North Korea's "Silent Revolution"

Andrei Lankov recently suggested that instead of diplomatic and high-profile measures, the best way to change North Korea is through disseminating information to as many North Koreans as possible.

He argued that measures such as financial sanctions are fairly ineffectual as the main victims are ordinary North Koreans "whose suffering has not hurt the regime historically." For instance, even after 3 to 5 per cent of the population starved to death in the late 1990s, there were no signs of political unrest. "Terrified and isolated, the North Koreans did not rebel; they died quietly."

The Kookmin University academic also argued that the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be resolved in isolation as it is part of the broader North Korean issue that can only be "resolved with a radical transformation of the regime."

"Since outside pressure is ineffective, change will have to come from the North Koreans themselves. The United States and its allies can best help them by exposing them to the very attractive alternatives to their current way of life.” (Changing North Korea An Information Campaign Can Best the Regime, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2009)

Lankov believed that this approach would work given that it was the West's economic prosperity and political freedom that had "irrevocably undermined popular support for communism."

The main premise of the approach would be to weaken the regime's monopoly on information and driving home the point to North Koreans that they are living "in an ocean of suffering" instead of the "island of happiness" which they were conditioned to believe. It also includes propagating information about the affluence of foreign countries, especially South Korea's.

The latter is already happening in the Kaesong Industrial Complex where North Koreans have come into direct contact with their Southern neighbors. "As these North Korean workers get to observe the South Koreans’ dress and possessions and hear their conversations, they become more likely to realize the dishonesty of Pyongyang's propaganda."

"The goal would be to spread knowledge about the modern world to North Korea's common people and lower-level elites, those without a vested interest in perpetuating the brutality of the current system."

Well and good. But I have my doubts when it comes to the actual measures proposed by Lankov.

Lankov suggested that the U.S. government should spearhead initiatives that bring foreigners to North Korea and take North Koreans abroad. These include academic and student exchanges where "away from police surveillance (and close to Internet-equipped computers), they would learn much more about the true workings of the world" and be exposed to truthful information.

Even though Lankov concurred that "only the scions of the North Korean elite" would be allowed in such programs, it is still worth encouraging "as those involved might develop a more independent mindset and share some of their newly acquired knowledge with the less privileged back home."

I am doubtful as it is unlikely that more than just a privileged few will be able to go on such programs. And the small numbers will mean that the programs are not likely to achieve the intended results.

Lankov also suggested smuggling in more foreign DVDs and videos into North Korea, especially those that inform North Koreans about daily social and economic life in South Korea.

Better still, the U.S. should support the production of documentaries "specially tailored to the tastes of the North Korean audience" and which cover issues relating to North Korean contemporary history and reunification. In addition, lighter videos and DVDs "can educate North Koreans about the real world even if their chief purpose is simply to entertain."

I think this might work only if massive amounts of such foreign DVDs get into the Hermit Kingdom. As it is, many South Korean drama serials are already finding their way into North Korea mainly from China, but we are still not witnessing the revolution which Lankov hope would materialize. Or maybe it is already quietly underway and that all it needs is an added push/impetus?

Other measures which Lankov had suggested include digitizing videos and books and putting entire libraries within the reach of North Koreans, and encouraging the spread of computers inside North Korea. "For even without access to the Internet, computers remain a powerful tool of emancipation, thanks to flash drives, DVDs, and the like."

Lankov further argued that Washington has to lead such efforts because South Koreans are "remarkably indifferent to the plight" of their northern cousins.

But he also acknowledged that such an approach will be a hard sell to most Americans.

"It is likely to bring about only barely visible, incremental change – at least until the situation reaches a breaking point, which would be many years away. Granting a scholarship to a farmer's son, promoting the concert tour of a North Korean tenor, and donating funds to a small radio station run by defectors are not glamorous diplomatic initiatives. Nor will they yield the sort of demonstrable, quantifiable results sought by bureaucracies that are accountable to the public."

On North Korea's weapons program, Lankov noted that Pyongyang cannot do away with these programs as this would mean losing both a powerful deterrent and a "time-tested tool of extortion."

"It would also relegate North Korea to being a third-rate country, on a par with Mozambique or Uganda. This is the reason that Pyongyang has rejected South Korea's "Vision 3000" plan, which proposed raising North Korea's per capita GDP (currently estimated at between $500 and $1,700) to $3,000 through a general aid and investment program – on the condition that Pyongyang denuclearize."