The Plight of South Korea's Labor Movement

Ah, one of the topics I find most fascinating written by one of the foremost authority on the issue.

In an article titled Labor Movement in Korea Losing Steam (Insight into Korea, Herald Media 2007), University of Hawaii at Manoa professor Hagen Koo (pictured) painted a picture of Korea's labor movement that is vastly different from general perceptions.

Globally, South Korea is known for its aggressive and militant labor movement and its "endemic strikes."

"At a time when organized labor in most advanced industrialized countries is severely weakened and remains in the doldrums, South Korean labor seems rather unique in demonstrating fresh militancy and class solidarity backed by powerful unions located in heavy and chemical industries."

Foreign investors are said to be "afraid" of the powerful unions when considering whether or not to invest in South Korea, while international labor groups "show great respect for the Korean labor movement in playing a leading role in fighting neoliberal globalization."

However, the reality, according to Koo is that even though Korea's large unions are indeed militant, they hardly make up a strong and cohesive union movement.

The movement currently represents no more than 11 per cent of the active labor force, and union membership is disproportionately made up of employees of larger firms, leaving unprotected the majority of the workforce at smaller enterprises.

Also excluded is the rapidly growing number of irregular workers who now comprise more than half of the national workforce.

Although there is a strong push for building industry unions, the basic structure of Korean unions is that of enterprise unions, "which make it difficult to achieve broad solidarity among workers in diverse job conditions."

"Labor leadership at the national level appears hopelessly divided along ideological and factional lines, failing to offer an effective strategy to deal with serious structural problems faced by the working class in this age of globalism."

Worsening the situation are widespread public dissatisfaction with the militant strategies adopted by large unions in their wage negotiations, coupled with frequent revelations of corruption and violence within union leadership.

With declining public support, and with growing internal division, Koo concluded that the current South Korean labor movement "faces a serious crisis of identity and class solidarity."

Korean Urbanization and Cultural Identity

Even though mass relocation from the Korean countryside took place during the Japanese colonization period, 85 per cent of Koreans were - by the end of the colonial period in 1945 – still classified as rural dwellers.

But the process of urbanization gained momentum after President Park Chung Hee put in place industrialization policies that had ignited the explosive growth of major cities such as Seoul, Busan and Daegu, and new manufacturing centers such as Ulsan, Pohang and Anyang.

That was the observation of California State University East Bay academic Laura Nelson in an article titled The Many Challenges of Urbanization in Korea, (Insight into Korea, Herald Media 2007).

"In a single generation, South Korea "tipped" from an agricultural, rural nation to one that was industrial and urban," Nelson noted.

She added that urbanization sounded like a technical process, whereas in fact it involved wrenching personal and societal changes which can be "voluntary or imposed, enriching or impoverishing" – all of which I am certain applied to Korea.

Massive urbanization also meant that the majority of residents in most Korean cities are now "native-born".

"While just a generation ago, most city dwellers were at the same time learning to live a city life and coping without the support of their extended families, now most South Koreans have no idea how to transplant a rice seedling. Of course, this can (and does) lead to grumbling from the older generation about the loss of "Korean" culture and values."

After four decades of growth, Korean cities are no longer growing at a breathtaking pace. In fact, the two largest cities, Seoul and Busan, lost population between 2000 and 2005, due mainly to intraregional settlement to new developments in the surrounding metropolitan areas.

But clearly, urbanization has also generated what Nelson called "a cultural identity conundrum" for the country. After all, South Koreans often present "Koreanness" to themselves and to the outside world as a cultural heritage rooted in the countryside (pictured).

"Whether the focus is on the Confucian honor of the yangban class or the honesty of the modest farmers, South Koreans produce idealized symbolic images of Korean cultural authenticity that emphasize the rural past rather than the urban present."

Nelson added that the elders' complaints that something significant had been lost "are not entirely groundless", since cultural traditions that were apparent in the countryside were no longer meaningful for urban residents.

For instance, taking care of a family's ancestral burial site is now likely to be seen as a burdensome and time-consuming chore, whereas in the past, doing so brought together an extended family and reaffirmed generational interdependence through cooperation and sharing a common meal.

The Feminization of Poverty in Korea

Dr. Seungsook Moon suggested that Korean women's employment insecurity is linked to “the feminization of poverty in Korea", especially in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

In her article The Rise of Women in Korea: Gains and Obstacles (Insight into Korea, Herald Media 2007), the Vassar College academic said that at the top of women's "sexual hierarchy" in Korea are "married women who have a sexual relationship with one man (their husbands), and thereby enjoy social respectability and receive economic and sexual protection."

"For example, wives can gain access to a range of economic resources tied to their husbands' employment, including family allowance, national pension, national medical insurance, veteran's welfare, and housing."

"Wives as respectable women tend to receive better responses form the courts and the mass media ... when they fall victim to sexual violence committed by other men. But ironically, wives are often ignored when they become victims of sexual violence committed by their own husbands."

At the "second tier of the sexual hierarchy" are "unmarried women who have sexual relationships with men outside the institution of marriage. This group of women is stereotypically perceived to be either loose or selfish."

At the bottom of the hierarchy are "prostitutes who have commercial sexual relationships with multiple men." They are regarded with social disdain and receive little protection, particularly from sexual violence.

Even so, prostitutes are categorized according to the type of customers they cater to. Those who serve Korean men reportedly stood above those who serve foreign customers.

"Lesbian women are largely invisible in the sexual hierarchy of women and occupy an ambiguous position. Like prostitutes, they are deeply stigmatized and receive little economic or physical protection."

Moon noted that despite the faster increase in the level of women's education as compared to men's, an absolute majority of women are employed in insecure and poorly-paid positions that do not allow them to support themselves, let alone their families.

Women with higher education too had not fared very well. For example, in 2003, women's average monthly wages remained at 63 per cent of men's.

"Although educated men's employment conditions have deteriorated because of outsourcing, temporary employment, underemployment, and unemployment, this economic downward spiral has lowered the quality of women's employment more rapidly than men's. The gender difference reveals that women are still considered a secondary work force in the labor market regardless of their educational achievement."

Demographic Changes in Korea

There are many proponents and opponents of the correlation between population growth and economic growth. But among the latter, University of California Berkeley academic John Lie is perhaps one of the most eloquent.

In an article titled Implications of Demographic Changes in Korea (Insight into Korea, Herald Media 2007), Lie argued that economic growth beyond a certain level does not enhance and may in fact erode the quality of life.

Lie said that "it is difficult for me to believe that Seoul’s concrete jungle (pictured) and traffic jams represent the telos of either Korean civilization or human progress. To me, at least, they are aesthetic blights and social disasters."

"Why would it be so terrible to have fewer South Koreans? There will be more space for people and fewer cars on the road. What would ordinary people be giving up if the economy were to enter a steady-state level? In the age of global warming and impending environmental catastrophes, what we least need is a single-minded stress on economic growth that systematically undervalues clean air, healthy living, and leisurely pursuits. What are human beings for? To paraphrase Oscar Wilde, policymakers who obsessively worry about population and economic decline strike me as people who know the price of everything and the value of nothing."

Whoa.

But as for Lie's description "the telos of either Korean civilization or human progress" – what are "telos"? Or was that a typo?