Iraq and Sunshine Policy

I don't really like to admit this. But sometimes I do derive a perverse yet ironic sense of pleasure while reading history. Only problem is: can 2003 be considered "history"?

In February that year, James E. Goodby had this to say about America's handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis in his article titled Playing The Long Game Is Risky.

"What is the national security team of President George W. Bush up to? One answer is that after an anticipated rapid victory over Iraq, the negotiating hand of the United States will be strengthened and Pyongyang will agree to a settlement on better terms than could be got now."

An anticipated rapid victory over Iraq? Remind me to check in again in 2010 to see if American forces are still tangled in Iraq. And ditto about the better "settlement" with North Korea.

Also in 2003, Brad Glosserman took former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung to task for the latter's sunshine policy. Glosserman might as well be castigating current President Roh Moo Hyun. Just change the name from Kim to Roh and notice how smooth everything sounded.

Arguing that the sunshine policy had become an end in itself, Glosserman noted that the "perpetuation and justification of the policy have become more important than its actual achievements."

Citing a study that year undertaken by the Rand Corporation, Glosserman wrote that Kim Dae Jung had "used his sunshine policy overtly and intentionally to improve both his personal political position and his party's electoral prospects. He polarized what had generally been considered a non-partisan issue and increased the perceived stakes in domestic political terms."