Wednesday, January 20, 2010

China’s Soft Power in Southeast Asia

China's charm offensive in Southeast Asia had clearly altered the internal dynamics and external interactions of many of these countries.

For instance in East Timor, China had funded the construction of the East Timor foreign ministry (pictured), paid for the Timor government to open a new embassy in Beijing, and sponsored training programs.

Chinese official had also emphasized both nations' history of socialism given that many Timorese leaders had begun their guerilla careers as Marxists. China was the first country with which independent Timor established diplomatic relations.

But as Joshua Kurlantzick noted, "the savvy Timorese leadership saw in Beijing an opportunity to use China for its own ends, allow Timor to avoid becoming dependent on either of its two giant neighbors, Indonesia or Australia." (Charm Offensive How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World, Yale University Press, 2007)

Kurlantzick added that even though some former independence fighters seem concerned about Timor "cozying up to China," Beijing appeared genuinely popular in Dili. Across the half-island, people praised China’s influence, and many young Timorese were eager to study Chinese.

"Educated middle-class Timorese who knew anything about the PRC knew that China had once been poor, like Timor, but somehow had become fabulously wealthy."

But in Cambodia, things seemed less benign, and even took on a somewhat ominous twist.

As Kurlantzick pointed out, China had refused to join the Mekong River Commission, the main organization monitoring the river, and continued "blasting and damning its sections of the waterway." Scientists said this had the effect of drying up Cambodia's Tonle Sap, the biggest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia which is fed by the Mekong and provides the major protein source in Cambodia.

But every time Cambodians complain privately to the Chinese about the Mekong River, the Chinese reportedly offers promises of aid, and pledged to uphold environmental standards.

"Beijing's aid goes far in poor countries like Cambodia. As a result ... Hun Sen had publicly declared that Chinese dams would pose "no problems" and instructed his diplomats not to make any complains about the Mekong."

As for Singapore, Kurlantzick described the island-state as "one of the Southeast Asian nations more skeptical of China’s charm offensive." (Ah-ha!)

One Singaporean diplomat reportedly said that Chinese diplomats he had dealt with had "become increasingly sure and proud of their status, and disdainful of Southeast Asian nations." This diplomat added that as the Chinese diplomats abandon their style of listening to every nation’s concerns, "they will lose some of their appeal."

China's growing diplomatic assertiveness had even suggested to some Singaporean officials that China's charm is merely a façade, and a reason why the island state had boosted defense cooperation with the United States in recent years.

As for Southeast Asia as a whole, ASEAN diplomats say consensus at ASEAN meetings had often been delayed as member nations tried to "analyze how Beijing will react to any decision." Not only do ASEAN countries take into consideration what the Chinese think, they are also "trying to figure out what China wants ahead of time."

But in certain cases it is not even a matter of "figuring out ahead what China wants" but plainly doing China's bidding. In 2001, Dennis Blair, then commander of American forces in the Pacific proposed to create an informal regional security organization. But many Asian nations "vetoed the idea, in part because China quietly applied pressure on them to reject it."

Similarly, after Chinese angry protests surrounding then Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's visit to Taiwan, the island state reportedly promised that it would not support Taiwan in a war if Taiwan provoked the conflict by making moves towards independence.

Kurlantzick predicted that in time to come, China could prod countries like the Philippines or Thailand, "which are already using China as a hedge, to downgrade their close relations with the United States, or could push countries like Singapore to stop providing basing rights for America."

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