China's Charm Offensive

China's charm offensive may not be as charming as it sounds, or so according to Joshua Kurlantzick.

In his book Charm Offensive How China’s Soft Power Is Transform-ing the World (Yale University Press, 2007), Kurlantzick suggested that as a developing country China could "overplay its hand, making promises to other nations that it cannot fulfill."

China's diplomatic style of signing many agreements during foreign visits by its top leaders may have earned it "considerable initial goodwill and positive media coverage", but often the agreements are merely letters of intent.

"In Latin America and Asia, when officials from local boards of trade and investment follow up, they sometimes find that Chinese officials had laid no groundwork to put these letters into practice. Indeed, after Chinese leaders make promises of new aid during visits overseas, Beijing sometimes fails to follow through with the cash."

Even though China's aid does not always match that of other major powers, Kurlantzick said that Beijing has tried to make the most of the goodwill it receives.

For instance, after the tsunami in December 2004, China offered $95 million in assistance, said to be one of its biggest-ever pledges of humanitarian aid, but still far less than Japan's assistance or U.S. aid, which approached $1 billion.

"But because China is a new donor, Beijing seemed to win almost as much media coverage in Asia for its tsunami relief as did the United States and Japan. This has become a trend: China generates goodwill from its assistance partly because countries have become used to receiving money from Japan and America for decades, and China is a new donor."

But surely the novelty would have worn off by now. Indeed, during the recent Haiti earthquake, China’s assistance had probably generated goodwill but not to the same extent as it used to be, especially given the perception that China's rescue team seemed more interested initially in rescuing Chinese aid workers buried in the rubble.

Kurlantzick also pointed out that since governments worldwide "had little experience with a powerful China ... they can believe that China, unlike other major powers, will impose no conditions on other countries or pressure other nations to do what Beijing wants. They can believe that China's rise will truly be an uncomplicated "win-win", an opportunity but not a threat."

But as Kurlantzick categorically put it, "that honeymoon period will end." In fact, there are indications that even though China does not make as many demands as the United States, it has "skillfully used soft power to influence nations to act according to Beijing’s wishes."

For instance, China has warned in 2006 that it might cut off diplomatic ties with Zambia if voters there picked an opposition candidate known for protesting China's poor labor policies. China is one of the largest investors in Zambia especially in the local copper industry, and one of the biggest sources of aid. Though the remarks "sent shockwaves" through the local media, Beijing eventually got the result it wanted.