China's Opaque Decision-Making Process

Many observers had written about China's opaque decision-making system, particularly in the aftermath of the collision of a U.S. reconnaissance plane with a Chinese fighter jet in 2001 (otherwise known as the EP-3 incident).

Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders noted that specialists in civilian foreign policy research institutes are reluctant during a period of crisis or leadership conflict "to put controversial analysis forward in a nationalistic policy environment."

Michael Swaine described the policy process as regularized, bureaucratic and consensus-oriented.

Robert Suettinger on the other hand pointed out that "at some point ... Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Wen Jiabao (温家宝) may find themselves in a situation in which they need reliable information, short time-frame decisions, and sound judgment on a foreign policy issue. It is fair to wonder whether the decision-making system currently in place in China - opaque, non-communicative, distrustful, rigidly bureaucratic, inclined to deliver what they think the leaders want to hear, strategically dogmatic, yet susceptible to political manipulation for personal gain - will be up to the task of giving good advice."

Much as I have misgivings about the largely American portrayal of China as the evil perpetrator and the U.S. as the victim in the EP-3 incident, I have to agree with Suettinger's assessment of the decision-making process within the Chinese bureaucracy. But let's not wait for another foreign policy mishap to prove Suettinger right.