Beware of North Korea's Economic Liberalizations
In his book Nuclear North Korea (2003), Victor Cha argued that earlier attempts by North Korea to move towards greater economic liberalization does not necessarily mean that the country is becoming less threatening.
Cha noted that those sympathetic to the North cite the baby economic steps taken by Pyongyang prior to the escalation of the nuclear crisis in 2003. These include sending a delegation to the U.S. to study international contract law, and not cracking down on the black markets that have sprouted up on the Chinese-North Korean border.
Those sympathetic to the North also argued that economic engagement with the North is the answer, and that economic carrots will "pacify" the regime by giving them what they want.
Cha noted: "The problem with this argument is ... the distinction between tactics and intentions."
Cha argued that North Korean sympathizers are assuming that "tactical actions represent true change in the North's intentions."
Cha asked: "Upon what basis is this assumption that economic carrots should be associated with reduced DPRK belligerence? Contrary to what engagers posit, if one looks at the history of North-South Korean interaction, Pyongyang has been the most belligerent in its security behavior when it has been economically strong."
"In the 1960s and 1970s, for example. DPRK provocations against the South were at their highest (both in number and severity), and this was when the North was equal to or superior to the South on economic terms (measures in terms of per capital GNP)."
In a way, I too am a North Korean sympathizer. But Cha's point was convincing. And much as I tried, I could not erase it too easily from my mind.
Cha noted that those sympathetic to the North cite the baby economic steps taken by Pyongyang prior to the escalation of the nuclear crisis in 2003. These include sending a delegation to the U.S. to study international contract law, and not cracking down on the black markets that have sprouted up on the Chinese-North Korean border.
Those sympathetic to the North also argued that economic engagement with the North is the answer, and that economic carrots will "pacify" the regime by giving them what they want.
Cha noted: "The problem with this argument is ... the distinction between tactics and intentions."
Cha argued that North Korean sympathizers are assuming that "tactical actions represent true change in the North's intentions."
Cha asked: "Upon what basis is this assumption that economic carrots should be associated with reduced DPRK belligerence? Contrary to what engagers posit, if one looks at the history of North-South Korean interaction, Pyongyang has been the most belligerent in its security behavior when it has been economically strong."
"In the 1960s and 1970s, for example. DPRK provocations against the South were at their highest (both in number and severity), and this was when the North was equal to or superior to the South on economic terms (measures in terms of per capital GNP)."
In a way, I too am a North Korean sympathizer. But Cha's point was convincing. And much as I tried, I could not erase it too easily from my mind.
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