Yet, as Becker noted, "little of comparative worth has appeared since 1949."

Hardly surprising, given that Mao Zedong (毛泽东) had made it clear that "there is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above the classes, art that is detached from or independent of politics. Proletarian literature, and art ... are, as Lenin said, cogs and wheels in the whole revolutionary machine."

Mao went on to add that the only role of intellectuals was to be "oxen for the proletariat and the masses, bending their backs to their tasks until their dying days."

Shenzhen During Its Heydays

According to Chinese writer Liu Yong (刘勇), Shenzhen had lost the magical glow it used to exude in the 1980s.

Then, the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was "so excitable that it could make anyone jump."

In his book 媒体中国 (Media China), Liu noted that apart from being a "special economic zone", Shenzhen was also a "special political zone."

Liu wrote: "At that time, those living in the SEZ dared to say whatever they wish to say, and those working in the media dared to publish whatever they wished to publish. Many still remember those days with fond memories."

Liu added: "Then, Shenzhen was like a young man with no hair growing above his upper lip."

But this bravado on the part of the media had also led to its downfall, according to Liu.

For instance, in 1987, the Shenzhen Youth Daily (深圳青年报) published an article titled 劝邓小平同志退休 (or Advising Comrade Deng Xiaoping to Retire).

Needless to say, the paper was subsequently shut down.

Concept of Private Property in China

Over the past few years, China had taken various measures to protect private property rights in the country.

But as recently as 1999, a small group of academics were discussing whether there could be such a thing as "private property" in China.

According to Jasper Becker in his book The Chinese, out of the hubbub of voices, "the sharp tones of the president of Zhengzhou University (郑州大学) raised a point that silenced the rest."

The university President reportedly said: "Then what would stop people from claiming the property they lost to the state after Liberation? After the French Revolution, children of the nobility could still claim their property under Napoleon. (pictured)"

Even former Chinese President Jiang Zemin (江泽民) concurred as much when he noted that China's socialist system will lose its economic foundation "if large amounts of state assets are indiscriminately transferred to individuals, and ultimately concentrated in the hands of just a few."

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long held that socialist publicly owned assets are sacred. Indeed, if the concept of public ownership is diluted, the CCP's name, which literally means "The Party of Public Assets", might also have to be altered.

Beggars in Japan

According to Chinese writer Hu Wei (胡伟), beggars in Japan are not technically beggars, coz 1) they do not beg, 2) no one will give them any money anyway.

In his book 美丽的中国人 (or The Beautiful Chinese, Writers' Publishing Press, 1998), Hu said Japanese would seldom feel sorry for beggars.

Why?

Because under the country's "employment for all" policy, every one will be able to find a job, no matter how lowly. And even if they cannot find one, the authorities will extend a helping hand in finding one.

Hu remembered how anxious his Japanese friend was in explaining to him when the two were walking together on a Japanese street and met some beggars.

His friend explained: "These people initially have jobs and families, but were either dissatisfied with their jobs or families, or have "queer thinking." Hence, they roam the streets as a form of protest. You have to understand that these beggars do not represent Japan!"

Hu noticed that many Japanese were extremely uncomfortable about the presence of beggars in Japan. Some even saw beggars as a form of "national humiliation."

Turning to the lives of these beggars, Hu noted that even though beggars do not beg, they generally eat well. They do this by waiting outside the various supermarkets at closing time, where unsold food for the day will either be distributed or thrown away.

Hu added: "Sometimes they even get to savor food that ordinary housewives either cannot afford to, or find it too expensive to purchase."

But things were completely different, according to Hu, when it came to foreign beggars begging in Japan. Japanese, it seems, were more than happy to give generously to these mainly American beggars.

The reason, as Hu surmised, was sort of a perverse pleasure in a reversal of roles. After all, in the past, it was the Japanese men who begged for food from American soldiers, and Japanese women who had to offer their bodies to Americans ... but now ...

The Extreme Decline of Japanese Militarism

According to Chinese writer Hu Wei (胡伟), the Japanese as a nation and people is on a path towards deterioration.

In his book 美丽的中国人 (or The Beautiful Chinese, Writers' Publishing Press, 1998), Hu noted that if you were to ask Japanese in their 20s the question "who will protect Japan from military invasion", you are likely to get the following answers:

1. Escape to the United States.
2. Hire those from the Third World to fight for us.
3. Surrender immediately.
4. That is precisely the reason why we need the Americans on Japanese soil! (Ok, indirect answer there).

Hu noted that if you were to ask the Chinese the same question, the answers would be:

1. We'd safeguard our nation!
2. We'd join the army!

Half ridiculing the decline of Japanese militarism, Hu added that young Japanese who join the army these days would be ridiculed for not being smart or competent enough to do anything else in life.

Hu also noted that no army in the world would allow their soldiers to live outside of the military barracks. This also explained why troops were slow in responding in the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake.

Hu added: "Furthermore, without the high salaries and free driving lessons, only a fool would join the army."

In addition, when Japan started dispatching peacekeeping troops, all hell broke lose when some soldiers either refused to go, or declared they would quit the military.

Hu wrote: "Of course, these dissenting troops were not thinking of profound questions such as the revival of Japanese militarism. Rather, they were afraid to die. But even so, their superiors did not dare do anything to them. Because if harsh penalties were meted out, no one would want to join the army."

Chinese Writer Wang Meng

I found the following excerpts by Chinese writer and former Culture Minister Wang Meng (王蒙) in his book 我是王蒙 (or I am Wang Meng) truly inspirational.

"我写作，因为我爱生活。我叹息一切美好的瞬间的短促，只有文学才能使美好的瞬间与永恒连接起来。”

"I write, because I love life. I sigh at the momentary briefness of everything that is good and beautiful. Only literature is capable of joining good and beautiful moments together with eternity."

“至少我有理由指望，我的作品会比我自己更长久。我已经不在的时候，也许有一个青年会为我的某一篇散文而微笑，也许有一个少女会为我的某一篇诗歌而动容，也许有一位长者会为我的某一篇小说而煎熬。单是这样想一想已经够让人激动的了。”

"At least I have reasons to believe that my works will last longer than myself. When I am not around, perhaps a young man will smile after reading one of my prose. Perhaps a young girl might be moved after reading one of my poems. Or perhaps an elderly will put up with the difficulties and hardships in life after reading one of my novels. Just thinking of these is enough to excite me."

“文学是一种快乐。文学是一种疾病。文学是一种手段。文学是一种交际。文学是一段浪漫。文学是一种冒险。文学是一种休息。文学是上帝。文学是奴婢。文学是天使。文学是娼妓。文学是鲜艳的花朵。文学是一剂不治病的药。文学是一锅稀粥。文学什么都是也什么都不是。”

"Literature is a form of happiness. Literature is a form of illness. Literature is a type of tactic. Literature is a type of socializing. Literature is a period of romance. Literature is a form of adventure. Literature is a type of recreation. Literature is God. Literature is a slave girl. Literature is an angel. Literature is a prostitute. Literature is a bright flower. Literature is a type of medicine that does not cure diseases. Literature is a pot of porridge. Literature is everything, and yet is nothing."