Chinese Nationalism Isn't Like A Switch To Be Turn On and Off At Will

I am always a little weary of those who suggest that nationalism is a card that China likes to play, as if it is a "sure-win" option if resorted to.

Such as Murray Scot Tanner who suggested that Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) is likely to "flirt with nationalist appeals if this serves his ends."

Tanner also wrote that it was Hu "who went on Chinese television in May 1999 to address the nation after the errant bombing by the United States of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade." (Murray Scot Tanner, "Hu Jintao's succession: Prospects and Challenges" in "China's Leadership in the 21st Century, Ed David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan)

First of all, given Hu's cautious nature in the years leading up to his eventual succession as President, it seems unlikely that he would volunteer himself for the task. More likely, and according to what I've heard, Hu was "pushed" by former President Jiang Zemin (江泽民) to do the television appearance. So that if anything goes wrong, Hu can take the blame, and if all goes well, Jiang can take the credit.

Secondly, I get the sense that while Beijing was certainly keen to get some political mileage out of the bombing, and hence it condoned, or as some may say, encouraged the few days of demonstrations and protests by mainly students outside the U.S. Embassy, there is also the very real fear that things might spiral out of control, and which explained why the demonstrations were broken up after 3-4 days. Indeed, the last thing the Chinese leadership wanted to see were demonstrations that began as nationalistic in nature, but ended up anti-communist and anti-regime.

Nationalism is a card that Chinese leaders had, and will continue to play, but if handled indelicately, it could be a double-edged sword. Nationalism isn't like a switch whereby Beijing can turn on and off at will, and I am pretty sure its leaders are astute enough to realize that.