Kim's Geeky Side and the North Korean Military

I cannot help but admit that I found The Complete Idiot's Guide To Understanding North Korea by Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones and Joseph Tragert (Alpha Books, 2003) interesting.

Writing about Kim Jong-il's "geeky side", the authors said that the train Kim rode from North Korea to Moscow in 2001 was equipped "with an elaborate bank of computer and monitoring screens."

"With a click of his mouse, Kim could call up the daily weather forecast, get detailed data about any town in Russia, and track his gold transactions at the London and Zurich gold exchanges."

North Korea had also reportedly installed a nationwide network of advanced fiber optic telephone lines that linked Kim to all areas of the nation.

Buried underground, the transmissions are reportedly safe from being intercepted by electronic eavesdropping by US intelligence aircrafts.

On the country's military (pictured), Kim is said to rely "more on psychology than coercion to keep his army in line."

"He keeps the million-man army subordinate by keeping the generals loyal to him. He strokes the generals' egos with shiny medals and promotions. He bestows BMWs and Lexus cars on them and stuffs their pockets full of hard currency."

"They have access to the best apartments in the capital, villas in the countryside, and ample supplies of the best European booze. They and their visitors from abroad can also visit the so-called "happy houses" where they can enjoy karaoke and the favors of young ladies."

River Elegy

I remember watching Chinese television docu-mentary 河殇 (He Shang, or River Elegy) almost two decades ago with a sense of awe, but unfortunately with terribly little real understanding then, and even now.

According to W. J. F. Jenner in his book The Tyranny of History - The Roots of China's Crisis (The Penguin Press, 1994), the "amateurishly made but hotly controversial" television series "was screened in 1988 to the delight of all those who see China's past as a dead weight from which people need to be freed if China is to have a future."

Using the Yellow River (pictured) as a symbol of China, River Elegy blamed traditional norms and values for most of the country's problems.

As Jenner noted, "even when first shown, the series aroused much hostility from people who were appalled by what they saw as its negation of much of China's past."

"The end of the Mao era had more or less corresponded with the death of the radical aspects of Mao's traditional approach to history, so that there was now a growing divergence between those who were more conservative than ever about the past and those who wanted an intellectual and emotional break from it."

Interestingly, Jenner wrote that former leader Zhao Ziyang （赵紫阳) not only allowed River Elegy to be aired, he also suppressed publication of an article attacking it. The article only saw the light of day "after the People's Liberation Army washed Peking's streets in blood."

"When it did appear the piece by the pesudonymous Ji Jiayan was as vitriolic in its denunciation of River Elegy as Yao Wenyuan （姚文元） had been in his attacks on writers in the 1960s - and Yao had done something without precedent in human history by rising between 1966 and 1976 to the highest levels of power on the strength of unpleasant book reviews."

"If Yao was reading the People's Daily in his cell in 1989 he would have approved of Ji Jiayan's style and recognized the sort of ideological terrorism that in his day could leave its victims in gaol or even dead. The ferocity of the attack shows that River Elegy had hit its mark."

The Tyranny of History

Bought the book The Tyranny of History - The Roots of China's Crisis by W. J. F. Jenner (The Penguin Press, 1994) in London in 1996. Am finally reading it this year. Geez. But at least I got to it eventually!

Jenner argued that China's crisis goes far deeper than the problems of its current leaders to a value system that is rooted in the autocratic traditions of China's past.

He said that China had been both held together and held back by its extreme deference to history, adding that "the history of tyranny is matched by a tyranny of history, perception and thought patterns from the past bind living minds."

"Just as the record of the past was an essential guide to how to deal with the problems of today, so the records of one's own time yet to be compiled, and their distribution of blame and praise, were something so worrying that they might even influence present actions."

"History thus play a role comparable to that of religious texts in other cultures. It is also the Last Judgment ... The rulers of dynastic China, like their present-day successors, did not have to bother about what they would look like on television news or in the next day's paper; but many of them cared what history would say about them, just as European monarchs have worried about whether their souls were heading for heaven or hell after death."

Overall point taken.

But somehow I am not sure if it is entirely true that in 2009, Chinese leaders do not care about how "they would look on television news or in the next day's paper." They probably do. But then of course there is an army of propagandists out there to make sure that they at least do not look bad.

Shanghai's Yangshan Port

The deve-lopment of Shanghai's Yangshan Port (pictured) was reportedly due to the support of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin in the early 2000s, at "a time when the "Shanghai Gang's" influence in Beijing was paramount."

The port is located north of the Hangzhou Bay area, and its development is linked to the desire to regain Shanghai's previous global shipping hub status.

"However, Shanghai's grand ambition to become China's premier shipping hub was being constrained by the physical conditions surrounding Huangpu River. Huangpu River is not only narrow but shallow, with a depth of only seven meters. Big vessels often have to wait for up-tides to enter and leave the Port." (Yang Mu & Lionel Ho, Shanghai's Mega Port in Yangshan, in Interpreting China's Development, Ed. Wang Gungwu and John Wong, World Scientific Publishing, 2007).

Hence, the construction of a mega deep water port is said to be "of paramount importance" to Shanghai in serving its long-term needs. So after six years of feasibility studies and lobbying, the Yangshan Deep Water Port Project was formally approved by the central government in 2005.

The Port had reportedly led to major industry shakeups in Northeast Asia.

It has upset Busan's plan to be the prime logistics hub in Northeast Asia, while Kaohsiung Port - once the third busiest container port globally - is increasingly losing its trans-shipment status in the Asia-Pacific region.

"It is also likely to thwart Kobe's ambition to become Asia's leading port. On a negative note, intense competition among Asian ports has raised concerns over an oversupply of cargo handling capacity coming on line. Indeed, industry players are already forecasting a dip in charges in certain ports in the near future," Yang and Ho wrote.

As for Hong Kong, the impact on the SAR "will not be detrimental" as the territory depends largely on shipments within southern China, especially the Pearl River Delta region.

The development of Yangshan Port has also led to cooperation between the ports of Ningbo and Zhoushan. The two plan to invest RMB 10 billion to build a 12-berth facility in Zhoushan. Construction began in 2008, and the first two berths are due for commissioning in 2010.

Shanghai may be ambitions, but it faces competition from other Chinese regions such as Guangdong and Beijing-Tianjin.

"With the retirement of Jiang Zemin, the "Shanghai Gang" was slowly losing political clout. It was unsure if the new Hu-Wen administration would continue to channel resources ... to support Shanghai or divert resources to regions that are needier or politically in vogue."

June 4th

An interesting analysis of the appraisal of the June 4th incident from a current affairs book published in Hong Kong.

“实际上，人们要求为六四平凡，主要不是要追究哪个人的责任，而是要求公道，正义，良心，客观对待历史； 盼望中共能总结六四的教训，通过改革走向新生，如台湾的国民党为二二八事件道歉而推进民主和经济腾飞一样。镇压六四的主要主要决策者已相继作古，当时的 “八老” （邓小平，陈云，李先念，杨尚昆，王震，薄一波，邓颖超，宋任穷）一个也不在了，平反六四的条件已经成熟。

“就看胡温在17届中央的五年中敢不敢实事求是了。他们不敢干，迟早有人干。平反六四是一座富矿，谁去开采它，谁就有最大的政治资本。诚然，其中埋有 “地雷”。号称坚持实事求是思想路线，曾经冲毁 “两个凡是” 的中共难道还怕 “地雷” 吗？“地雷” 早晚要排除，早引爆早平安的。” （极目 编著，中共政局全破译，新文化图书有限公司，2007）

"When people call for the reappraisal of June 4th, they are not mainly calling for certain individuals to take responsibility for the incident. Rather, they are seeking justice, righteousness, conscience, and an impartial approach towards history. They are also hoping that the Chinese Communist Party can learn from the lessons and undertake reforms. This can be compared to Taiwan's Kuomintang who had apologized for the February 28th incident. This led to the growth of democracy and rapid economic growth. The major policymakers who had made the decision to crack down on the June 4th incident have all died. The "eight seniors" (Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Yang Shangkun, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, Deng Yinchao, Song Renqiong) are no longer around. The conditions for reappraising June 4th are ripe."

"What remains is whether the 17th administration of Hu and Wen has the courage to seek truth from facts. If they do not dare, someone else will have to do it. Reassessing June 4th is like having access to a gold mine. Whoever has the courage to excavate the mine will reap the largest political capital. Of course, there will be "landmines." But the Communist Party had often insisted upon its ideology of seeking truth from facts, and had once banished "The Two Whatevers." So why should it be afraid of "landmines"? "Landmines" must eventually be eliminated. The earlier they are ignited, the safer it will be."

Limitations of the SASAC

The Chinese State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) was set up in June 2003.

It was designed to be the owner and investor of state-owned assets as well as the supervisory body of the Centrally-Administered Enterprises (CAEs) in China.

While the number of CAEs under SASAC is small and decreasing, from 196 in 2002 down to about 160 in 2006, these firms are considered the cornerstones of Chinese industry. (Sarah F. Tong, Reforming State-Owned Enterprises, in Interpreting China's Development, Ed. Wang Gungwu and John Wong, World Scientific Publishing, 2007).

The most important sectors under SASAC's control are capital-intensive large-scale industries including petroleum and refining, metallurgy and electricity.

But while efforts have been made to improve and strengthen the effectiveness of SASAC, it still does not have the authority to appoint the top managers of some CAEs, as that power belongs to the Communist Party.

"As a result, the appointees may not set as their top priorities the maximization of profit and the value of state assets," Tong wrote.

"SASAC is often powerless as many of the CAEs are very powerful and well-connected with some evolving from former government ministries. There is still a long way to go for SASAC to become an effective government body to exercise its designated right as the owner and investor of state-owned assets."

Revival of Confucianism Threatening Christianity?

Purdue University professor Yang Fenggang spoke about the revival of Confucianism in China in an article titled Cultural Dynamics in China: Today and in 2020 (2007).

Even though he claimed that "Confucian fundamentalists proclaim the superiority and uniqueness of Chinese culture centered around Confucianism, emphasize the uniqueness of the Chinese social situation, and reject liberty, equality and democracy as notions of western culture," little evidence was provided to back his assertion.

The sociology professor added: "These fundamentalists are unapologetically elitist and have offered cultural and nationalistic justifications for political authoritarianism. They have also generated some popular sentiments against Western cultural influences in China, including western socio-political philosophies, including liberalism."

The only piece of evidence Yang had thrown up was the signing of an open letter by ten Chinese PhD students arguing against Christmas celebrations.

Even so, Yang concluded that "if this trend continues without restraint, the Confucianists revival movement will likely make Christianity the direct target of attacks, as occurred in the Boxer Rebellion around 1900 and the anti-Christian movement in the 1920s. History is likely to repeat itself."

More evidence is needed to support your conclusion, Prof Yang. And besides, what is the linkage between the revival of Confucianism and the attack on Christianity? Why should one necessarily lead to the other?

Soviet Persecution Of Koreans

Koreans began immigrating to the Soviet Union after 1860.

In the 1920s, Korean population in the Russian Far East (pictured) stood at an estimated 250,000.

According to Jeanyoung Lee, "the motivation of the Korean immigration to Russia at that time was the same as that of the Korean immigrants in Manchuria, to escape hunger and the Japanese rule in Korea." (Ethnic Korean Migration in Northeast Asia)

Russian citizenship was allowed, and by 1914, about a third of the Korean immigrants had become Russian citizens.

"Unlike in Manchuria, there were visible signs of successful assimilation of Koreans into the Russian communities. Many were converted to the Orthodox Church and Russified their names," Lee wrote, adding that "the Sovietization of the Koreans were completed in 1920."

But it was during this period that the Koreans sent a petition for the establishment of a Far Eastern Korean People's Republic to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

The move was said to be influenced by the decision of the Soviet government to form the Jewish Autonomous Republic in Birobidzhan.

The petition was denied in 1929.

Along with the petition, some Korean farmers protested and clashed with Russians over better agricultural machinery and more land that were received by Russian collective farms.

The Soviet local government was also alarmed by the waves of Korean and Chinese immigrants into the Soviet Far East.

Hence, by the early 1930s, Stalin labelled Koreans and other ethnic minorities "class enemies" and forcibly transferred them to labor camps.

It was not until 1936 that the migration of Koreans to Central Asia became massive. At least 118,000 Koreans were forced to move to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. By 1939, the number of Koreans in Central Asia had reached 182,300.

Before the transfer, the Soviet government executed more than 2,500 Korean Communists, mostly leaders of the Korean community in the Far East.

China's Repatriation of North Koreans

China's repatriation of North Koreans is apparently not a contem-porary pheno-menon.

According to an article (Ethnic Korean Migration in Northeast Asia) by Jeanyoung Lee from Kyunghee University, during the Qing dynasty, the Chinese court had agreed in a treaty with Choson (Korea) to repatriate Koreans who had migrated to Manchuria, which is today's Northeastern China.

The Choson court (pictured) wanted to prevent Koreans from migrating "for fear of losing tax revenues and to ensure the safety of the border with China."

After they were repatriated, convicted Korean criminals were reportedly beheaded.

History is fascinating as it, among other things, helps shed light on contemporary developments.

CCP Party Congresses

The 18th Party Congress will not be held until 2012, but it is almost for sure that it will be held. But this predict-ability has not always been the case.

In the Chinese Communist Party's 85-year history, it is only during the last two decades that the the Party Congress has "gradually been institutionalized and followed increasingly predictable patterns." (Wang Zhengxu, What to Expect From the 17th Party Congress, in Interpreting China's Development, Ed. Wang Gungwu and John Wong, World Scientific Publishing, 2007).

In the Party's early years, its first six Congresses were held in the space of seven years, from 1921 to 1928.

The Congress did not meet again until 18 years later, in 1945 after the Long March.

The Eighth Congress met in 1956, 11 years after the Seventh, while the Ninth did not meet until 13 years later in 1969, followed four years later by the 10th Congress in 1973.

"The arrest of the Gang of Four and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 made another Party Congress inevitable, which met in 1977," Wang wrote.

It is only under Deng Xiaoping that the Party Congress began to stabilize. Since the 12th Congress in 1982, Party Congresses have met every five years.

And starting from the 14th Congress in 1992, the Congress "gradually assumed two important roles: succession and consensus building."

"Now at every Party Congress there is either succession or adjustments to the top Party leadership, and an emphatic effort by the Party to achieve ideological unity. At the 17th Party Congress, this pattern will be institutionalized even further," Wang noted.

One major function of the Party Congress is for the Party leadership to set the ideological platform of the Party.

"The work report read at the opening session of each Congress normally bears the most significance in expressing the Party's ideological thinking and policy orientations. This report always gives a comprehensive reexamination to the Party's work record in the past five years, while at the same time setting the goals and directions for the Party for the coming years. One or a few central concepts are emphasized in official documents throughout the Congress, and will dominate Party discourse in the years to come. By informing party members of the most important goals and policy directions of the Party, the leadership hopes to achieve ideological unity within the Party."

For instance, the 12th Congress in 1982 officially embarked on economic reforms, the 13th of 1987 recognized China as being at the preliminary stage of socialism, and the 14th of 1992 called for transition into socialist market economy.

The 15th Congress of 1997 (pictured) called for the whole nation to strive toward a comprehensive well-off society by the end of the century, while at the 16th of 2002, the Theory of the Three Represents was officially hailed.

As for the most recent 17th Congress, the concepts of scientific development, building a harmonious society, and ensuring sustainable and even development were officially endorsed.

Early Catholicism in Korea

Apart from the religious aspects, Catholicism also made other contri-butions to Korea.

For instance, it was the first to officially recognize and even popularize hangul (the Korean writing, pictured), at a time where only Chinese characters were officially recognized and mastered only by the aristocratic class.

In the 1860s, Catholic hymns and translated texts defending Catholicism and its doctrines were written and printed in hangul in large numbers. They were said to have contributed to the development of Korean literature.

In the latter half of the 19th century, the church even issued orders to believers to teach their children hangul, wrote Cho Kwang (The Meaning of Catholicism in Korean History, Translated by Ch'oe Mi-hwa, in The Founding of Catholic Tradition in Korea, Ed. Chai-Shin Yu, Asian Humanities Press 2004).

Catholicism had also introduced for the first time a concept which was unheard of during the late Chosun dynasty - "the possibility of a new political system in which the ruler could be selected."

The system of selecting the Pope was said to have "dealt a considerable shock to the ruling class of that time", who in turn responded by deriding Catholicism as "a religion without a king."

The Catholic doctrine had also influenced eminent scholars such as Chong Yak-yong who in a dissertation opposed the existence of hereditary kings and appointment of officials on the basis of blood ties.

"In other words, he made it clear that all who held public posts should be deprived of their positions unless they won popular approval," wrote Cho.

Overall, Catholicism was rejected by the ruling elites who dismissed it as a "foreign import."

But a movement demanding cultural opening argued that if that was the case, why did the Koreans used Chinese characters which was also a foreign import.

"They also pointed out that Buddhist thought and Taoist thought were not native to Korea but had their origin in China or Central Asia. Pointing out also that many things foreign in origin were used daily in life, they asked why Catholicism was rejected while Buddhism was recognized."

I think the simple answer about acceptance or otherwise lies in whether or not the doctrine/teachings in question were a threat to the authorities' hold on power.

History of Catholicism in Korea

The Catholic church was founded in Korea in 1784.

Yi Sung-hun returned from Beijing after being baptized there, and held a meeting at the home of Kim Pom-u, now the site of Myongdong Cathedral in downtown Seoul (pictured).

Observed Cho Kwang, "the Catholic Church was established in this manner by Koreans for themselves without aid from foreign missionaries," (The Meaning of Catholicism in Korean History by Cho Kwang, Translated by Ch'oe Mi-hwa, in The Founding of Catholic Tradition in Korea, Ed. Chai-Shin Yu, Asian Humanities Press 2004)

Western missionaries who arrived in China suggested that Confucianism and Catholicism were not mutually opposed to each other, as the latter was "able to supplement what was insufficient in Catholicism." But such a view was rejected by Confucian intellectuals and even by the Catholic Church itself.

This, coupled with Catholics who made it clear that their aim was to reject the traditional social order and re-creating the Catholic faith as their own, made it easier for authorities to suppress the faith.

Cho also noted that Catholicism gained acceptance in Korea as it was a "stimulant for the formation of a modern society", given that Chosun dynasty was "in the process of collapse" during the latter half of the 18th century.

This led to the emergence of various movements aimed at modernization, and Catholicism stood out as a progressive force due to its emphasis on equality, and respect for women and children.

Chosun Prosecution of Catholics

Catholicism is now a mainstream religion in (South) Korea, but this has not always been the case.

During the late Chosun dynasty, authorities saw Roman Catholicism as a "dangerous heterodoxy that intended a social revolution (The Chosun Government's Measures against Catholicism by Cho Kwang, Translated by Ch'oe Mi-hwa, in The Founding of Catholic Tradition in Korea, Ed. Chai-Shin Yu, Asian Humanities Press 2004)

Authorities attributed their then deepening feeling of crisis to the prevalence of Catholicism, but "were at a loss to account for its popularity among the lower classes."

So counter-measures were taken, including strengthening the Confucian culture, keeping the traditional value system and social order alive, and preventing the spread of Catholicism at the local level.

"If orthodoxy was clarified, they believed, the new heterodoxy would cease; they (also) prohibited the introduction and distribution of Catholic books ... (to deter the "corrupt practice of trading in the vile books")," Cho wrote.

Attempts were also made to persuade Catholics to leave the faith "by both mild means and persecution", and even through exiles and executions.

In 1791, the Chinsan event occurred, where Yun Chi-ch'ung and Kwon Sang-yon - in an attempt to follow Catholic teachings - burned their ancestral tablets.

"They were punished neither as rebels nor as immoralists but were given the punishments prescribed for those who were followers of heterodoxy and grave robbers. They were beheaded as grave robbers."

Earlier on, measures taken to counter Catholicism were milder, and included persuading Catholics to apostatize, granting a stay of execution to those who willingly abandoned Catholicism, and setting people free "after a beating if they had renounced Catholicism due to torture."

But authorities were highly puzzled as to why nobles could become involved in Catholicism.

"Though your position is low, you are still different from the really mean people. Why did you become a Catholic?" - stated a government material.

Cho Kwang noted that ordinary people saw the faith as a way to overcome "the conflict of pre-modern society".

But according to Yi Won-sun, the nobles "thought that Catholicism sought for a better and higher value", and because they hoped "to find an outlet for the human agony in the absurd reality of late Chosun society, not through institutional innovation nor through industrialization, but through searching for the value of a new idea."

"They accepting Catholicism was an effort to seek something for humanity, and they were intellectuals looking forward to the future, " (The Sirhak Scholars' Perspectives on Sohak, in The Founding of Catholic Faith in Korea, Ed. Chai-shin Yu, Asian Humanities Press, 2004).

Yu Dan and Popularizing Confucianism

As someone who had popularized Confucianism in China over the past two years, it probably does not come as a surprise that Yu Dan (于丹) had been criticized by those who argued that she had not been true to the teachings of the ancient sage.

In defence, Yu - a professor in media and communications - pointed out that she had never claimed to be a Confucian scholar, and that her intention was indeed to popularize Confucianism. (我的角度是一种普及的角度.)

"我觉得人家只要抱着一种真诚的意愿，说你哪个地方讲的不够严谨，或者你这种提法站在学理角度是不被允许的，其实对我有好处，可以让我的讲解变得更完善一些。而且，不同的声音越多，越说明更多人关注，这对 《论语》 的解读大有好处。。。我从来不敢说我提供的内容都是正确的，但是我会准确地传递出我的一种感觉，就是圣贤之道它是朴素的，是温暖的，是贴近人心的，它能活在我们的生活里，它能给你解忧。"

("It does benefit me if my critics are sincere, and point out the areas in which I lack rigor, or tell me that from the standpoint of academic theory, such an argument is untenable. These will help me improve my lectures. Moreover, more varied voices also mean that more people are paying attention, and this is good for the re-interpretation of The Analects ... I have never said that the information I have provided are always accurate. But I will always accurately portray my own sentiments, and that is, the ways of the ancient sages are simple and warm, and close to our hearts. They can be relevant to our lives, and help us with our problems.")

Indeed, Yu had often placed much emphasis on the humanism of Confucianism in a way which I would describe as soft, fuzzy, and with a feminine touch.

"《论语》 是什么？我们今天这样奉为经典的一部书，当时不过就是孔子的一些课堂言论，他的学生把笔记整理整理就弄出来了，整理出来的这20篇实际上没有太内在的逻辑体系。我觉得，我们不要以一种过分神化的眼光去把 《论语》 看成一个完整的体系。有时候，把孔子还原成凡人，可能会激发我们心里真正朴素的爱。

("What is The Analects? What we acclaim as a classical text today was merely Confucius' classroom comments which were later put together by his students. The 20 chapters do not really have an inherent system of logic. I feel that we should not cast an overly religious eye by viewing The Analects as a comprehensive system. Sometimes, seeing Confucius as a mortal will help trigger off a true simple love that is within our hearts.")

On her personal voyage in understanding Confucianism, Yu said that in the past, it was the grander and loftier aspects of the ancient text that had appealed to her.

But as she became older, it is the simplicity that called out to her. Such as 仁爱难道离我们很远吗？我要真想做到的话，心中一念它就到我身边来了，or "is love or benevolence really very distant from us? If I really want, I'd utter them in my heart and they'd appear at my side."